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Cassius Dio, Competition and the Decline of the Roman Republic

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Submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Philosophy

School of Humanities

College of Arts

University of Glasgow

September 30th, 2016

Abstract

Cassius Dio, Competition and the Decline of the Roman Republic

This thesis argues that Dio's narrative of the Late Republic constitutes a sophisticated and consistent interpretation of the fall of the Republican governmental form, centred on competition. In Dio's narrative, institutionally generated political competition is the central destructive factor of the Late Republic, which causes its deterioration and eventual collapse. This competition was inherent to the Republic according to Dio but underwent a destructive transformation in the Late Republic and Dio hereby presents an institutional explanation for the decline of the Republic.

The discussion is divided into an introduction, two thematic chapters and two chapters containing case studies, all of which include a number of subchapters each. Chapter 1 ("Introduction") presents the argument and the scholarly tradition on Dio's Late Republic, and hereafter examines Dio's fundamental ideas about and perspectives on competition. Chapter 2 ("Dio and the sources for the Late Republic") compares Dio with the parallel sources for the events surrounding Lucullus and his command, the *lex Gabinia* and the Catilinarian Conspiracy. Through this, I will argue that Dio manipulated and selected his material carefully in order to present and strengthen an original interpretation in which competition is central. Chapter 3 ("Dio and the annalistic method") examines Dio's use of the annalistic tradition and, via a main focus on elections, omens and legislation, demonstrates that Dio was highly selective in his use of annalistic material as he only incorporated it when it furthered his interpretative aims.

Chapter 4 ("A diachronic analysis of Book 36") argues that Dio incorporated his main exploration of external competition in Book 36, and through skilful manipulation and structuring of the narrative, created a cumulative interrelation between individual parts of the book. This interrelation furthered the communication and strengthening of Dio's overarching interpretative framework centred on institutional competition. Chapter 5 ("Book 39 and competition in practice") asserts that Book 39 is Dio's central investigation of internal competition and its intimate connection to the fall of the Republic. To support and communicate this, Dio again creates a sophisticated interrelation within the book, which presents violence, bribery and political manipulation as central tools used by dynasts

to further their ambition. Thus Dio here further strengthens his explanation of the fall of the Republic, where institutionally generated competition is the central focal point.

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Acknowledgements

A thesis is never the work of one person alone and this is indeed the case here as well. I have received many types of support from a range of different people who all deserve my heartfelt gratitude. Words are paltry vehicles for conveying this feeling of gratitude but I shall try here nonetheless. Firstly, I would like to thank Catherine Steel and Christopher Burden-Strevens who have been exemplary supervisors and whose contributions and encouragements have been invaluable. I arrived in Glasgow full of ideas about Dio and the Late Republic but my supervisors have been instrumental in helping me organise and develop these ideas into a meaningful and presentable piece of work.

I also extend my gratitude to Jesper Majbom Madsen who was the original source of inspiration for many of these ideas. However, I am even more thankful to him for luring me into the world of Classics in my early years of History at SDU, and especially for stimulating me, through a healthy dose of friendly sternness, to seriously pursue this subject at universities abroad. Lisa Hau and Henriette van der Blom certainly also deserve mention for their valuable and generous advice at a critical juncture in the project.

My family of course deserves my sincerest gratefulness as well. Especially my father has always been an intellectual role model and has encouraged me to explore different academic areas since I was boy. This encouragement has been fundamental in my ultimate choice of pursuing a career in academia. My grandfather's characteristically modest but always kind Jutlandic praise and encouragement have also served as an important motivation in my university life. I am also deeply grateful to my mother and grandmother for their unwavering and unqualified support and kindness which have been keenly felt even from across the sea. Finally, I extend unreserved thanks to my endlessly loving and supportive partner Myriam whose kind words and affectionate support during hard times have been invaluable.

1: Introduction

Cassius Dio has generally been portrayed as a crude and simplistic historian who is supposed to have had no “specific aim in view save that of composing the work [of his history] itself”.¹ This view has been highly influential: the *Historia Romana* has since Millar almost exclusively been seen as unoriginal and overly influenced by Dio’s own time, even by the newest works on the historian.² I, however, will argue that Dio structured his work in a sophisticated and premeditated manner and that he approached and interpreted the Late Republic according to an overarching interpretative framework. This framework centred on the competition for offices and commands that emerged from the institutional composition of the Republic, and Dio viewed this institutionally generated competition as the central destructive factor in the Late Republic. This period played a significant role in Dio’s overall work and he manipulated, structured and selected his material carefully in order to bring out his institutional explanation of the fall of the Republic.

The idea that the Late Republic succumbed to degeneration is almost canonical in Roman historiography of the first century onwards. However, Dio’s incorporation of Late Republican competition at the centre of an institutional explanation of this degeneration, as opposed to the character-driven narratives of other writers, is highly original.³ Furthermore, this portrayal is not merely a commentary on Dio’s own time; rather it is an exploration of the Late Republic on its own terms. Moreover, Dio has often been criticised for a poor understanding of the Republic⁴ but modern scholars have also frequently focused on the institutional problems of the Roman Republic as a cause for its downfall.⁵ Commonly, they too attempt to detract from the importance of individuals and see the problems of the Republic in a broader perspective that is not solely concentrated on Caesar and Pompey. Dio is therefore in fact the ancient source that most closely resembles modern explanations. These assertions amount to a comprehensive rejection of central parts of both older and newer scholarship. I will achieve this by exploring a hitherto relatively untouched area, namely Dio’s narrative of the Late Republic. Only Rees, Burden-Strevens

¹ Millar (1964) 73.

² See e.g. Rees (2011); Kemezis (2014).

³ See pp. 14-15 for an explanation of these two types of history.

⁴ Schwartz (1899) 1690-1691; Millar (1964) 47-49; Lintott (1997) 2514-2517.

⁵ Meier (1966) sees a crisis without alternative, at least for the period from 49; Brunt (1971) argues for social conflicts; Millar (1998) concentrates on the people; Steel (2013) focuses on the senate.

and Kemezis have so far accorded this period focused study but the former two, especially Burden-Strevens, focus on Dio's speeches, whereas Kemezis concentrates on more general narrative strategies and largely passes over the detailed narrative. The above works are certainly important advances in the study of Dio but the lack of close attention to the narrative constitutes a hole in the scholarship, which undermines attempts at rehabilitating Dio as a more capable historian. No scholar has thus so far analysed Dio's narrative choices outside the speeches in the detailed, sustained manner that I propose.

This new approach to Dio is sorely needed as Millar's simplistic assessment has had consequences far broader than the field of Dionean studies itself; Dio has as a result been used far too uncritically in modern works about the Late Republic where he is commonly held in low esteem as incompetent and unreliable, but also uncomplicated. However, he remains one of the most frequently used sources for the Late Republic and his is one of the fullest surviving works on Roman history. The frequent use of a supposedly unreliable and crude historian is deeply problematic and is seen clearly in a range of seminal works on the Late Republic as for example Scullard (1959), Gruen (1974) and Millar (1998) all use Dio regularly but include no sustained methodological considerations of Dio's work or the ways in which it can be used as a source.⁶ Millar's index even reveals that Dio is the most used historian in his entire work.⁷ One of the fuller considerations of Dio as a source in a general work about the Late Republic is Steel (2013): "Appian, and the slightly later, Cassius Dio are inescapable, but their distance, chronologically and intellectually, from what they describe cannot be ignored".⁸ This approach to Dio is certainly understandable due to the uncritical attitude towards the historian in specialist scholarship but also highlights the lack of complex methodological considerations regarding Dio despite his admitted importance. A more critical approach to Dio is needed. However, this must be founded on a deeper and more complex understanding of the *Historia Romana* in itself and the role of the Late Republic herein. It is with this important understanding that my thesis is concerned.

Previous scholarly work on Dio and the Late Republic, or rather the lack thereof, only emphasises the need for further exploration of this field; the scholarly attention before Millar's seminal book *A Study of Cassius Dio* (1964) was focused on *Quellenforschung*

⁶ See e.g. Scullard (1959) 126.

⁷ Millar (1998) 231-232: used a full 42 times.

⁸ Steel (2013) 6-7.

and included a highly critical view of Dio. Reimarus⁹ and Gutschmid¹⁰ did praise Dio but these are lonely voices in the pre-Millar literature as Haupt's *Jahresberichte* from 1882 and 1884 demonstrate.¹¹ Haupt here gives an overview of the thoroughly negative view of Dio in this period and concurs for example by arguing that Dio's primary use is not as a source but rather as a tool to reconstruct lost, supposedly better sources.¹² This negative view of Dio was widespread also outside the German tradition as it found expression in for instance English, French and Italian scholarship as well.¹³ This critical strand climaxed in the most influential work before Millar, namely Schwartz's entry in the *Realencyclopädie*. Schwartz, as his predecessors, mainly focused on establishing Dio's sources and is highly critical. However, despite criticism of Dio's understanding of the Republic, an important part of the condemnation is centred on Dio's writing style: Schwartz asserts that the Late Republic was ripe for narrating, but under Dio's clumsy hands it became "einer grauen formlosen Masse"¹⁴ that is unpleasing and rather disguises history than teaches it.¹⁵ These hostile comments owe something to the writing style of nineteenth century German scholars but also reveal an important reason for the disregard and low esteem that Dio has experienced even to this day: Dio was criticised and deemed a poor source in older scholarship largely due to a negative assessment of his writing style. When stated explicitly, this is plainly unjustified as historical reliability and usefulness as a source on the one hand and stylistic merit on the other ought to be separated, but the approach has been highly influential nonetheless.

The influence of this view is for example clearly seen also in Millar's monograph from 1964 which remains by far the most comprehensive work on Dio to date: "Dio's History is, to say the least, not a literary work of the first rank. It is hardly surprising that he has been used mainly as a source of individual facts and examined simply for his 'credibility'."¹⁶ This is a clear continuation of the previous scholarship, exemplified forcefully by Schwartz, as Dio's supposed faults as a writer are projected onto his abilities as a historian, which is of course logically untenable. Recent works tend to draw a sharp line between scholarship before and after Millar.¹⁷ However, the pre-Millar critique of Dio the historian

⁹ Reimarus (1750) IX.

¹⁰ Gutschmid (1894) 548.

¹¹ See also these for previous scholarship which I will not treat here.

¹² Haupt (1882) 146; (1884) 679.

¹³ Micaella (1896); Jullian (1901); Columba (1902); Vlachos (1905).

¹⁴ Schwartz (1899) 1689.

¹⁵ Schwartz (1899) 1689-1691.

¹⁶ Millar (1964) 28.

¹⁷ Burden-Strevens (2015) 6; see also Rees (2011) 1-6.

through his writing style is clearly seen in both Millar and the subsequent scholarship where especially Dio's penchant for rhetoric is criticised.¹⁸ Yet, Millar's work did also herald a shift in the scholarly perspective on Dio since it decisively broke with *Quellenforschung* as Millar wrote that "the search for a proto-Dio is futile."¹⁹ Millar adds that without further knowledge of the working methods of ancient historians, "source-criticism is mere speculation".²⁰ This is an important and noteworthy advance as Dio himself is now accorded attention rather than merely seen as a tool to reconstruct lost sources.

However, Millar is hardly more forgiving towards Dio as a historian than his continental predecessors:

"the long years of working through the whole of Roman history brought Dio to formulate no general historical views whatsoever. The sheer effort of note-taking and composition absorbed his energies and left no time for analysis or interpretation, and what he produced was a history whose justification lay simply in being itself, a continuous literary record which began at the beginning and went on as far as its author could take it. The opinions he expresses are therefore incidental, and largely called into existence by the demands of literary form."²¹

The idea that Dio lacked aims or framework and simply desired to write a history is perhaps Millar's most important legacy as it has reverberated in the scholarly debate ever since. A connected assertion of Millar's is that Dio was unoriginal and especially the Late Republic supposedly left little room for originality: "For Dio who came to it only as part of the whole sweep of Roman history, the chances of dealing with it in a way that was profound or original were small indeed."²² The vastness of Dio's work thus precluded any original perspectives, which is of course connected to Dio's alleged lack of broader historical views. A final important legacy of Millar is the connection of Dio's history to his own time: "In Dio we can see not only the perspective of Roman history available to a man who was born in the reign of Marcus Aurelius and lived into that of Severus Alexander, but also, **not in his contemporary history alone**, the reactions of a conservative observer to an age full of stress and change."²³ Millar here argues that Dio's own time is

¹⁸ Millar (1964) 42-45 and e.g. Berrigan (1966) 59; Piatowski (1974); Wirth (1985) 35-37; Gowing (1992) 289.

¹⁹ Millar (1964) 85.

²⁰ Millar (1964) VIII.

²¹ Millar (1964) 118.

²² Millar (1964) 46.

²³ Millar (1964) VII (my emphasis).

fundamental to understanding his history in general. Millar's main assertions, namely that Dio had no framework, that he was unoriginal and that his history was significantly influenced by his own time, have been ever present in subsequent works on Dio's Late Republic²⁴ of which the most critical is perhaps the acidic article by Lintott from 1997.²⁵ However, Millar's rejection of *Quellenforschung* has been less influential as many of these works, especially those concerned with the Gallic Wars, have focused on this area. One work in particular has stood out in the decades after Millar, namely Fechner's from 1986 on Dio's Republic. It includes only scant attention to the Late Republic but Fechner presents the novel assertion that Dio was in fact a supporter of an ideal Republic and far more critical of the move to the Principate than previously acknowledged.²⁶

In the 2010s Dio and his Late Republic have come under increased revision.²⁷ This is clearly seen in Rees' PhD from 2011 which argues that Dio has a historical framework centred on human nature. This is a development of the psychological and moral perspective started by Hose in 1994 and subsequently championed by both Sion-Jenkis (2000) and Kuhn-Chen (2002), in which a static human nature was argued to be central to Dio's work.²⁸ However, in contrast to these authors, Rees argues that human nature in Dio changes according to external influences and is the prime cause for the downfall of the Republic.²⁹ Yet, Millar's arguments still influence the account as Rees asserts that Dio's Caesar is conventional³⁰ and that Dio differs from the parallel sources, "if he differs at all, only in the *intensity* of his account. [...] he might have struggled to make his mark on a well-worn period."³¹ This is a clear continuation of Millar's assertion that Dio was unoriginal. Furthermore, Rees mirrors Millar's focus on Dio's own times as he argues that Dio presents "detailed recommendations for the kind of man the emperor needs to engage,

²⁴ Most recently Kemezis (2014). Scholarship is often focused on speeches: e.g. Stekelenburg (1976); Steidle (1988); Martinelli (1989); Claassen (1996); Gowing (1998) or the Gallic Wars: e.g. Sordi (1971); Zecchini (1978); Cipriani (1978); McDougall (1991). See also the general work of Harrington (1970) that has attracted little attention but also offers negligible new perspectives.

²⁵ Lintott (1997).

²⁶ Fechner (1986) 98-107, 130-131.

²⁷ See also the new commentaries of Lachenaud and Coudry with sensible introductions: (2011); (2014).

²⁸ Hose (1994) 436; Sion-Jenkis (2000) 184-185; Kuhn-Chen (2002) 243-246. The latter asserts that human nature could be tempered by education. Sion-Jenkis (2000) 96-101 additionally sees the involvement of the people in government as a central problem for Dio.

²⁹ Rees (2011) 6-7.

³⁰ Rees (2011) 186-189.

³¹ Rees (2011) 4.

which derive from his explanation of the rise, fall and rebirth of the Roman state”.³² Dio’s work was thus again formed by his own time according to Rees.

This argument is further seen in Kemezis’ important work whose whole premise rests on this position.³³ Kemezis argues: “Readers would naturally have asked what was new or original, what Dio was adding to the existing record. Dio might have given many answers, but the most interesting from our point of view relates to the Severan context.”³⁴ Dio’s own time is again of central importance but Millar’s argument that Dio was unoriginal is also evident. Kemezis is generally positive towards Dio but simultaneously, in a further continuation of Millar, includes criticisms of Dio’s lack of skill and historical framework: “Dio seldom if ever applies to any one incident the analytical acumen of a Polybius or a Thucydides, and he does not show the talent those historians do for condensing complex stretches of history into a compelling framework of causal explanation. At the detail level, Dio can indeed be conventional and sometimes downright banal”.³⁵ As shown above, Millar’s work is clearly still highly influential in general and forms the foundation on which Dio is evaluated in even the most recent scholarly works. Only a single work appears to have rejected Millar more categorically, namely Burden-Strevens’ from 2015. He argues that Dio had an interpretative framework focused on both political and moral aspects, which was innovatively incorporated in speeches and that this framework was concerned with the Late Republic rather than with Dio’s own times.³⁶ Forthcoming volumes of articles on Dio promise to continue this firmer revision of the historian,³⁷ but Burden-Strevens’ work so far stands alone.

1.1: Methodological considerations

However, before the chapters can commence, a brief explanation of key terms is necessary in order to create clarity throughout the thesis. The “overarching interpretative framework” is central here: by this term, I mean a premeditated perspective formed during reading and notetaking but before writing, governing the interpretation of long-term periods of Roman history. More specifically, Dio thought competition to be the most

³² Rees (2011) 255.

³³ Kemezis (2014) 11-14.

³⁴ Kemezis (2014) 103.

³⁵ Kemezis (2014) 93.

³⁶ Burden-Strevens (2015) 85, 167-174, 254-258.

³⁷ See e.g. Kemezis (forthcoming 2016); Burden-Strevens (forthcoming 2016); Coudry (forthcoming 2016).

destructive institutional factor in the Late Republic, which therefore constitutes a framework in which this period as a whole is conceived. This is central as the assertion that Dio had an overarching interpretative framework stands in sharp contrast to previous scholarship.

Competition in itself also deserves clarification³⁸ as this is, I shall argue, the central problem in Dio's interpretation of the decline of the Republic. Since Dio's history is essentially politically focused, this competition also becomes political in nature: individuals struggle for different types of political resources such as prestige, offices, military victories, commands, alliances, money and other elements that can be used to further the political goals of one's political group, family or oneself. This political competition in the Late Republic can often be identified by its egoistic aspect as the good of the state is frequently disregarded and the political advancement of the individual or his group is prioritised instead. This egoism is regularly highlighted through linguistic markers of which the most prominent are φιλοτιμία and φθόνος. It should be noted that φιλοτιμία is typical of classical Greek philosophy where it in fact also had a positive meaning.

Dio's history, and therefore the competition therein, is essentially split into an internal and an external sphere: internally, the competition revolves around the political world of elections, laws and decrees, and is essentially organised around Rome. Externally, on the other hand, the competition is fundamentally focused on wars and the attainment of prestige, alliances and monetary resources through military victories. It is important at this point to note that Dio himself never includes an explicit definition of competition and one should therefore be careful not to construct an overly rigid or categorical definition. I have therefore chosen to operate with a broad definition where acts based on political ambition and attempts to attain political goals, both internally in Rome and externally among the generals, as well as efforts to hinder the attainment of these by others, are seen as competition. More specifically, competition most often, but not always, manifests itself in the pursuit of offices and foreign commands.

However, this definition is not merely conjured up for argumentative convenience but is instead rooted in the Republican institutional composition itself and in Dio's own perception of political competition in the Late Republic. Firstly, the Republican governmental form with a limited number of offices naturally meant that a large number of

³⁸ See also Lindholmer (forthcoming 2017).

politicians strove for the same goals and any act by an individual to obtain these therefore affected numerous other actors who would oppose and compete with this individual and each other.³⁹ Secondly, in this period Dio in fact describes political competition as a zero-sum game where all attempts to further one's own interest impinge upon other political actors. This is clear in Dio's interpretation of the reasons for Pompey's desire for the consulship:

“The fact, however, that Caesar's influence was increasing [...] was a cruel thorn in Pompey's side (δεινῶς αὐτὸν ἤνία). So ambitious was he (φιλοτιμία ἐχρήτο) that he undertook to disparage and undo all that he himself had helped to gain for Caesar, and that he was displeased with him both because he was greatly praised and because he was overshadowing his own exploits, and he blamed the people because they slighted him and were excessively enthusiastic over Caesar. Especially was he vexed to see that they remembered the former achievements of a man just so long as nothing new occurred, that they rushed with the greatest haste to each new achievement, even if it were inferior to that which had preceded, because they became tired of the usual and liked the novel, and that, actuated by envy (ὑπὸ τοῦ φθόνου), they overthrew everyone who had once been in high repute, but, urged on by their hopes, helped to exalt one who was just emerging. Because of this he was vexed (δι' οὗν ταῦτα δυσχεραίνων)”.⁴⁰

The power and influence of Pompey is here clearly linked to Caesar in an inverse relationship where every success of the latter undermines the former.⁴¹ However, Dio also underlines that this interrelation between the influence and achievements of different politicians is a general aspect of Roman politics that is not merely confined to Caesar and Pompey, which accords with the actual form of Republican government. Roman politics is thus described as a zero-sum game, which justifies my broad definition where all attempts to secure political advancement or hinder others in this respect are seen as political competition. This clear correlation between Dio's view of competition and my definition of it is important as the definition hereby also points to Dio's main interpretative interest, namely the process and mechanisms of competition in the Late Republic rather than the ambition of individuals, as I will show. The above definitions are necessary as they will create a foundation on which subsequent reasoning can be built and will make the conclusions of the thesis sharper and more focused.

³⁹ See e.g. Steel (2013) 49-53; Lintott (1968).

⁴⁰ Cass. Dio 39.25.1-26.1. Adapted from Cary (1914-1927). All translations of Dio are from Cary (1914-1927), and for other quoted authors, I have likewise used the Loeb Classical Library. Any adaptations of the translations have been noted, as here.

⁴¹ See also Kuhn-Chen (2002) 179 on φθόνος.

Furthermore, Dio's notion of political competition also demonstrates his resistance to traditional interpretations based on moral decline. It is not, in contrast to other ancient writers, the character of Caesar or Pompey that is at fault in the above quote, but rather the process of competition. The "process of competition" in this thesis signifies the tools and mechanisms through which competition was performed. As an example, in Book 39, Dio demonstrates the destructive process of competition in the Late Republic as violence, bribery and political manipulation are rife, which stands in sharp contrast to the traditional, peaceful ideal process of competition based on public speaking and constitutional acts.⁴² The process of competition has in short degenerated markedly. This destructive and institutionally generated competition in the Late Republic constitutes an "institutional problem" for Dio: institutional competition, for example for offices or commands, is part of the very foundations of the Republic but has degenerated and turned destructive in itself, a transformation where the dynasts become manifestations rather than causes. Dio thus posits an institutional rather than a character-driven interpretation of the Late Republic, centred on the destructively transformed process of institutional competition, the central problem of this period according to Dio. Dio does of course accord individuals importance and all the parallel sources do not completely disregard political institutions. However, a notable difference remains: the parallel sources centre on the individuals set in a political world, whereas this political world is Dio's main area of investigation and the characters become tools herein. Essentially, while the Republic in other accounts is driven to destruction mainly by the leading characters, Dio posits the institutional makeup of the Republic itself and the consequent destructive competition as the central driving force that locks the individuals in a certain behavioural pattern as seen in the quotation above.⁴³

The difference between these two types of history writing can also be clearly illustrated through the types of turning points focused upon by the different writers. The parallel sources centre for instance on the meeting at Luca, Julia's death or Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon.⁴⁴ Dio by contrast even omits both Luca and Caesar's crossing, and Julia's death is moved chronologically in order to detract from its importance as I will show later. Instead the *lex Gabinia* is a central turning point for Dio and the consequences and problems of this law are inherently institutional in nature: the speeches surrounding the *lex* highlight the shortcomings of the traditional institution of magistracies and the need for a

⁴² Dio, however, also partly breaks with this idealisation: Libourel (1974); Burden-Strevens and Lindholmer (forthcoming 2017).

⁴³ For the behavioural pattern see Kemezis (2014) 101-102.

⁴⁴ See pp. 83-84.

sole commander in a vast empire, while also emphasising the threat this command, itself essentially the product of competition, would pose to the Republican constitution.⁴⁵ In short, Dio focuses on the *lex* because it allows him to highlight and interpret central institutional problems that were complex and fundamental to the Roman Republic. This also illustrates Dio's reasons for downplaying the common turning points as these were too simple and singular to allow the more institutional focus that permeates Dio's work. In relation to the *lex Gabinia*, the parallel sources, contrastingly, focus on Pompey the individual rather than on the wider consequences.⁴⁶ Another fundamental period for Dio is the years 57-54,⁴⁷ described in Book 39. As I will show in chapter 5, Dio here presents destructive competition most forcefully as a central driving force in the eventual fall of the Republic. This focus again permits Dio to articulate and support his institutional interpretation and move away from the singular causes seen in other sources. These different turning points are emblematic of the types of interpretations of Republican history presented by the authors: the parallel sources focus mainly on the individual characters and organise their causal explanations and interpretations around them. Dio, on the other hand, explains historical change institutionally, primarily through the perspective of destructive competition, and detracts from the importance of the usual main players. The difference between these two historical approaches is central since it facilitates and supports the assertion that Dio was an original historian with an independent scope, as I will show throughout the thesis.

However, this institutional perspective centred on competition is central not only to the Late Republic but to the Republic as a whole. Libourel already in 1974⁴⁸ argued that Dio's Early Republic was far less idealised than in other sources and Sion-Jenkis in 2000 briefly echoed this idea, which I also develop and expand in a forthcoming article.⁴⁹ This is not surprising since Dio himself, in the aftermath of the murder of Caesar, even asserts that "if ever there has been a prosperous democracy, it has in any case been at its best for only a brief period (γε βραχεῖ χρόνῳ ἤκμασεν), so long, that is, as the people had neither the numbers nor the strength sufficient to cause insolence to spring up among them as the result of good fortune or jealousy as the result of ambition (φθόνους ἐκ φιλοτιμίας)."⁵⁰ This "βραχεῖ χρόνῳ" cannot be held to cover the whole Republic before the fall of

⁴⁵ Cass. Dio 36.33-34; Burden-Strevens (2015) 140-144.

⁴⁶ See pp. 25-29.

⁴⁷ All historical years are BC unless otherwise noted.

⁴⁸ Libourel (1974); see also (1968).

⁴⁹ Sion-Jenkis (2000) 90-91; Lindholmer (forthcoming 2017).

⁵⁰ Cass. Dio 44.2.3.

Carthage and Dio even underscores the brevity by the emphatic γε. Furthermore, Dio asserts that competition, here seen in the shape of φθόνος and φιλοτιμία, is inherently linked to the δημοκρατία.

This assertion also accords with the very inception of Dio's work where he in relation to Romulus and Remus argued that equality necessarily breeds competition: "so, no doubt, it is ordered by Nature that whatever is human shall not submit to be ruled by that which is like it and familiar to it, partly through jealousy, partly through contempt of it."⁵¹ This is of course not merely a comment on the problem of co-regency, which plays a relatively limited role in Dio's work, but also on human nature and on the Republic since this governmental form in Dio's eyes was fundamentally based on equality, especially equality of opportunity (ισομοιρία) and equality before the law (ισονομία).⁵² According to Dio's above assertion, it is therefore no surprise that competition would particularly proliferate in the zero-sum, equality based Republic. Any attempt to increase one's influence would diminish that of others, which would in turn engender jealousy and more competition. This notion that equality breeds competition is yet again clearly seen when the Roman king Tullius fights the Alban Mettius after he realises that an alliance is impossible "owing to the inherent disposition of men to quarrel with their equals (ἐκ τῆς ἐμφύτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τε τὸ ὅμοιον φιλονεικίας) and to desire to rule others."⁵³ These examples are of course from the regal period but Dio emphasises that the lessons to be learned about the problems of power-sharing are universal through his focus on human nature. These problems would logically flourish in the Roman Republic since this system was fundamentally based on power sharing through the offices and their collegiality. This is central as it shows that competition was part of the very fabric of the Republic but then proceeded to deteriorate in destructive fashion in the Late Republic. Rome's deterioration in itself is commonplace but its incorporation into an institutional explanation centred on competition is, as I will show in chapter 2, original. Dio's view of δημοκρατία, grounded as it is in his philosophical conception of ισομοιρία and ισονομία, is important as it suggests the presence of the rational, overarching principles in Dio's view on government for which this thesis is going to argue.

⁵¹ Cass. Dio F 5.12.

⁵² Fechner (1986) 37-39.

⁵³ Cass. Dio F 7.3.

Competition was certainly present in the Early and Mid-Republic but never became inherently destructive as ambitious individuals were unable to break the constitutional limits. In the Late Republic, on the other hand, Dio argues that “for a city [...] possessing many men of great wealth”⁵⁴ democracy was unworkable. In other words, due to the influx of wealth as a result of empire, ambitious politicians and dynasts, that is those who exercise *δυναστεία*, could successfully break the constitutional barriers as they used their resources for bribery, political manipulation and violence, often effected through the people. These three aspects are the most important tools of internal competition in the Late Republic; but they are also symptoms of the transformation of institutional competition as they were unavailable to earlier politicians with lower levels of resources. Through these tools, Republican competition was further distorted and traditional authority undermined in favour of ambitious, egoistic politicians, which among other things caused the thoroughly problematic extraordinary commands. This destructive competition is thus both institutional in origin and effect; it is of course, at least on some level, individual as well but the individuals are incorporated in the institutional explanation and behaviourally locked herein. Through his institutional focus, Dio, in short, succeeds in presenting individual characters as part of a broader process of political competition which underwent a destructive transformation in the Late Republic and ultimately caused the fall of this governmental form.

I have divided the following into four chapters with a number of subchapters each, which focus on Books 36-40, that is the years 69-49, since these books survive almost intact and the fragmentary earlier books of the Late Republic appear not to contradict the conclusions drawn from 36-40. The first of these chapters is a comparison between Dio and the parallel sources for the Late Republic, which has never received independent study. I intend to show that Dio’s account of this period is highly original and that he uses deviations and manipulations of the source material to bring out his institutional explanation and to position competition at the heart of it. In the following chapter, I will explore Dio’s relationship with the annalistic tradition of history writing. I will here show that Dio breaks decisively with the annalistic conventions and merely exploits these when it suits his narrative and interpretative purposes. Dio’s use of the annalistic traditions in the Late Republic is also an area that has eluded comprehensive and sustained enquiries. This

⁵⁴ Cass. Dio 44.2.4.

chapter will again suggest that Dio worked according to a premeditated framework organised around competition.

These two chapters will be followed by two case studies of Books 36 and 39 that will further support the above conclusions. It should be noted that Dio's individual Late Republican books constitute another area that remains hitherto unexplored. The first case study will focus on Book 36. Here I will highlight Dio's sophisticated structuring that aimed at demonstrating the destructive consequences of mainly external institutional competition through a focus on the use of commands for ambition, the re-empowered tribunes, the problematic extraordinary commands and the ineffective dictatorship. The second case study will focus on Book 39 as Dio here most clearly sets out his explanation of the fall of the Republic and its intimate connection to internal competition. In this book, Dio focuses heavily on the actual mechanisms of competition and the practical tools used herein, which are explored in a thematic structuring. Destructive institutionally generated competition in the external and internal spheres was thus at the heart of the failure of Dio's Late Republic.

2: Dio and the sources for the Late Republic

2.1: Introduction

In this chapter I will explore the relationship between Dio and other sources of the Late Republic. It is important to underline that this chapter will not focus on traditional *Quellenforschung* as the main objective is not to identify the source(s) that Dio used for his narrative but rather to explore what Dio's deviations and parallels in relation to other sources can tell us about his framework for the Late Republic. In contrast to the widely held view that Dio was unoriginal,¹ I will argue that he is distinctive both on a detailed level and in his grander interpretation of the Late Republic and that his consistent manipulations suggest the presence of an overarching interpretative framework centred on competition. Dio's central distinguishing feature, then, is that he focuses on the institutional problems of the Roman political world whereas the parallel sources present a character-driven narrative where the individual is at the centre. These institutional problems are, as set out in chapter 1, centred on competition.² Through these conclusions I will furthermore argue that traditional *Quellenforschung* and especially the attempts to reconstruct lost sources on the basis of Dio are deeply problematic and that firm conclusions about this area will be perpetually elusive as indeed they have been so far.

However, *Quellenforschung* in fact constitutes a significant part of the research on Dio's Republic so far and dominated almost completely before Millar. The highly influential work of Schwartz from 1899 argued that Dio relied substantially on Livy for the Republic and Augustan age,³ a work that is now only preserved in the summary *Periochae*. This view was supported during most of the twentieth century.⁴ Yet, Manuwald in 1979 convincingly argued against the sole use of Livy for the Augustan age⁵ and the previous consensus on this point does indeed appear surprising in view of the meagre summaries of

¹ Millar (1964) 46; Rees (2011) 4; Kemezis (2014) 93.

² See e.g. pp. 13.

³ Schwartz (1899) 1697-1714. For previous works see Haupt (1882); (1884).

⁴ See e.g. Blumenthal (1913) 97; Marx (1933) 326; Charlesworth (1934) 876; Millar (1964) 34; Harrington (1970) 43; Pelling (1979) 91-95.

⁵ Manuwald (1979) 168 *passim*.

Livy's account available for comparison. Dio's use of the contemporary historians Sallust, Cremutius Cordus, Asinius Pollio and Aufidius Bassus has also received scholarly attention but no sizeable parts of their work, even in epitomated form, survive and the conclusions therefore stand on rather shaky ground.⁶ The Gallic Wars are perhaps the most studied part of Dio's Late Republic and here again *Quellenforschung* is dominant. Melber followed previous German scholars in 1891 when he argued that Dio exclusively relied on Caesar and that discrepancies were down to Dio's incompetence⁷ but this view was gradually challenged and Pollio and Livy among others suggested as additional sources.⁸ Yet, no consensus has emerged and the soundest article on this subject is McDougall's from 1991 that ends with the judiciously vague conclusion that Dio blended a variety of sources.⁹

The wider reasons behind Dio's choices are, however, left untouched by the above scholars. I, on the other hand, will argue that Dio consciously deviated from the parallel sources in order to emphasise the destructiveness of institutional competition and the consequent untenability of the Late Republic. These deviations are thus consistently employed to bring out the problematic process of competition at the expense of a more persistent focus on a few leading individuals as seen in other sources. One might object that Dio's supposed originality is due to a source that is today no longer extant. However, Dio insists that he had "read pretty nearly everything (πάντα ὥς εἰπεῖν)"¹⁰ written about the Romans and that he spent ten years taking notes¹¹ which, despite the possibility of distortion as part of self-representation, undermines the idea that Dio's work is the result of a single or few unknown sources.

Furthermore, despite the lack of clarity in our knowledge of ancient working methods,¹² Nissen's Law, that ancient historians followed a single source for stretches of narrative, appears decidedly unlikely here since Dio's deviations are highly consistent and

⁶ Aufidius Bassus: Marx (1933) 325-326; Levi (1951) 415-434; Townend (1961) 232; Manuwald (1979) 258. Cordus: Millar (1964) 85; Swan (1987) 286. Pollio: Micallella (1896); Sordi (1971) 170-172; Lintott (1997) 2519-2520. Sallust: Haupt (1882) 143-146.

⁷ Melber (1891) 55-58 gives a good overview of previous German research.

⁸ In addition to the *De Belle Gallico*, Sihler (1887) 19-29 argued for Oppius; Jullian (1901) 134-139 for Livy; Sordi (1971) 170-172 for Pollio; Zecchini (1978) for Tubero. See McDougall (1991) 617-619 for a comprehensive overview.

⁹ McDougall (1991) 638.

¹⁰ Cass. Dio F 1.2.

¹¹ Cass. Dio 73.23.5.

¹² For Dio's working method see Millar (1964) 32-40; Pelling (1979) 92-95; Rich (1989) 89-92; Mallan (2014) 760 n. 8; Burden-Strevens (2015) 39-41.

thoroughly informed by his own overall aims, as I will show. This undermines the idea that Dio's originality derives from a single, completely unknown previous source.¹³ Several unknown sources could be another albeit speculative possibility and the sources available to Dio were surely far more numerous than today. However, scrolls were too large and impractical to allow a historian to work directly from several sources at the same time. Lucian, in his work on history writing, suggests instead that writers should compose an *aide-memoire* (ὑπόμνημα) of their material¹⁴ and it seems an attractive hypothesis that Dio followed this model.¹⁵ The ὑπόμνημα would thus provide Dio information from a wide array of sources without the impracticalities, which would free Dio from the dependence on a single or perhaps two sources.

Moreover, as mentioned previously, Dio's framework centred on competition appears to span the entirety of the Republic¹⁶ and the idea that a single source furnished Dio with all his information for this vast period of time is therefore highly speculative and a complete *argumentum ex silentio*. Moreover, the parallel sources show a surprising unity in the themes they choose to emphasise which are decidedly different to Dio's. This suggests that Dio, the latest of these writers, was not working from a hypothetical source tradition that was available to his predecessors. Thus the hypothetical source furnishing Dio with his deviations would necessarily have been written in the mere half a century between Appian and Dio. If such a source had existed, it is also doubtful that Dio would even have chosen to write such a full account of the Late Republic since another, newly written work fulfilled this niche. In conclusion, Dio's consistent and calculated deviations cannot be explained away by a hypothetical and speculative source, and are instead a manifestation of his overarching interpretative framework.

The areas chosen for analysis are Lucullus' removal from command, the *lex Gabinia* and the Catilinarian Conspiracy. I have chosen these as they represent both internal and external matters and both longer and shorter stretches of narrative. The events thus collectively become representative of the narrative of the Late Republic in Dio. Furthermore, the events exemplify well the type of deviations centred on competition that are characteristic for Dio's treatment of the period. The main sources chosen for

¹³ This is the suggestion of Libourel (1968) and (1974) for the Early Republic.

¹⁴ Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 48; Burden-Strevens (2015) 39-40.

¹⁵ *Contra* Millar (1964) 33.

¹⁶ See pp. 15-16 above.

comparison are Appian, Plutarch, Velleius and Sallust and to a lesser extent the *Periochae*, in addition to Suetonius who touches upon the period in his biography of Caesar.

A brief note is in order here on their different perspectives: Plutarch wrote pairs of biographies of significant Greek and Roman figures and consequently his focus is less on historical facts than on the personality and morality of his characters. Appian's history is focused on civil wars and the opposition between the desires of the ordinary people and the political elite, and the former group is often portrayed quite positively.¹⁷ Sallust and Velleius are both heavily influenced by Cato the Elder and see the Roman republic as entering a moral decline after the destruction of Carthage in 146.¹⁸ Furthermore, Velleius, covering all of Roman history in merely two books, frequently favours the so called *optimates*¹⁹ in contrast to Appian. The *Periochae* consists of summaries from the writings of Livy, whereas Suetonius often focuses on individuals and sensationalism rather than politics. It is also important to note the generic differences between authors; Plutarch and Suetonius wrote biographies, whereas Velleius' history is extremely brief while Dio, Livy and to a certain extent Appian and Sallust wrote fuller histories. In light of these differences, the relative argumentative unity of the parallel sources and Dio's consistent deviation from these, as I will show below, are only more striking. However, the above selection also carries with it the exclusion of other authors of which Orosius, Florus, Valerius Maximus and Cicero should be mentioned. The former two mainly touch upon the foreign wars of Rome, whereas the writings of the latter two are not structured as narrative histories and they are consequently ill suited to be compared to Dio at this stage where the political narrative of Rome will take centre stage.

2.2: Lucullus and his command

The narrative surrounding the removal of Lucullus from his command in the Third Mithridatic War is central in Dio's Book 36 and covers the first 17 chapters. However, Appian largely ignores the event and the other sources treat it far more briefly than Dio: in one perspective, seen in Velleius, Lucullus is disinclined to end the war because "he was a victim to the love of money (*pecuniae pellebatur cupidine*)"²⁰ and the power-hungry

¹⁷ See e.g. App. *B. Civ.* 1.7-13.

¹⁸ Sall. *Cat.* 10; *Hist.* 1.4; Vell. Pat. 1.7.4; 2.11.

¹⁹ Vell. Pat. 2.2-3.

²⁰ Vell. Pat. 2.33.1.

Pompey takes over.²¹ Velleius judges Lucullus harshly as he relinquishes his command: “he was the first to set the example for our present lavish extravagance (*profusae huius [...] luxuriae primus auctor fuit*)”.²² This is clearly in line with Velleius’ view of the Republic degenerating into luxury as the political world is ignored and only a single chapter devoted to the event. In a contrasting perspective, seen in Plutarch and the *Periochae*, Lucullus is a glorious general, robbed of his victory by the immoral and mutinying soldiers.²³ Fortune, Lucullus’ own failings and the envy of the popular leaders are all mentioned by Plutarch,²⁴ but the most important immediate factor is instead Clodius who incites the soldiers to mutiny and who “most of all vitiated (τὸ μάλιστα [...] διεργασμένον) the undertakings of Lucullus.”²⁵ The *Periochae* is brief but seems in agreement with Plutarch as it argues that “a mutiny of the soldiers [...] kept Lucullus from [...] obtaining the ultimate victory”.²⁶ Thus, the perspectives of these sources focus on the individuals of Lucullus, Clodius and Pompey and the political institutions of Rome are mostly ignored.

Dio’s focus, on the other hand, is clearly on Roman politics, particularly the connection between competition and foreign commands. However, he does not neglect the individuals and their actions but instead uses these to focalise his interpretation. This is seen in the beginning of Dio’s narrative where Lucullus is removed after he failed to follow up a victory over Mithridates and Tigranes: “Because of this he was charged by the **citizens, as well as others**, (παρά τε τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις) with refusing to end the war, in order that he might retain his command (ἄρχῃ) a longer time.”²⁷ It is noteworthy that the alleged object of Lucullus’ desire is not money as in Velleius’ account but rather the perpetuation of power which has convincingly been shown by Burden-Strevens to be a central problem in the Late Republic.²⁸ Lucullus is thus indeed problematic himself in Dio’s version but this is not couched in typical *Dekadenz* rhetoric as seen in Velleius and his focus on luxury on money. The narrative centres rather on competition and the problems of a political system where Lucullus and other generals, especially Pompey and Caesar, cling on to command, which was a central challenge to the authority of the senate

²¹ Vell. Pat. 2.33.2.

²² Vell. Pat. 2.33.4.

²³ *Per.* 98; Plut. *Luc.* 19, 34.5.

²⁴ Plut. *Luc.* 33.

²⁵ Plut. *Luc.* 34.1.

²⁶ *Per.* 98. Adapted from Schlesinger (1959).

²⁷ Cass. Dio 36.2.1 (my emphasis).

²⁸ Burden-Strevens (2015) 157-175; Burden-Strevens (forthcoming 2016) 3-11. See also Eckstein (2004) 279-288.

in the Late Republic. That the accusation against Lucullus can be made convincingly to a broad spectrum, “citizens as well as others”, furthers Dio’s critique of the Late Republic.

Dio again deviates from the parallel sources in his treatment of Clodius. Dio in fact describes two mutinies, the first at Nisibis where he echoes Plutarch and blames Clodius and his “innate love of revolution”²⁹ for the mutiny. Dio as the only source emphasises the perfidy that Clodius, the mutineer, was in fact married to Lucullus’ sister.³⁰ Dio then comments on the second mutiny: “At this time, however (ἄλλως), they became turbulent again largely because they heard that Acilius, the consul, who had been sent out to relieve Lucullus for the reasons mentioned (δι’ ἅπερ εἶπον), was drawing near, and they accordingly regarded Lucullus with contempt”.³¹ Whereas Plutarch blames Clodius for the single mutiny he records, Dio asserts that the political machinations in Rome directed against Lucullus are the direct cause and he underlines the importance of this by the emphatic particle –περ, attached to the relative pronoun. It is thus the process of constant competition, manifested both by Lucullus’ ambition and the rivalrous attack on him from Rome, which creates the problems in Dio’s account – a clear contrast to the character-driven narratives of the parallel sources.

This institutional focus is again clearly seen in Dio’s detailed description of intense egoistic competition within the group of generals sent to relieve Lucullus and it is important to note that this narrative element is exclusive to Dio. Lucullus is here undecided as to his next step because he is unaided by his rival generals and Dio emphasises the perplexity of Lucullus in this situation: “Λούκουλλος ἔκ τε τούτων [...] ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἐγένετο.”³² Marcius Rex, consul the year before and on his way to Cilicia, refuses Lucullus’ request for aid on “the pretext (πρόσχημα)”³³ that his soldiers refused. Dio underlines the falseness of this by his use of “πρόσχημα” and even tells us that the main mutineer, Clodius, after he had fled the army of Lucullus, was welcomed and put in command of the fleet by Marcius because of their relation by marriage.³⁴ This is an important critique from Dio as Marcius here puts family relations and the competition with Lucullus above the interests of the Republic. After the soldiers of Lucullus deserted *en masse*, he also desisted from protecting Roman lands as his replacement Acilius was

²⁹ Cass. Dio 36.14.4.

³⁰ Cass. Dio 36.14.4.

³¹ Cass. Dio 36.14.4.

³² Cass. Dio 36.23.3.

³³ Cass. Dio 36.17.2.

³⁴ Cass. Dio 36.17.2.

drawing near.³⁵ Furthermore, Acilius too is roundly criticised as Dio writes that he delayed his arrival after realising that it was now too late to “snatch the victory from underneath Lucullus’ feet (ὕφαρπάσων)”.³⁶ The result of this egoistic competition is devastating and immediate: “the soldiers of Mithridates won back almost all his domain and caused great havoc in Cappadocia”.³⁷ Dio’s narrative is here distinctive as the focus is no longer on the incompetence or pyrrhic greatness of Lucullus but instead on the destructiveness of a system of aristocratic competition which severely impairs the greatness of Rome. As a consequence of this system, Mithridates is given easy successes and the mutineer who set it all in motion is rewarded with a command. Here Dio’s narrative of the events breaks off and leaves the reader with a forceful reminder of the dangers of excessive competition.

This unique narrative of competition is far too complex to have been invented and Dio thus shows himself to be a careful selector of material as this representation of events supports his focus on Rome’s institutional problem of competition, the foundation of Dio’s critique. In conclusion, Dio does have similarities with the other sources but his institutional focus and criticisms are clearly different from the other authors and he even includes unique narrative material to support it. Dio’s account is not bereft of the exploration of individuals found in the parallel evidence. However, this factor is not an end in itself but rather a means to communicate and strengthen his critique of the political system of Rome which is his main area of investigation.

2.3: The *lex Gabinia*

The events surrounding the *lex Gabinia* are the first treatment of internal politics in Rome in Dio’s narrative of Book 36 and the law stands as the central, internal event of the book given that fourteen whole chapters are devoted to it. The other sources treat this event far more superficially. Appian and the *Periochae* do not include the enactment of the *lex Gabinia* itself, whereas Velleius continues his focus on the individual: he criticises the immense power given to Pompey but asserts that a similar grant of power had been accorded Antonius (in 74) which had caused no nervousness in Rome: “sometimes the personality (*persona*) of the recipient of such power, just as it renders the precedent more

³⁵ Cass. Dio 36.17.2.

³⁶ Cass. Dio 36.17.1. Adapted from Cary (1914-1927).

³⁷ Cass. Dio 36.17.1.

or less dangerous, increases or diminishes its invidiousness.”³⁸ The importance of the individual thus dominates the political institutions. The significant factor here is therefore Pompey’s character and the more minor figure of Gabinius is consequently ignored. Plutarch echoes Velleius in his focus on Pompey, unsurprisingly given his biographical structure, and also merely mentions Gabinius as proposer of the *lex*. He does note that Gabinius is the intimate of Pompey but no collusion is suggested.³⁹ However, in contrast to Velleius, Plutarch asserts that the populace supports the law and even acts threateningly.

Dio first of all deviates from the tradition in giving by far the fullest treatment of the event, which is also illustrated through three speeches given to Pompey, Gabinius and Catulus. This indicates the enormous importance with which Dio invested this event, which is a testament to his institutional focus; the significance of the *lex Gabinia* is inherently institutional in nature as it breaks the constitutional limits of Rome and creates a dangerous precedent. To Dio, furthermore, the *lex* is also a product of the problematic process of political competition in the Late Republic as an ambitious dynast with the support of the people is able to trump the senate and the upright but unavailing Catulus, and push through the first of the deeply problematic extraordinary commands. Pompey is of course important here but Dio rather focuses on the changing balance of power between ambitious individuals and the senate, which is both a cause and a result of the problematic institutional competition. The *lex Gabinia*, in short, stands as a mile-stone in Dio’s narrative of the end of the Republic because of its long-term consequences for the political system⁴⁰ rather than for Pompey personally.

This significance of the *lex Gabinia* to Dio’s work is further supported when compared to the comparatively meagre space, merely two chapters, devoted to the later *lex Manilia*. This indicates that Dio had already made his exploration of the problematic extraordinary commands in the narrative surrounding the *lex Gabinia* and another grand exposition would be superfluous. Plutarch and Velleius, by contrast, give roughly equal space to the laws but never appear interested in the wider political ramifications of Pompey’s great power. Dio is thus singularly interested in the institutional and constitutional ramifications of the *lex*,⁴¹ and presents it as the outcome of political competition. This is clearly seen in

³⁸ Vell. Pat. 2.31.4.

³⁹ Plut. *Pomp.* 25.2.

⁴⁰ Coudry (forthcoming 2016).

⁴¹ Dio’s interest in constitutional matters is often noted but not explained. See e.g. Fechner (1986) 8-9; Hinard (1999) 431; (2005) 271; Lachenaud (2011) LXVIII.

Dio's portrait of an ambitious Pompey craving the command, which stands in contrast to Plutarch and Velleius where Pompey is wholly passive and in Plutarch's narrative even withdraws on the day of the vote.⁴² Dio comments:

“Pompey, who was very eager to command (ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πάνυ ἄρξαι), and because of his own ambition (ὕπό τε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φιλοτιμίας) and the zeal of the populace no longer now so much regarded this commission as an honour as the failure to win it a disgrace, when he saw the opposition of the *optimates* (τῶν δυνατῶν), desired to appear forced to accept. He was always in the habit of pretending as far as possible not to desire (ἐπιθυμεῖν) the things he really wished, and on this occasion did so more than ever, because of the jealousy (ἐπίφθονον) that would follow”.⁴³

Pompey here clearly lusts duplicitously for power. Especially Velleius, seen in the subchapter on Lucullus, had also previously attacked Pompey along the same lines⁴⁴ but in Dio's account, the description is rather used to demonstrate the problematic process of competition as all actors, both the ambitious (φιλοτιμία) politicians and the δυνατοί,⁴⁵ compete egoistically for their own good. Furthermore, the competition itself in fact causes further degeneration as Pompey is forced to employ duplicity to avoid the φθόνος of a broken system.

Dio again deviates significantly in his portrayal of Gabinius who was completely ignored in Velleius and Plutarch. An example hereof is that Gabinius is given a whole speech that is even longer than Pompey's and the two speeches in fact function in tandem as a duplicitous *recusatio* in order to avoid φθόνος. Moreover, and very importantly, Dio is the only source to explicitly suggest the possibility that Pompey had spurred Gabinius on to make this proposal, which fits with his picture of the ambitious general.⁴⁶ Dio does also mention another possibility, namely that Gabinius was trying to ingratiate himself with Pompey, but this still remains unique in the source tradition and functions equally well in Dio's critique of the egoistically ambitious politicians of the Late Republic.⁴⁷ Furthermore, it is also only Dio who criticises Gabinius and he does so forcefully by saying that he was “not prompted by any love of the common welfare, for he was a most base fellow

⁴² Plut. *Pomp.* 26.1.

⁴³ Cass. Dio 36.24.5-6.

⁴⁴ Above pp. 22-23. See also below pp. 64.

⁴⁵ Δυνατοί is often used by Dio to denote the conservative voices in the senate. Cary (1914-1927) mainly translates it to *optimates*.

⁴⁶ Cass. Dio 36.23.4.

⁴⁷ Cass. Dio 36.23.4.

(κάκιστος [...] ἀνὴρ).”⁴⁸ This critique appears banal and could feature in any of the other sources. However, in Dio’s narrative it becomes a continuation of his focus on egoistic competition which is permeating and destroying the Republic as Gabinius in Dio is centrally important to the enactment of this deeply problematic law but acts self-interestedly. Gabinius thus demonstrates that the deteriorated competition was not merely due to the dynasts but rather permeated the Roman political world since his personal failings are not an individual problem but instead characteristic of Rome as a whole. Indeed, Dio comments in Book 37 that only Cato was selflessly involved in politics,⁴⁹ which again shows Dio’s focus on the degeneration of institutional competition.

Another important contrast to Velleius and Plutarch is Dio’s view of the senate. Velleius writes that the *optimates* advised against the command “but sane advice succumbed to impulse”.⁵⁰ Plutarch has a similar narrative as the senate vehemently opposed the *lex* since “such unlimited and absolute power, while it was greater than envy (μεῖζον μὲν φθόνου), was yet a thing to be feared (φόβου).”⁵¹ Dio on the contrary, is far more critical of the senate: “that body preferred to suffer anything whatever at the hands of the freebooters rather than put so great command into Pompey’s hands; in fact they came near slaying Gabinius in the very senate-house (ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ συνεδρίῳ)”.⁵² Firstly, the senate is not opposed to the command in itself, as they are in Plutarch, but rather to the increase of Pompey’s power and they self-interestedly put their enmity above the good of Rome in stark contrast to the positively described senate in Velleius. The constant egoistic competition and a consequently dysfunctional senate thus preclude solutions to the piracy problem. Secondly, the senators are uniquely violent in Dio’s narrative⁵³ as he is the only one to assert that they almost killed Gabinius, and through αὐτῷ, Dio emphasises that this even took place in the senate-house. Dio’s use of violence to create his negative picture of Late Republican competition is further seen in his presentation of the violent populace. Plutarch also includes this factor but whereas the people in his account come close to attacking one senator,⁵⁴ in Dio the people “rush upon them [the senators] as they sat assembled; and if the senators had not gotten out of the way, they would certainly have

⁴⁸ Cass. Dio 36.23.4.

⁴⁹ Cass. Dio 37.57.3.

⁵⁰ Vell. Pat. 2.31.4.

⁵¹ Plut. *Pomp.* 25.3-4. Adapted from Perrin (1914-1926).

⁵² Cass. Dio 36.24.1.

⁵³ This is general for Dio’s account of also the earlier Republic: Libourel (1968); (1974).

⁵⁴ Plut. *Pomp.* 25.4.

killed them.”⁵⁵ Dio thus increases the violence as all the senators are at risk here and they even have to flee to save their lives. Furthermore, Pompey is highly popular among the people and they hereby become a tool used to force the senate’s acceptance of the *lex Gabinia*. This use of the people and their forceful violence by Pompey’s camp against the senate exemplifies the new distribution of power in the Late Republic, where individuals could in fact overpower the senate through the help of the people, which exacerbates institutional competition. Ambitious politicians, here personified by Pompey, have through the people and their violence gained sufficient unconstitutional power that the senate is overwhelmed and the traditional constitutional constraints broken via the extraordinary command.⁵⁶ Dio has thus again through deviations put the process of institutional competition at the heart of his account.

Dio’s account is of course not completely unique or fabricated as most main elements and several details are identical in the other sources. However, Dio presents and embellishes his material in a wholly different way as both Gabinius and Pompey are self-serving and mendacious and the latter’s ambition is the central driving force. The presentation of the senate is also very different and the whole focus switches away from the individual that is so important in Velleius and Plutarch and onto the political institutions. Individuals are not neglected, but they are used to communicate and strengthen Dio’s critique of the political system and the destructive role of competition in a way that is unique in the source tradition.

In contrast to the events surrounding Lucullus, it seems that at least some of Dio’s deviations originate in embellishments because the explanation of the motivations of Gabinius, Pompey and the senate appears to be Dio’s own work. It is, on the other hand, harder to determine the origins of the unique violence and the suggestion of collusion between Gabinius and Pompey. However, given that I am not attempting to identify Dio’s source(s), these considerations are of secondary importance. What is important is instead the clear picture that Dio has here again manipulated and selected his material to create a narrative where the political institutions and the destructiveness of competition take centre stage. The focus on institutions and competition is furthermore notably identical to the narrative surrounding the removal of Lucullus, which suggests that Dio made his narrative choices based on an overarching and premeditated interpretative framework that governed

⁵⁵ Cass. Dio 36.24.2.

⁵⁶ See also e.g. Cass. Dio 38.1-8.

his work. It thus seems that Dio attempted to present an institutional explanation for the problems of the Late Republic where competition stood at the centre. This, and the consistency of Dio's approach, will be further supported in the next subchapter on the Catilinarian Conspiracy.

2.4: The Catilinarian Conspiracy

The Catilinarian Conspiracy of 63 is a central event in the historiography of the Late Republic and, not surprisingly, all of our sources treat it to some extent. The narratives are often complex and I will not here follow them minutely but instead focus on the main aspects and on points where Dio deviates from the other sources. Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae* is our most thorough treatment and here we are told that it was Catiline's corrupt character, helped by the equally corrupt city, which caused the conspiracy.⁵⁷ This is a continuation of the previously mentioned idea of a degenerating Rome in the absence of *metus hostilis*. Sallust's narrative is riddled with corruption, bribery and immorality and in that sense mirrors Dio's. Indeed immorality in fact creates the conspiracy: "Catiline formed the plan of overthrowing the government, both because his own debt was enormous in all parts of the world and because the greater number of Sulla's veterans, who had squandered their property and now thought with longing of their former pillage and victories, were eager for civil war. There was no army in Italy; [...] this was his golden opportunity."⁵⁸ The individual here again plays a central role as Catiline's personal corruption, underlined in the opening of the work,⁵⁹ is key in the creation of the plot, an explanation that is inserted even before the so-called First Catilinarian Conspiracy of 66. Cicero is the main hero of the narrative, continuously frustrating Catiline's designs and the people "extolled Cicero to the skies".⁶⁰ Velleius' short work is far briefer but also praises Cicero who detected the plot by his "extraordinary courage, firmness, and careful vigilance"⁶¹ and "Catiline was driven from the city by fear of the authority of the consul [i.e. Cicero]".⁶² However, the wider political causes or consequences are non-existent in a continuation of Velleius' previously seen focus. In the *Periochae*, Cicero is again the saviour of Rome: "This conspiracy was extirpated by the energy of Marcus Tullius

⁵⁷ Sall. *Cat.* 5.1-8.

⁵⁸ Sall. *Cat.* 16.4.

⁵⁹ Sall. *Cat.* 4-5.

⁶⁰ Sall. *Cat.* 48.1.

⁶¹ Vell. *Pat.* 2.34.3.

⁶² Vell. *Pat.* 2.34.4.

Cicero.”⁶³ Appian gives a fairly full narrative that mirrors Sallust’s as the conspiracy is here explained as natural to Catiline and Cicero is the hero: “Catiline was [...] a madman [...]. He had reduced himself to poverty in order to gratify his ambition, but still he was courted by the powerful, both men and women, and he became a candidate for the consulship as a step leading to absolute power. [...] Cicero, the most eloquent orator and rhetorician of the period, was chosen instead.”⁶⁴ Again, the society is corrupt and Catiline’s plans for a conspiracy are inherent to his character. Lastly, this picture is also seen in Plutarch who underlines the dire state of affairs: “matters needed only a slight impulse to disturb them, and it was in the power of any bold man to overthrow the commonwealth, which of itself was in a diseased condition. However, Catiline wished to obtain first a strong base of operations”.⁶⁵ We are again lacking a definite starting point for the idea of a conspiracy as this is the first we hear of any plans on the part of Catiline. The biography of Cicero is by far the fullest treatment of the Conspiracy by Plutarch, and Cicero is of course the central hero. The above general acceptance of Cicero’s heroic role and the idea of Catiline’s complete corruption is at least in part the product of the use of Cicero’s speeches as source material by Sallust and subsequent historians. In conclusion, all the above sources focus persistently on Cicero and Catiline as the two central characters that drive the narrative forward.

Dio gives many of the same details as the parallel sources but deviates in two main areas, namely the origins of the conspiracy and the treatment of Cicero. Catiline had been described once by Dio before the second conspiracy but Dio here merely calls him “very bold (θρασύτατος)”⁶⁶ in relation to the so-called first conspiracy without elaborating through damning accusations. It is instead a surprising acquittal in 63 for his deeds under Sulla that spurs Catiline on: “Catiline, who, although charged with the same crimes as the others [...], was acquitted. And from this very circumstance he became far worse (ἐκ τούτου χείρων τε πολὺ ἐγένετο) and even lost his life as a result. For, when Marcus Cicero had become consul [...] Catiline undertook to set up a new government, and by banding together the allies against the state threw the people into fear of a mighty conflict.”⁶⁷ Coming after the corruption of Republican politics and egoistic competition described by Dio in Book 36, the surprising result of Catiline’s trial suggests foul play and

⁶³ *Per.* 102.

⁶⁴ *App. B. Civ.* 2.2.

⁶⁵ *Plut. Cic.* 10.5-11.1.

⁶⁶ *Cass. Dio* 36.44.4.

⁶⁷ *Cass. Dio* 37.10.3-4.

becomes part of Dio's institutional critique. Dio hereby has far less focus on the personal immorality of Catiline as he in Dio's narrative is not a madman or inherently destined for revolution. Instead, by the inclusion of this acquittal, unattested in the parallel sources, Dio gives the impression that it was only from the year 63 that the idea of revolution took hold.

The above quotation is inserted by Dio as a summary of the conspiracy but in the subsequent more detailed narrative he again deviates from the source tradition in telling ways: "the senate decreed, chiefly at the instance of Cicero (τοῦ Κικέρωνος ἐξ τὰ μάλιστα ἐνάγοντος), that banishment for ten years should be added by law to the penalties established for bribery. Catiline, accordingly, believed that this decree had been passed on his account, as was indeed the case; and so, after collecting a small band, he attempted to slay Cicero and some others of the foremost men on the very day of the election, in order that he might immediately be chosen as consul."⁶⁸ This narrative element is again completely unique to Dio and gives the lead-up to the actual conspiracy a different flavour. The senate attempts to correct the problematic bribery, part of the destructive process of competition, but through this legislation in fact spurs Catiline on to take even more extreme measures in his quest to become consul. Dio has hereby again included a deviation that allows him to highlight the destructiveness of competition in the Late Republic and he even indicates that this problem is unsolvable as the seemingly positive law rather makes Catiline's intended means even more extreme. This whole situation is born out of the Republican institutional competition for offices but the competition has here turned destructive and uncontrollable. An important reason for this is the weakness of the senate and traditional authority, and the excessive power of ambitious individuals as exemplified in the above situation where the senate's attempts are characteristically futile and result in the imminent collection of a personal army by Catiline.

However, before this, Catiline fails miserably in both plots and elections: "new consuls were chosen, and Catiline no longer directed his plot in secret or against Cicero and his adherents only, but against the whole commonwealth."⁶⁹ In Sallust, Plutarch and Appian, Catiline is a corrupted madman and his desire for revolution and outrages far precedes the actual conspiracy of 63. In Dio, on the other hand, the so-called first conspiracy is consciously played down and it is instead institutional problems in the shape of the seemingly corrupt courts, the futile attempt to rectify the problematic excessive bribery and

⁶⁸ Cass. Dio 37.29.1-2.

⁶⁹ Cass. Dio 37.30.1.

the loss in the consular elections that provide the catalyst. Dio does also incorporate Catiline's moral degeneration but he uses it to focalise his critique of the political system which provides the concrete cause for the conspiracy rather than an inherent moral failing in Catiline, as in the other sources. This seems a difference of prioritisation: especially Sallust and Plutarch but also Appian explore the individual, Catiline, as their main theme and use the political situation around the Catilinarian Conspiracy to do so. Dio by contrast uses the individual as a tool to explore the political problems of Rome. The main difference in the two versions of the origins of the conspiracy thus seems to be one of priority and perspective.

The second major area of deviation in Dio's account is the role played by Cicero. Dio is the only source to include an assassination plot on Cicero in 64,⁷⁰ which the latter exposes. However, afterwards Cicero is disbelieved in the senate "since his announcement was not regarded as credible and he was suspected of having uttered false charges against the men because of personal enmity (διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχθραν), [and] Cicero became frightened (ἐφοβήθη), now that he had given Catiline additional provocation."⁷¹ This frightened Cicero stands in sharp contrast to the hero of the parallel sources and it is significant that the suspicion of egoistic rivalry undermines Cicero's effort to help the state. This suspicion is again representative of the institutional problem of constant and pervasive egoistic competition for offices in Dio's Late Republic where no one works for the state, which precludes the possibility of assistance or corrections and the alternative depiction of Cicero is fundamental in creating this representation of Republican politics. This negative description of Cicero is highly consistent as Dio often posits an alternative cause when the former achieves a success. An example is Cicero exposing another plot on his life while consul: "This plot, too, was divulged, since Cicero, being a man of great influence, and one who gained many followers through his speeches, either by conciliation or by intimidation (ἐκφοβῶν), had many men to report such occurrences to him".⁷² It is not Cicero himself but his helpers who uncover the conspiracy, and his great rhetoric extolled by Appian and Velleius⁷³ is here cast in a decidedly less flattering light as a tool for political competition. This portrayal of rhetoric is representative of Dio's Late Republic as it is exploited by

⁷⁰ Sallust places unspecified "plots" in 63: *Cat.* 26.

⁷¹ Cass. Dio 37.29.3.

⁷² Cass. Dio 37.33.1.

⁷³ App. *B. Civ.* 2.2; Vell. *Pat.* 2.34.3.

often mendacious dynasts to further their political aims, and degeneration of public debate as a result of competition becomes an important institutional problem.⁷⁴

Furthermore, even Cicero's grand exploit of thwarting Catiline's main plot is partly undermined: "the statue of Jupiter was set up on the Capitol [...] For these seers [the ones instructing the statue to be set up] had decided that some conspiracy would be brought to light by the erection of the statue, and [...] its setting up coincided with the discovery of the conspirators".⁷⁵ Dio here uses annalistic conventions to undermine Cicero's claim to have protected the city. In the parallel sources by contrast, Cicero is extolled as the saviour of Rome⁷⁶ and even called "father of his country"⁷⁷ by the people in Appian and Plutarch. Dio, on the other hand, mentions several times the anger of the populace towards Cicero since he had the conspirators killed unlawfully⁷⁸ and because of his boastfulness: "[Cicero] certainly did take great pleasure not only in being praised by others but also in extolling himself [...]. [Cicero] added to his oath the statement that he had saved the city; and for this he incurred much greater hatred."⁷⁹ Cicero is hereby transformed in Dio from the masterful rhetorician and "father of his country" to a boastful and hated figure. This is not as Millar would have it "a failure, perhaps the most complete of his History."⁸⁰ Rather it furthers Dio's overall picture of the thoroughly corrupted process of Republican competition where rhetoric becomes a political weapon and no one, except Cato, works for the common good. Essentially, the portrayal of Cicero demonstrates Dio's skilful and selective use of the then-available source material, and perhaps imperial anti-Ciceronian literature,⁸¹ in order to support his interpretation of the Republic, which has no space for a heroic Cicero. Just as in the case of the origins of the conspiracy, Dio here emerges as a careful selector and manipulator of sources, who had an overarching framework, with competition at its centre, which informed his approach to Roman history. In conclusion, Dio's institutional perspective on the Catilinarian Conspiracy stands in stark contrast to the parallel sources where the central focal point is the individual moral degeneracy of Catiline himself.

⁷⁴ Burden-Strevens (2015) 209-226; Mallan (forthcoming 2016).

⁷⁵ Cass. Dio 37.34.3-4.

⁷⁶ Sall. *Cat.* 48.1.

⁷⁷ App. *B. Civ.* 2.7; Plut. *Cic.* 23.6, 24.1.

⁷⁸ Cass. Dio 37.38.1. See also 38.12.4-7 for a very similar evaluation of Cicero.

⁷⁹ Cass. Dio 37.38.2.

⁸⁰ Millar (1964) 55.

⁸¹ For an overview, see Gowing (2013).

2.5: Conclusion

I have thus shown how Dio deviates significantly from the parallel sources in his treatment of the above important but also representative events of Dio's Late Republic. One notable aspect here is the consistency with which Dio deviates from the parallel source material, achieved at least partly by embellishments. The consistent narrative differences between Dio and the parallel sources clearly show that Dio was neither thoroughly following any of the today extant sources nor the lost portion of Livy, as indicated by the *Periochae*. However, the narrative elements unique to Dio are too complicated to be explained away by embellishments or invention alone. This supports Dio's claim to wide knowledge of sources and ample notetaking but also illustrates a careful selection process of the available material in order to communicate and strengthen main arguments. Furthermore, the institutionally founded framework illustrated above supports the idea that Dio followed Lucian in the use of a ὑπόμνημα. This would free Dio from the dependence on a single or perhaps two sources, which the consistent deviations from the parallel evidence, as part of his interpretative framework, suggest was necessary.⁸² This independent framework makes Dio's work impractical for reconstructing older sources and undermines the *Quellenforschung* that still constitutes a central part of scholarly work⁸³ – arguably an important factor in the reluctance to ascribe such a framework to the historian.

This undermining of *Quellenforschung* is further exacerbated by the comparisons above that show Dio's politically focused framework to be very different in scope from the other sources where the individual is the main area of interest and driver of the narrative. Dio by contrast uses the individual as a tool in his critique of the political system of the Late Republic which is his most important arena of investigation. The above also shows how Dio consistently and in a sophisticated manner highlights the destructive process of competition in his narrative of the Late Republic by presenting an alternative portrait of events compared to other authors. The parallel sources occasionally deal with political problems as well but fail to invest them with the broader political significance of Dio's narrative. The dissimilarities can of course partly be explained by a variation in the available source material or by generic differences between the authors. However, this explanation cannot account for the fact that Dio's narrative is so consistently different and

⁸² So Rich (1989) 89-92 for the Augustan age.

⁸³ Even as recent as Schettino (2006) and Simons (2009).

constantly furthers the same institutional explanation. Instead, the consistency of Dio's deviations suggests the presence of an overarching interpretative framework focused on institutional competition, which undermines the position of Millar and Lintott⁸⁴ while also weakening Kuhn-Chen's argument that Dio's account was primarily created through a moralising perspective.⁸⁵ Furthermore, it also challenges the widespread view that Dio was unoriginal⁸⁶ which has recently been restated by both Rees and Kemezis.⁸⁷ In short, Dio's distinctive account appears premeditated and governed by an overarching framework, in contrast to the majority of scholarly work, which will be supported in the following chapter on Dio and the annalistic method.

⁸⁴ Millar (1964) 46; Lintott (1997) 2514-2517.

⁸⁵ Kuhn-Chen (2002) 243-246. Also *contra* Hose (1994) 436 and partly Sion-Jenkis (2000) 184-185.

⁸⁶ Millar (1964) 46.

⁸⁷ Rees (2011) 4; Kemezis (2014) 93.

3: Dio and the annalistic method

3.1: Introduction

Dio's structuring of his narrative has received scant scholarly attention, which mostly consists of uncorroborated claims that Dio was a traditional annalist.¹ However, in the following I will show that Dio instead was a competent manipulator who exploited the annalistic conventions in order to communicate and strengthen his overall interpretative framework, namely that institutional competition was the main destructive factor of the Late Republic. Dio thus suborned the annalistic conventions seen in Livy to the broader goal of political interpretation.

This dominant view of Dio's use of the annalistic tradition is especially problematic because the term "annalist" generally lacks strict definitions and often simply uses Livy as a model. The use of Livy is clearly seen in Swan's definition where the year, generally organised around the consuls, is divided in three sections of events on the model of internal-external-internal but mostly focused on the internal:

"The character of urban annalistic material is amply illustrated in Livy and Tacitus and is not a topic of scholarly debate. It consists above all else of the annual record of public transactions: elections, proceedings in the Senate, legislation, trials, the business of magistrates and priests, festivals, shows, governmental largess, and the like [...]. The account of each year in Roman annals contains one or two "constellations" or "clusters" of such material [...] and it is these more than anything else that are the hallmark of the annalistic genre."²

This is arguably the fullest definition of the annalistic tradition, clearly based on traditional views of mostly Livy but also Tacitus, and according to the vast majority of scholars, it is on this Livian model that Dio straightforwardly bases himself.

However, this widespread view appears surprising since in any case the use of the annalistic method by the traditionally categorised annalistic historians Tacitus and even Livy has been complexified in recent years. McDonald, in 1957, articulated the traditional

¹ Even in newer works such as Rees (2011) 57 or Kemezis (2014) 90-94.

² Swan (1987) 274.

view that Livy worked in a strictly annalistic fashion throughout the work and this assertion has been widespread.³ However, Rich in 2011 argued that Livy's use of the annalistic method is more varied than generally thought as the latter for example rearranges strict chronology in Books 31-45 to create an interconnectivity between eastern and Roman events.⁴ Regarding Tacitus, Ginsburg in 1981 convincingly showed that the historian exploits the annalistic conventions for his own interpretative ends.⁵ Deviations from the annalistic conventions have thus been identified for Livy and Tacitus but never considered for Dio.

In short, Dio has in the past almost exclusively been termed an annalist without further investigation. Schwartz did in fact in 1899 argue that Dio interspersed his annalistic organisation around the consuls with a more "pragmatisch-geographischen" structure.⁶ However, this is used as an argument in Schwartz's severe critique that Dio's narrative lacks clarity due to the absence of a clear organisational structure and Dio remains an annalist to Schwartz. Swan in 1987 also acknowledged that Dio occasionally reworked parts of the annalistic material, here for the Augustan age, in order to create a more fluent narrative, but Dio's overall use of the annalistic method is not questioned.⁷ This perspective is also seen in Swan's article from 1997 which includes the Late Republic: "Roman annalistic structure is visible throughout the single long stretch from 69 B.C. to A.D. 46 (Books 36-60)."⁸ Some reworking is again admitted for the Augustan age but not the Late Republic. Lachenaud in 2011 and 2014 echoed Schwartz's assertion that Dio used both annalistic and thematic structuring,⁹ and Fotheringham in 2015 built on this by arguing that Dio, in anticipation of the fall of the Republic, partly abandoned the annalistic chronology in Book 40 for a geographical organisation. However, Fotheringham still asserted that Books 36-39 were organised annalistically.¹⁰ Rich in a forthcoming article reasserts the conclusion that Dio, despite some flexibility to create a fluent narrative, worked annalistically for the extant part of the Late Republic and uses this to argue that all the preceding 33 fragmentary Republican books were organised in similar fashion.¹¹ Thus, a scholarly consensus exists which asserts that Dio's Late Republic, in spite of moments of

³ McDonald (1957) 156; Carney (1959); Phillips (1974).

⁴ Rich (2011) 7-8.

⁵ Ginsburg (1981).

⁶ Schwartz (1899) 1687-1689.

⁷ Swan (1987) 276-277.

⁸ Swan (1997) 2525.

⁹ Lachenaud (2011) XXI-XXII; Lachenaud (2014) XXX-XXXI.

¹⁰ Fotheringham (2015) 203-204.

¹¹ Rich (forthcoming 2016) 2.

flexibility, is indeed annalistic, conforming largely to the Livian model and Swan's above definition.¹² This is clearly mirrored in general works on Dio where he is commonly termed "annalistic" without further investigation,¹³ as exemplified by Fechner who argues that Dio writes "im wesentlichen nach annalistischen Schema"¹⁴ but fails to elaborate or support his assertion. Only Burden-Strevens has argued for a more complex use of the annalistic structure by Dio which furthers the latter's interpretation: "Dio manipulates the annalistic structure [...] to implicate the disaster of Crassus' Parthian campaign, presented in terms of ἐπιθυμία, within the chaos in the city in 53 BCE."¹⁵ However, the area is not explored further.

The above consensus on Dio could stem from the impression that the Livian annalistic method was widespread and the only logical choice for Dio. Yet, in view of Ginsburg's arguments, no historian between Livy and Dio can be identified to work on the same pattern as the former. Furthermore, the tradition before Livy is far less homogenous than often argued,¹⁶ as even Pictor, often seen as the first annalist,¹⁷ seems to have treated a large part of his work much more summarily than we see in Livy. This is supported by Dionysius who asserts that Pictor, and his contemporary Cincius Alimentus, "touched only in a summary way (κεφαλαιωδῶς) upon the early events".¹⁸ Cato, moreover, clearly arranged his material in a thematic way¹⁹ and the Greek Polybius used a chronological system based on the Olympic years. Furthermore, most of the historians prior to Livy wrote too few books to cover all of the chosen period in the methodical way that Livy did.²⁰ It thus seems that the historians before Livy generally bore only a superficial resemblance to him and the latter was therefore perhaps far more innovative than is commonly asserted.²¹ This heterogeneous precedent, and the calculated structuring by Tacitus, would allow Dio far greater flexibility in relation to the annalistic structure than has so far been admitted.

¹² See, however, Urso (2013) 13 who notes the use of "flashbacks".

¹³ E.g. Millar (1964) 39-40; Harrington (1970) 148-150; Gowing (1992) 33-34; Hose (1994) 440-441; Freyburger-Galland (1997) 15; Lintott (1997) 2503-2506; Kuhn-Chen (2002) 339; Rees (2011) 57; Kemezis (2014) 90-94.

¹⁴ Fechner (1986) 13.

¹⁵ Burden-Strevens (2015) 208.

¹⁶ So Rich (2011) 15-22; (forthcoming 2016) 2.

¹⁷ So Rich (2011) 29.

¹⁸ Dion. Hal. 1.6.2.

¹⁹ Nep. *Cato* 3.3-4.

²⁰ E.g. Sisenna or Claudius. Mehl (2011) 66-69.

²¹ *Contra* e.g. Rich (2011) 15-22 who argues that the Livian method stems from Valerius Antias.

The above overview clearly asserts a gap in the research on the annalistic method in Dio since important variations have been identified in both Livy and Tacitus, and the idea of a set annalistic method imposed by tradition appears untenable. In the following, I shall therefore focus on Dio's handling of the traditionally asserted core annalistic themes of elections, omens and legislation in addition to a briefer overview of a range of other annalistic aspects.

3.2: Elections

The annalistic method is fundamentally organised around the consuls, and the elections of these, and of magistrates generally, therefore take on singular importance and are rarely omitted. Against this background, it is striking that Dio completely omits the consular elections of 69-65 and only includes these in 64 (Book 37) in relation to the Catilinarian Conspiracy.²² Catiline's defeat in the consular elections is an important cause: "new consuls were chosen, and Catiline no longer directed his plot in secret or against Cicero and his adherents only, but against the whole commonwealth."²³ This is, as shown above, in contrast to the other sources, which thought the plot inherent to Catiline, and Dio therefore appears to have tapped into the annalistic tradition at exactly this moment in order to emphasise that it is the political system and its constant competition for offices which create the conspiracy.

The narrative around the formation of the triumvirate is another case in point as Dio notes that Pompey "had Lucius Afranius and Metellus Celer appointed consuls (ὑπάτους ἀποδειχθῆναι ἐποίησεν), vainly (μάτην) hoping that through them he could effect whatever he desired."²⁴ Here Dio shows how the excessive power of Pompey has effectively undermined the political system since he appears to control the consular elections. However, Pompey still attempts to use the traditional institutions for influence, which is clearly a mistake as Dio already through μάτην singles out this plan as *a priori* futile and quickly hereafter underlines Pompey's actual failure as the δυνάτοί block any progress because of their personal dislike of and rivalry with Pompey.²⁵ This is also facilitated by the indifference of Afranius and the active opposition to Pompey by the supposed ally

²² See above: pp. 32-33.

²³ Cass. Dio 37.30.1.

²⁴ Cass. Dio 37.49.1. These, we know from other sources (e.g. Plut. *Pomp.* 39.2), were Pompey's *legati*.

²⁵ Cass. Dio 37.49.

Metellus, because “Pompey had divorced his sister”.²⁶ These egoistic acts, predicated on internal, factional competition, are representative of the process of Roman politics in general and the annalistic convention of focusing on consular elections has been exploited to facilitate this presentation.

Pompey realises that he has no real power and the so-called first triumvirate is formed as a consequence, which sets the stage for the next included consular elections (for 59) in which Caesar is elected. The *δυνατοί*, led by Cato, attempt to block Caesar too but with the support of the triumvirate he “was unanimously elected by them all.”²⁷ Dio here uses the consular elections to reveal that the triumvirate of the dynasts is far more powerful than the *δυνατοί* and the senators, and the alliance easily dominates politics.²⁸ The strength of the triumvirate also later explains Caesar’s successes during his consulship.²⁹ However, while exploiting the annalistic conventions, Dio also subverts them as the focus is never on the elections themselves but rather on the dynasts controlling them. Through this narrative prioritisation Dio again emphasises that it is Caesar, Pompey and Crassus who are the main holders of power, whereas the consular elections themselves are unimportant since they are controlled by these players and the consuls alone have no real power, as Pompey too realised. The traditional Republican institutions have thus been completely undermined by the ambition of the dynasts.

The involvement of Crassus and Pompey could then also explain why the consular elections of 56 are the only instance in the Late Republic where the election itself is in focus. Other consular elections are of course described, such as the tumult surrounding the elections for 53,³⁰ but only in 56 does Dio delve into the actual election process and competition between candidates. The general omission or relegation of consular elections could appear surprising for a historian focused on institutional competition. However, these omissions are part of Dio’s rejection of the annalistic framework as a viable method to describe Late Republican politics. To Dio, essentially, power was (as mentioned) no longer centred on the consuls but rather on the dynasts, which rendered the consular elections unimportant in themselves. The annalistic method, whose main focus was exactly

²⁶ Cass. Dio 37.49.3.

²⁷ Cass. Dio 37.54.3.

²⁸ Cass. Dio 37.57.

²⁹ See e.g. Cass. Dio 38.5.

³⁰ Cass. Dio 40.45-47.

on the consuls and their election,³¹ could therefore not describe Late Republican politics satisfyingly. Dio consequently rejected the annalistic convention of mechanically including consular elections, and in his use of these, instead prioritised the dynasts and the surrounding institutional competition. This is demonstrated as the consular elections of 56, the most extensively described, do involve two dynasts and the narrative is firmly focused on them and the accompanying competition rather than on other candidates. Likewise, the unrest of for example 53 exemplifies the problematic process of competition for offices and is part of the lead-up to Pompey's sole consulship. Dio's use of the consular elections is thus highly calculated as he carefully selects the cases which best exemplify his interpretative point about destructive competition. Furthermore, Dio's selective inclusions in fact also constitute a rejection of the annalistic method and a statement about the actual distribution of power in the Late Republic.

Dio's narrative of the consular elections of 56 has an instructive background: the triumvirate had secured an extraordinary command for Caesar who consequently attained great military success which in turn spurred Pompey on to seek the consulship. Dio comments: "the fact, however, that Caesar's influence was increasing [...], was a cruel thorn in Pompey's side."³² As set out in chapter 1,³³ Dio here presents Late Republican competition as a destructive zero-sum game and the typical annalistic element of consular elections is essential in this presentation. Dio then turns to one of the central problems of destructive political competition, namely violence, seen in the events surrounding Pompey's ally Clodius during the lead-up to the elections: the senators attempted to sway the populace but Clodius, who had favoured the populace consistently, quickly won them over and only when the senators employed violence against Clodius did they gain the upper hand. However, the populace quickly overpowered the senators attacking Clodius by escalating the violence: "many ran to the scene bringing fire and threatening to burn his oppressors along with the senate-house if they should do him any violence".³⁴ These highly violent scenes are unique to Dio in the source tradition and are incorporated in the only extensive and sustained treatment of consular elections in the whole Late Republic, and indeed the account teaches the reader several important lessons: firstly, the senate will never be able to gain a firm hold on the fickle populace which follows whoever favours them; and, secondly, violence decidedly trumps speeches and mere words but the popular

³¹ Rich (2011) 3-5.

³² Cass. Dio 39.25.1.

³³ Pp. 13.

³⁴ Cass. Dio 39.29.3.

leaders and dynasts will always have the upper hand in this escalation as the threat of the populace so clearly showed.

This second point is further seen as Pompey and Crassus terrify their opponents into submission: “To be sure, Lucius Domitius, who canvassed for the office up to the very last day of the year, set out from his house for the assembly just after dark, but when the slave who carried the torch in front of him was slain, he became frightened and went no farther. Hence, since no one at all opposed them, and furthermore since Publius Crassus, who was a son of Marcus and at that time lieutenant under Caesar, brought soldiers to Rome for this very purpose (ἐπ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο), they were easily chosen.”³⁵ Here, Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, who seemingly refrained from violence, is terrified into standing down and soldiers are even brought to Rome in order to stifle opposition. Dio’s narrative is a forceful reminder that the speeches of the senators are no match for the determined violence of the dynasts especially when supported by the army as well. Dio has thus here employed a typical element of the annalistic structure but manipulated it to present his interpretation of a political system in Rome which has broken down in the face of competition that has turned violent. This is, furthermore, the most extensively treated consular elections, which only supports their communicative value and suggests that the inclusion is deliberate and premeditated. The consular elections following 56 are mostly ignored except when Dio uses them to emphasise the chaos in Rome that prevented the magistrates from being chosen for several months in 53 and 52.³⁶ This use again supports Dio’s presentation of the Republic as broken due to competition and shows how Dio consistently omits annalistic material unless it serves his overall aims.

Another highly instructive area of annalistic exploitation in Dio is the priestly elections. Rich has argued that Livy does occasionally vary the positioning of priestly affairs according to narrative aims, but he also notes that “Livy gives a nearly complete record of changes to the pontifical college”.³⁷ Dio by contrast only mentions two priestly elections in the whole of his Late Republic and both serve clear interpretative aims. The first is Caesar’s election to *Pontifex Maximus* which is curiously inserted in the middle of the narrative of the Catilinarian Conspiracy. Dio emphasises Caesar’s youth and lack of experience but “basing his hopes of it upon the multitude [...] he accomplished his purpose

³⁵ Cass. Dio 39.31.

³⁶ See e.g. Cass. Dio 40.45-50.

³⁷ Rich (2011) 4.

and was elected *Pontifex Maximus*, in spite of the fact that many others, and Catulus in particular, were his rivals for the honour. This was because he showed himself perfectly ready to serve and flatter everybody, even ordinary persons, and shrank from no speech or action in order to get possession of the objects for which he strove.”³⁸ In relation to the *lex Gabinia*, Catulus had, as one of the few politicians in the Late Republic, been portrayed positively and Caesar’s victory is hereby the mark of a thoroughly broken system of problematic competition. Furthermore, it is clear here that success depends on unbridled ambition and a ruthless disposition where no act is too low. Dio thus again uses the annalistic tradition, which allows him to incorporate this seemingly trivial detail, but then presents the material in order to support his presentation of the Late Republic as wholly corrupted.

This is further seen in the second of the priestly elections incorporated where Cornelius Spinther transfers his son to another *gens* to evade a law barring two people from the same *gens* from simultaneously being *augur*, and Spinther hereby secures this position for his son. Dio underlines that this story “has some bearing upon our history”³⁹ and concludes: “thus, though the letter of the law was observed, its spirit was broken (ὁ νόμος ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ῥήμασι μείνας ἔργῳ κατελύθη).”⁴⁰ Dio here uses the election to emphasise the problem of political manipulation and this inclusion, as I will show in chapter 5,⁴¹ heralds a whole phase of focus upon this specific problematic manifestation of political competition. This is part of Dio’s wider exposition in Book 39 of the internal factors, connected to competition, which destroy the Republic and he has here used the annalistic conventions to justify his inclusion of another seemingly trivial detail. However, this detail supports and communicates Dio’s overall interpretation, namely that the Late Republic was thoroughly corrupted and that competition, and in this case (family) ambition, was at the heart of this corruption. Furthermore, these examples are the only inclusions of priestly elections, which shows Dio’s selective and calculated use of the annalistic tradition to support his overall framework.

The elections of other magistrates are only sparsely treated, arguably since they had but little relevance to the overall portrayal that Dio sought. The elections of quaestors are ignored, whereas the aedilitian elections are only incorporated twice. The first instance is

³⁸ Cass. Dio 37.37.2-3.

³⁹ Cass. Dio 39.17.1.

⁴⁰ Cass. Dio 39.17.2.

⁴¹ Pp. 90-91.

when the important figure Clodius exploits the office to gain immunity.⁴² The second mention is coupled with the only reference to the elections for praetor, namely when Pompey and Crassus, newly elected consuls, opposed Cato's attempt for the praetorship: "The election of the praetors, now, was made in peace, for Cato did not see fit to offer any violence; in the matter of the curule aediles, however, there was some bloodshed, so that even Pompey was much bespattered with blood."⁴³ Through his uprightness and refusal to use violence, Cato is rendered politically impotent, as indeed he is generally in Dio's narrative. This is a conscious contrast to the violent aedilitian elections and the previous consular elections, which emphasises how violence and unbridled ambition are highly effective in the political competition in Rome. The upright characters are instead rendered powerless through this very quality.

Through the few, but carefully selected, inclusions of elections for magistracies and priesthoods, Dio has succeeded in presenting Roman political competition as highly destructive, thereby both communicating and supporting his interpretation. This amounts to a careful manipulation, visible throughout the narrative, of the annalistic tradition as its content is frequently disregarded and instead selectively employed only when it supports Dio's overall aims. Dio's structuring of his narrative is thus far more sophisticated and consistent than modern scholars have admitted and again suggests the presence of an overarching interpretative framework with competition at its centre.

3.3: Omens

The use of omens in Dio's account has clear parallels to the above described elections. Levene has shown how even Livy uses the omens as narrative devices,⁴⁴ but Dio's inclusion of these has met with general criticism instead. Millar argued that Dio's use is "harmless and trivial"⁴⁵ and Lintott critically connected the interest in omens to antiquarianism.⁴⁶ Wirth asserted that Dio's interest in omens showed that he viewed "Fakten und Ereignissen als manifestierten Willen der Gottheit"⁴⁷ and Gowing mirrors this view as he calls the omens "a convenient substitute for actual analysis".⁴⁸ Only Burden-

⁴² Cass. Dio 39.7.3-4.

⁴³ Cass. Dio 39.32.2.

⁴⁴ Levene (1993); see also Kraus (1994) 11-13.

⁴⁵ Millar (1964) 77.

⁴⁶ Lintott (1997) 2511.

⁴⁷ Wirth (1985) 27.

⁴⁸ Gowing (1992) 118-122.

Strevens has briefly counterargued this position.⁴⁹ Scholars in general thus see Dio's omens as trivial and unimportant or as an alternative to historical interpretation. However, I will argue that Dio's use of these, seen most clearly in Books 39 and 40, in fact has important narrative and interpretative functions.

This is clearly seen in connection with the severe bribery problems during the controversy regarding whether to reinstate the Egyptian king Ptolemy: "While mortals were acting thus under the influence of money, Heaven at the very beginning of the next year struck with a thunderbolt the statue of Jupiter erected on the Alban Mount, and so delayed the return of Ptolemy for some time."⁵⁰ Firstly, the omens are here the direct cause for delaying the return of Ptolemy and are therefore neither harmless nor trivial. Secondly, Dio uses these omens to comment on the wider problem of bribery; as I will show in chapter 5, Book 39 sets out the internal factors that caused the fall of the Republic and in this section of the narrative, bribery is the main theme.⁵¹ Dio therefore includes the omens of this year as they provide the opportunity to emphasise, in his authorial voice, the deeply problematic process of institutional competition where bribery was rife. Furthermore, this inclusion adds divine backing to Dio's criticisms as even the gods are angry with Rome. However, an important aspect here is that the threatening omens have no immediate effect on the Romans as no one is punished for the bribes and connected assassinations, and Pompey even continues to support Ptolemy. Immediately hereafter, Cato forces the unlawful publication of the Sibylline Verses that seemingly warned against helping Ptolemy, and Rome descends into internal wrangling where the political decisions are dominated by the rivalry between the senators and Pompey.⁵² Dio thus clearly uses the omens both to support his interpretation of the Late Republic and as a stepping stone to communicate this further.

The next set of omens, separated by merely four chapters from the omens above, serves a similar purpose. In the preceding narrative, another theme of Book 39, political manipulation, has been in focus as Clodius for example used a trial against Milo to attack Pompey.⁵³ The omens now function as the cause for Clodius changing his target:

⁴⁹ Burden-Strevens (2015) 208.

⁵⁰ Cass. Dio 39.15.1.

⁵¹ See below: pp. 88-90.

⁵² Cass. Dio 39.16.2.

⁵³ See below: 85-86.

“about this time some portents occurred [long list of portents is inserted]; and the soothsayers, being anxious to find a remedy, said that some divinity was angry with them because some temples or consecrated sites were being used for residence. Then Clodius substituted Cicero for Milo and not only attacked him vigorously in a speech because the site of the house he had built upon was dedicated to Liberty, but even went to it once, with the intention of razing it to the ground; but he did not do so, as he was prevented by Milo.”⁵⁴

The portents are here again an important part of the causal chain as they ultimately prompt Clodius to attack Cicero and these are therefore not included merely to satisfy the annalistic conventions. Furthermore, omens were in fact politically significant in ancient Rome where they were both used in political competition, as above, and had important functions for the proper workings of society.⁵⁵ The inclusion of omens is thus, despite modern prejudices, legitimate and unsurprising in a Roman history. Moreover, the portents are placed in the midst of the egoistic struggles and competition between Pompey’s group and Clodius’, and thereby emphasise the problematic nature of this rivalry. Cicero and Clodius constantly try to undermine each other’s authority by manipulating the legal underpinnings, a continuation of the general theme of this narrative part, and the omens play a crucial role in presenting this picture. Furthermore, it is striking that the Romans are again unable to heed the warnings of the omens as the political situation in fact deteriorates in the wake of the threatening portents. Dio again uses typically annalistic material, here in the form of omens, and then exploits it to communicate and strengthen his interpretation of the Late Republic as undermined by internal competition and rivalry.

Another use of omens is seen in the last example of Book 39,⁵⁶ inserted in the narrative preceding Crassus’ departure for his ill-fated campaign in the east: “The tribunes, then, seeing that their boldness, unsupported by arms, was too weak to hinder any of his [Crassus’] undertakings, held their peace for the most part, but they uttered many dire imprecations against him, as if, indeed, they were not cursing the state through him. At one time as he was offering on the Capitol the customary prayers for his campaign, they spread a report of omens and portents”.⁵⁷ Dio thus uses the occasion to assert that traditional political authority, personified by the tribunes, has little power without arms, whereas the dynast Crassus, who had used violence precisely to become consul, succeeds in departing for his province. This deeply problematic political situation furthermore results in an

⁵⁴ Cass. Dio 39.20.

⁵⁵ See Rasmussen (2003); Driediger-Murphy (forthcoming 2016). Beard (1998), however, emphasises that the Romans also had sincere respect for their religion.

⁵⁶ As 39.61 is a punishment rather than an omen.

⁵⁷ Cass. Dio 39.39.5-6.

exploitation of religion by the tribunes as they attempt to use omens to disrupt Crassus. The tribunes, moreover, continue the Romans' previously seen lack of understanding for religious matters since they overlook or disregard that their religious attacks on Crassus ultimately harm the state. Through this seemingly trivial mention of the use of omens, Dio thus succeeds in painting a complex picture of the self-destructive politics of Rome: traditional political power has been undermined, here leading to the corruption of religion, and the ambitious dynasts have become excessively powerful yet problematic to attack since they are deeply imbedded in the Roman political world itself.

The omens become even more significant in Book 40 as they play a key role in the disaster that befalls Crassus: "The occurrences [previously described omens] were such that anyone, even the most indifferent and uninstructed, would interpret them to mean that they would fare badly and not return; hence there was great fear and dejection in the army."⁵⁸ Dio spends three entire chapters on omens here, unprecedented in the Late Republic, and this functions as a rhetorical device to enhance the importance of the coming disaster. It should be noted that *Obsequens* through *Livy* has many of the same portents for Crassus,⁵⁹ which shows that these are not Dio's inventions. Rather, Dio chose to include the omens of this particular year as they suited his interpretative purpose, which is a clear example of Dio's selectiveness in his inclusion of urban annalistic material. This is further supported as the omens are in fact also a causal factor by completely demoralising the soldiers. Crassus in his ambition disregards these omens, like the Romans do in general in Book 39, and furthermore attempts to manipulate the bad omens to his own advantage. However, he clumsily adds to the severity of the portents and the soldiers consequently "fell into greater discouragement".⁶⁰ The omens are here an important factor in Crassus' problems and his own inability to heed the warnings affords a clear parallel to Rome more generally in Book 39. Dio thus again exploits the annalistic convention of including omens, here in order to show the deeply problematic consequences of the excessive power of ambitious individuals.

The above examples show that Dio's omens are far more than trivial inclusions but instead amount to a sophisticated exploitation of the annalistic convention for his own narrative purposes as both Crassus and the Romans in general are portrayed as blinded by

⁵⁸ Cass. Dio 40.18.5.

⁵⁹ *Obseq.* 64.

⁶⁰ Cass. Dio 40.19.3.

ambition and competition through their disregard of the portents. The omens are multifaceted tools as they also function as causal factors in Dio's history. Importantly, Dio is also highly selective in his use of omens as they consistently serve significant functions in his Late Republican narrative, often connected to competition, which in turn suggests the presence of an overarching interpretative framework, guiding the selection process.

3.4: Legislation

Legislation is another typical annalistic area, at least according to the above definition by Swan,⁶¹ and here too Dio's selective use is evident. Dio in fact highlights this selectivity in his authorial voice when he rejects the inclusion of a large number of Caesarian laws: "As these laws, now, are very numerous and contribute nothing to this history, I will omit them".⁶² Dio here demonstrates that he had a copious amount of annalistic material which, however, was mostly omitted since it was not interpretatively useful. Instead, he mainly included legislation which communicated and supported his interpretation of a Republic undermined by institutional competition.

This is clearly seen as Dio fully exploits the inclusion of Caesar's agrarian law, the most extensively narrated piece of legislation in Dio's Late Republic, which is treated far more fully than in other sources.⁶³ Dio asserts that Caesar proposed the law to win over the multitude but that it was highly beneficial to the state: "The swollen population of the city, which was chiefly responsible for the frequent rioting (ἐστασίαζον), would thus be turned toward labour and agriculture; and the great part of Italy, now desolate, would be colonized afresh, so that not only those who had toiled in the campaigns, but all the rest as well, would have ample subsistence. And this would be accomplished without any expense on the part of the city itself or any loss to the *optimates* (δυνατῶν); on the contrary, many of them would gain both rank and office."⁶⁴ Even the nature of the connected land commission is given and this whole detailed description, which takes up a lengthy chapter, is thus in keeping with the annalistic tradition. However, this degree of legislative detail is unequalled elsewhere in the narrative of Dio's Late Republic, which shows that the above is included with a specific narrative aim, namely to emphasise the advantageous nature of

⁶¹ Swan (1987) 274.

⁶² Cass. Dio 38.7.6.

⁶³ App. *B. Civ.* 2.10-11; *Per.* 103; Plut. *Caes.* 14.2; Suet. *Caes.* 20; Vell. Pat. 2.44.4.

⁶⁴ Cass. Dio 38.1.2-3.

the law – an element unparalleled in other sources.⁶⁵ The senate's egoistic opposition is through the detailed, positive description of the law put in an even sharper negative light and Dio adds that their disapproval was motivated by political competition: "For they suspected that by this measure he [Caesar] would attach the multitude to him and gain fame and power over all men; and this was, in fact, his very purpose."⁶⁶ Through Dio's use of the annalistic tradition, a picture is created of a wholly untenable political system where any progress is opposed because of political rivalry. However, the senate's opposition through the consul Bibulus is futile and Caesar, with the help of violence and his fellow triumvirs, succeeds in enacting the law and several others. These other laws are given far less attention,⁶⁷ which indicates that Dio had made his interpretative point in relation to the agrarian law and therefore considered further detailed descriptions pointless.

The full account of the agrarian laws thus allows Dio to assert several key points as he for example shows the weakness of traditional political authority in the face of violent dynasts. Dio also succeeds in highlighting the constant problems of internal competition since it is Caesar's ambition that makes him propose the law and the senate's opposition as well is due to factional competition which in turn inhibits beneficial change and causes internal struggles. Furthermore, Caesar in fact attains a position comparable to sole rule as the opposers retreat while Crassus and Pompey support him: "In most matters Caesar himself proposed, advised, and arranged everything in the city once for all as if he were its sole ruler (ὥς καὶ μόνος ἀντὶ τῆς ἄρχων)".⁶⁸ Caesar now proposes laws that, among other things, conciliate the equestrians regarding tax problems and ratify the long-postponed acts of Pompey which had also been opposed by the *δυνατοί*. Thus, only with the advent of *μόνος ἄρχων* could the institutional problems of the Roman political system be solved – a clear foreshadowing of the redeeming reign of Augustus. Dio here exploits the annalistic structure not only to criticise the Republic but to indicate the cure.

A contrastingly unsuccessful piece of proposed legislation is Crassus' and Pompey's attempt during their consulship to remedy the problematic situation in Rome by curtailing personal expenditures "although they themselves went to every length of luxury and indulgence; but they were prevented by this very circumstance from enacting the law. For Hortensius, [...] making use of their own mode of life to support his arguments, persuaded

⁶⁵ App. *B. Civ.* 2.10-11; *Per.* 103; Plut. *Caes.* 14.2; Suet. *Caes.* 20; Vell. Pat. 2.44.4.

⁶⁶ Cass. Dio 38.2.3.

⁶⁷ Cass. Dio 38.7.4-6.

⁶⁸ Cass. Dio 38.8.2.

them to give up their intention.”⁶⁹ This could appear an odd insertion as the law comes to naught, but this annalistic narrative element succeeds in supporting Dio’s interpretation of a Republic where progress is impossible; the consuls are caught in a web of internal corruption where every attempt to break the pattern through one’s position is hindered by the corruption used to obtain it. Furthermore, it is notable that this attempt, made by two consuls within the legal and constitutional limits, is unsuccessful, whereas Caesar’s legislation, backed up by extra-legal influences such as violence and the triumvirate, is successful. This is another forceful indictment of the Republican system as only a state approximating sole rule succeeds in bringing the needed change while constitutional attempts are ineffectual. The exploitation of annalistic conventions is here again fundamental in supporting Dio’s chain of arguments.

Dio’s instrumental use of legislation is also seen in several minor laws, often unattested in other sources. An example hereof is the abovementioned law against bribery directed at Catiline which plays a pivotal role in the prelude to the Catilinarian Conspiracy:⁷⁰ “Catiline, accordingly, believed that this decree had been passed on his account, as was indeed the case; and so, after collecting a small band, he attempted to slay Cicero and some others of the foremost men on the very day of the election, in order that he might immediately be chosen as consul.”⁷¹ The annalistic conventions are followed in the inclusion of this element but it then becomes a central narrative tool in Dio’s alternative version of the conspiracy, outlined in chapter 2.⁷² Dio thus uses this element to underline the institutional problems of the political system as the attempt to correct the destructive bribery rather causes a short-lived civil war. Dio has hereby again put internal political competition at the heart of Rome’s problems and the manipulation of the annalistic tradition is a central tool herein.

Another noteworthy law is mentioned in an oddly placed notice in Book 37, here given in full: “Since the taxes were proving oppressive to the city and the rest of Italy, the law that abolished them was acceptable to all. The senators, however, were angry at the praetor who proposed it (Metellus Nepos) and wished to erase his name from the law, entering another one instead. And although this plan was not carried out, it was still made clear to

⁶⁹ Cass. Dio 39.37.2-3.

⁷⁰ See pp. 32.

⁷¹ Cass. Dio 37.29.1-2.

⁷² See pp. 30-34.

all that they received not even benefits gladly from base men.”⁷³ Dio gives no historical context or apparent narrative ties to the surrounding material and the notice could appear to have been included merely on the basis of annalistic conventions. However, it supports Dio’s overall narrative as the senate is portrayed as egoistic and problematic but also weak through its futile attacks on a beneficial law, merely out of personal dislike for the proposer. The inclusion of this law therefore both communicates and strengthens Dio’s presentation of traditional political authority as weakened, and, importantly, internal rivalry is again central to the problems of the state.

Several other examples of legislation conform to the same pattern of highlighting the institutional problems of the Republic, especially competition: Clodius outlaws the observation of heavenly signs since these were exploited by his competitors, which shows how the workings of the state were suborned to political competition.⁷⁴ Another example is the reinstatement of censorial powers in Book 40 as due to the general corruption of society, the office had become unworkable, which again underlines the impossibility of reform within the Republic.⁷⁵ A final example is Pompey’s legislation during his sole consulship: the legislation is successful as it secures the conviction of a large number of people for especially bribery, a central competitive tool, who had before avoided conviction and Pompey also confirms the decree that five years must pass between holding office and holding command, which was important in order to lessen problematic competition.⁷⁶ Pompey is of course also portrayed as hypocritical, manipulative and self-interested during his consulship⁷⁷ in a further critique of the institutional competition of the Republic. However, the above successes, during a consulship where he nominally chose a colleague but in Dio’s narrative acted and held power completely independently,⁷⁸ also support the need for sole rule as only a situation approximating monarchy could solve central problems of the institutional competition.

All these examples of legislation are included using the annalistic conventions as foundation but are then, as the elections and omens, manipulated into supporting and communicating Dio’s overall arguments where monarchy was needed as a response to the destructively excessive competition of the Late Republic. Dio’s consistency in this respect

⁷³ Cass. Dio 37.51.3-4.

⁷⁴ Cass. Dio 38.13.6.

⁷⁵ Cass. Dio 40.57.

⁷⁶ Cass. Dio 40.50-56, 46.2.

⁷⁷ See e.g. Cass. Dio 40.55.2.

⁷⁸ Cass. Dio 40.51.2.

again supports the idea of an overarching interpretative framework. Thus Dio used the annalistic conventions but only when it suited his narrative and interpretative aims, and he thereby reveals himself to be a careful and consistent exploiter of the tradition.

3.5: Other annalistic elements

In this subchapter I will provide a brief overview of Dio's use of other important annalistic elements to show that the above manipulations were indeed widespread in Dio's narrative. One area where this is clearly seen is aedilitian actions as these are only mentioned once in the whole Late Republican narrative, namely in connection with Caesar. He received praise during his term in office "because he exhibited both the *Ludi Romani* and the *Megalenses* on the most expensive scale and furthermore arranged gladiatorial contests in his father's honour in the most magnificent manner."⁷⁹ Dio's purpose here is to show the origins of Caesar's *popularis* tactics and to foreshadow his future actions. Dio later explicitly claims that Caesar had sought the sole rule of Rome all along⁸⁰ and this passage gives weight to the assertion as we here see Caesar ingratiating himself with the people ever since his time as aedile. Furthermore, his successes in this respect, both here and later, show the problematic process of internal competition in Rome where great power could be obtained through popularity with the people. That this is the only mention of aedilitian activities in the Late Republican narrative strongly suggests that the inclusion of this typically annalistic notice had interpretative functions.

Another instance of a sparingly included annalistic element is religious matters. Dio for example once includes the *augurium salutis*, held only in times of complete peace, and it is positioned in the prelude to the Catilinarian Conspiracy. Dio here emphasises the absurdity of holding this *augurium* when the Romans were "causing one another unspeakable woes through party strife (στάσεις) [...]. Nevertheless, it was in some way possible at that time for the divination to be held; but it did not prove to be regular".⁸¹ Dio then narrates revolutionary measures brought by tribunes and the consul Antonius and comments: "Hence there arose turbulent factions and contentions (σπουδαί τε οὖν παραχώδεις καὶ φιλονεικίαι)".⁸² By emphasising the absurdity of holding the *augurium* during civil strife and rivalry, and then immediately hereafter narrating the internal troubles created by

⁷⁹ Cass. Dio 37.8.1.

⁸⁰ See e.g. Cass. Dio 41.54.1.

⁸¹ Cass. Dio 37.24.3-25.1.

⁸² Cass. Dio 37.27.1.

Antonius and the tribunes, Dio has here created a contrast between the needed circumstances for the *augurium* and the actual corrupt state of the Republic. Dio has thus clearly utilised the *augurium*, a standard annalistic element, to support his picture of a Roman Republic undermined by competition and civil strife.

This use of religious matters can further be seen in Book 39 where the internal competition during Crassus' and Pompey's quest for the consulship have effectively paralysed the senate as they did "not change back to their usual attire nor attend the games nor celebrate the feast of Jupiter on the Capitol nor go out to the Alban Mount for the *Feriae Latinae*, held there for the second time by reason of something not rightly done."⁸³ The religious elements mentioned are only included here in the entire Late Republic and Dio uses them to emphasise the destructive effect of the internal competition in relation to that year's consular elections, further explored in chapter 5.⁸⁴ It is, furthermore, striking that all the abovementioned elements are typical annalistic material and Dio underlines that the influence of the dynasts has effectively disrupted them. This could thus be a conscious emphasis of the inability of the annalistic method to independently describe the Late Republic as its typical elements and traditional Republican authority are undermined and dominated by the dynasts. This is further supported as Dio concludes the chapter: "Instead, they [the senators] spent the rest of the year exactly as if they were enslaved (ὥσπερ δεδουλωμένοι)".⁸⁵ The dynasts and their violent competition have here effectively enslaved the senators and Dio underscores this effect by the emphatic suffix *-περ* on the conjunction. The urban annalistic material that Swan so emphatically called the "hallmark" of the annalistic structure is essentially senatorial business, but the senate has here been completely paralysed and the dynasts are the true holders of power. Dio has thus presented a picture of the Roman Republic where the annalistic method is simply unable to describe the nature of its politics, which supports Dio's selective use of the tradition.

Pompey is at the centre of another rare annalistic inclusion, namely the construction of public buildings. Dio inserts the aside after relating a spectacle in the new theatre built by Pompey during his consulship but also includes a rumour that it was in fact a freedman of Pompey's called Demetrius rather than Pompey himself who had paid for the theatre "with the money he had gained while making campaigns with the general. Most justly, therefore,

⁸³ Cass. Dio 39.30.4.

⁸⁴ See below: pp. 94-98.

⁸⁵ Cass. Dio 39.30.4. Adapted from Cary (1914-1927).

did he give his master's name to the structure, so that Pompey might not incur needless reproach because of the fact that his freedman had collected money enough for so huge an expenditure."⁸⁶ The reference in the quote to Pompey's previously closely narrated campaigns and the money accrued as a consequence highlights the problematic nature of imperialism that furnished individuals with huge sums that could then be used for personal ambition and competition.⁸⁷ This problem is emphasised by the fact that even a freedman is allegedly able to construct a theatre. The role of the freedman could also be a comment on the excessive influence of freedmen in Dio's own time although this contemporary influence on the representation of Dio's Late Republic ought not to be exaggerated.⁸⁸ Dio shortly hereafter asserts that Pompey used the theatre as a tool in the competition for the people's favour as he staged games and thereby "afforded the populace no little delight".⁸⁹ Dio has here created a causal chain where Pompey's extraordinary commands gave him military successes and funds which in turn allowed the construction of a theatre that is then used to intensify and stimulate the destructive internal competition. Through the inclusion of the construction of a theatre and the staging of games, both typically annalistic elements, Dio has shown the interconnectivity between selfish imperialism, partly a consequence of the problematic extraordinary commands, and the increase in destructive internal competition.

A further annalistic aspect that is also used in calculated fashion is the allotment of provinces. Lucius Lucullus was chosen to serve as governor of Sardinia but "declined the province, detesting the business because of the many whose administration of affairs in foreign lands was anything but honest. That he was of a mild disposition he had given the fullest proof."⁹⁰ Both the provision of a first name and the positive description show that this Lucullus is not the general fighting Mithridates but a relatively minor figure who is only mentioned here. Furthermore, this is the only time Dio records the allotment of provinces when not connected directly to a leading political figure and it could appear superfluous. However, it allows Dio to criticise the corruption of Roman politics as the governing of the provinces has turned so corrupt that one of the few good men of the Late Republic refuses the governorship and leaves it to the selfish politicians using the provinces for their own ambitious competition. This contextually detached narrative aside,

⁸⁶ Cass. Dio 39.38.6.

⁸⁷ See Churchill (1999) for further discussion of this area.

⁸⁸ *Contra* Gowing (1992); Kemezis (2014).

⁸⁹ Cass. Dio 39.39.1.

⁹⁰ Cass. Dio 36.41.1.

typical of the annalistic tradition, thus serves to strengthen Dio's criticisms of the Late Republic as the traditional governing of provinces has turned unworkable due to the corruption connected to political competition.

We should resist the temptation to ascribe ulterior motives to all Dio's narrative choices as some elements, such as the oddly placed mention of the construction of the Fabrician Bridge,⁹¹ were no doubt included merely for the sake of recording them, especially when they add nothing to Dio's narrative and interpretative aims. However, the above clearly shows that Dio still exhibits a consistent exploitation of the annalistic tradition, which an analysis of further factors would only support.⁹² The overview supports the previous conclusions, namely that Dio used the annalistic conventions consistently to support his own communicative and interpretative aims, which in turn suggests the presence of an overarching interpretative framework.

3.6: Conclusion

In the above I have shown how Dio selectively includes annalistic material and exploits the annalistic tradition in order to strengthen and communicate his interpretation centred on competition, which constitutes a clear deviation from the largely Livian method asserted by Swan and Rich. The focus on the dynasts at the expense of the consuls and general annalistic material is of course also encouraged by the historical nature of the Late Republic. However, Dio's conscious manipulations and frequent omission of annalistic material are so careful and consistent that the historical aspects of the period can only be part of the explanation and Dio's own narrative and interpretative aims are instead a more significant factor.

Another objection to my conclusions could be that Dio's sporadic inclusion of annalistic elements is simply a reflection of the poverty of his source material as argued by Millar and Manuwald for the Augustan period.⁹³ Yet Dio spent most of his adult life as a senator and at the Roman court, and was the *amicus* of both Severus and Caracalla while he was arguably also involved in the intellectual life around Julia Domna.⁹⁴ Furthermore, he spent

⁹¹ Cass. Dio 37.45.3.

⁹² E.g. relief for disasters: Cass. Dio 39.61 or religious matters: 37.24; 39.30.4.

⁹³ Millar (1964) 87-92; Manuwald (1979) 276-277. Swan (1987) 285-288 disagrees.

⁹⁴ Millar (1964) 20; Moscovich (2004) 359-368.

a winter in Nicomedia in 214 AD⁹⁵ and became curator of Pergamum and Smyrna in 218 AD for a number of years.⁹⁶ These major intellectual centres would have offered Dio prime access to libraries and other resources for his history. In short, Dio was one of the best placed ancient writers to make use of written material and he does assert himself that he read widely.⁹⁷ Furthermore, Dio mentions Livy⁹⁸ and has frequent close overlaps regarding omens with Obsequens⁹⁹ who used the writings of Livy in some form for his work, which suggests that the latter continued the incorporation of annalistic material in the now lost Late Republic. This indicates that Dio knew and used Livy which would have furnished him with a wealth of annalistic material. Accordingly, Dio's sporadic inclusion of annalistic elements was not dictated by a lack of material but is rather testament to a high degree of selectivity in order to support his interpretative framework. Thus the general, incautious branding of Dio as an annalist appears problematic since it connects him to the far more consistent and at times mechanic annalistic model found in Livy.

This also highlights the need for a clearer definition of the annalistic method that is not merely based on the singular case of Livy. Moreover, the previous assertions of Swan and Rich that Dio follows the annalistic model in a relatively simplistic way are untenable as they in Dio see only an occasional flexibility with the annalistic method, which is attributed to mere narrative convenience. They fail to realise that Dio's Late Republic is not primarily governed by an annalistic structure but rather by Dio's own interpretative framework, while the annalistic conventions are a tool in the support and presentation of this framework. It could even be argued that Dio's highly selective use of annalistic conventions is a conscious rejection of the Livian mode of history writing: as far as we know from the surviving material, Dio was the first writer since Livy to attempt a long-term narrative of the Late Republic and Livy would therefore be a natural point of comparison.¹⁰⁰ However, this rejection is not merely historiographical in nature but also closely tied to Dio's interpretation: in Dio's narrative, the organisation of the Republic is severely distorted and starts falling apart, and the annalistic tradition, which bases itself exactly on the notion of a regular and traditional Republic, therefore ceases to be a viable method of narration. Consular elections are for example an absolutely fundamental part of the annalistic tradition and it is therefore highly problematic for this tradition when new

⁹⁵ Cass. Dio 77.18.3; Millar (1964) 20-22.

⁹⁶ Cass. Dio 79.7.4; Millar (1964) 23.

⁹⁷ Cass. Dio F 1.2.

⁹⁸ Cass. Dio 67.12.4.

⁹⁹ Compare e.g. Cass. Dio 37.9.1-2 with Obseq. 61 or Cass. Dio 40.18.3 with Obseq. 64.

¹⁰⁰ See also Urso (forthcoming 2017) for Dio as a possible "anti-Livian".

consuls are simply not elected as in the second half of the 50s. Moreover, in Dio's Late Republic, dynasts can simply have the consuls elected according to their wishes, exemplified by Pompey in the elections for 60 (ὕπατους ἀποδειχθῆναι ἐποίησεν),¹⁰¹ which undermines the importance of the elections since the dynasts, here Pompey, essentially control them. Furthermore, the annalistic method is essentially based on the consuls because these are the prime historical drivers given their occupation of the most powerful office in Rome. However, in Dio's Late Republic, the dynasts hold the actual power instead and therefore often occupy the narrative centre and frequently function as tools in the historian's exploration of institutional competition rather than the consuls. Consequently, Dio's interpretation and view of the Late Republic can simply not be conveyed through the Livian annalistic model. Dio's conscious rejection of the strict annalistic method of Livy is, then, part of an attempt at not only historiographic but also interpretative distinctiveness.

This is not to argue that Dio completely rejected the annalistic tradition but rather that his use of it was far more calculated and selective than previously asserted. Dio thus evinces a striking freedom in the structuring of his narrative, which has been acknowledged for Livy and Tacitus but explained away as incompetence or ignored in the case of Dio. Contrastingly, I have shown in the above that Dio's highly selective use of the annalistic tradition has important functions in his narrative, which demonstrates a sophisticated and premeditated approach to the Late Republic that revolves around political competition. This chapter in short leads to the same important overall conclusion as chapter 2, namely that Dio did indeed have an overarching interpretative framework, which further counters the mainly critical view of Dio in modern scholarship.

Remarkably, manipulation of the annalistic tradition is increasingly acknowledged for Livy and even more for Tacitus.¹⁰² Dio's connection with this tradition is far more diffuse than that of these authors and the structuring in Dio could therefore be seen as building on the manipulation of Tacitus and taking it a step further. Furthermore, it has been argued that Livy's annalistic method mirrors his historical interpretation where the stable institutions and workings of the state overshadow individual events and the office of consul is singularly important.¹⁰³ On the other hand, Tacitus' more thorough manipulative

¹⁰¹ Cass. Dio 37.49.1. This is seen also at e.g. Cass. Dio 37.54.3; 40.51.2.

¹⁰² Ginsburg (1981); Rich (2011).

¹⁰³ Phillips (1974) 273.

use of the annalistic structure has been seen as a parallel to the use and manipulation of vestiges of the Republic by the emperors in his history.¹⁰⁴ This line of argument could be extended to Dio whose use of the annalistic tradition can be viewed as a parallel to the mendacious exploitation and manipulation of the Republican institutions employed to great effect by Dio's leading characters. Furthermore, Dio's frequent omissions of annalistic material signify a narrative shift away from the consuls and the basic workings of the Republic and onto the dynasts. This in turn demonstrates Dio's view of the decreasing importance of the former and increasing significance of the latter whose constant institutional competition do indeed drive the Republic towards civil war because the state is unable to contain it. Thus Dio's consciously selective and manipulative use of the annalistic tradition arguably becomes part of and mirrors the overarching interpretative framework of the *Historia Romana*.

¹⁰⁴ Ginsburg (1981) 100.

4: A diachronic analysis of Book 36

4.1: Introduction

Scholars have traditionally looked at Dio's work in isolated fragments according to their specific needs for information. Furthermore, even the more recent scholarship on Dio has focused on particular aspects rather than on the continuous narrative. I here propose to explore Book 36 diachronically from beginning to end in the fashion that Dio intended. It should be noted that the book divisions are Dio's own,¹ which indicates that the historian saw these as meaningful narrative organisers, yet Dio's books have never been individually studied except in commentaries² which by their more linguistic, detail-oriented nature eschew the sustained, comprehensive interpretation I propose here.

I, by contrast, will show how Dio through skilful manipulation of the organisation and presentation of his material, created a sophisticated cumulative interrelation between individual parts of Book 36. This cumulative effect cannot be uncovered only by synchronic or thematic studies but is absolutely central to Dio as it facilitated the presentation of important political problems. Chief of these, as seen in the preceding chapters, is the destructive effects of political competition which was the central problem in Dio's Late Republic. I have chosen to focus on Book 36 since this is Dio's main exploration of external competition, as only four chapters are strictly detached from this topic. In Book 36, Dio clearly shows how the constant competition is undermining foreign policy but the political competition also manifests itself in more specific ways that are central to Dio's interpretation: firstly, it causes the first extraordinary command which has irreparable consequences for the Roman Republican system as it places increasing power in the hands of the dynasts and undermines traditional offices and authority. Secondly, the extraordinary commands are described as quasi-monarchical but also presented as unavoidable in order to solve Republican problems. By inference, Dio suggests that monarchy is the only cure for the Republican ills. The book is therefore central to Dio's overall narrative of the Late Republic and is also a manifestation of his institutional focus that, as seen in chapter 2, stands in contrast to the parallel sources.

¹ Suda s.v. Δίων, ὁ Κασσιος.

² See e.g. Swan (2004).

Both older and newer scholarly works highlight the need for a diachronic approach to Dio's work. The scholarly tradition started by Millar, and followed widely even today, included damning judgements of Dio's lack of narrative aim³ but never actually conducted a close reading of the narrative to support this claim. Furthermore, recent studies that have attempted, often successfully, in countering this view have in fact followed a similar synchronic or thematic approach as Rees and especially Burden-Strevens focus on speeches, while Kemezis' work is concerned with so-called narrative modes. These are indeed important works but none of them approach the narrative in the sustained diachronic fashion that I propose and there is therefore a clear gap in today's scholarship.

I have divided this chapter into four subchapters. The first focuses on Lucullus and his deposition; the second incorporates the Cretan War and the description of the pirates; the third explores the *lex Gabinia* and its speeches and the fourth concentrates on the *lex Manilia* and the surrounding events in addition to Pompey's campaigns in the east that close the book.

4.2: Lucullus and the Mithridatic War

The first chapter of Book 36 is only available in Xiphilinus' epitome which Fromentin and Mallan, however, have recently argued to be generally faithful to Dio.⁴ It is instructive that already this first chapter deals with Roman foreign policy as Hortensius, the consul of 69, relinquished his command in Crete to his colleague because he preferred the luxury of Rome. Luxury hereby undermined foreign policy as a potential general preferred indulgence over the Cretan battlefields. This moral aspect is problematic but not central to Dio who focused less on the supposedly excessive luxury than other sources, such as Sallust or Velleius. Dio therefore quickly moves on to the process of external competition regarding the command of Lucullus and inserts a criticism in the mouths of Rome's enemies: "For every victorious force was inherently insatiate of success and set no bound to its greed (πλεονεξία); and the Romans, who had won the mastery over many, would not choose to leave him [Arsaces] alone."⁵ This criticism of Roman imperialism through Rome's enemies is commonplace⁶ but Dio incorporates it in order to prime the reader to see the subsequently described external competition in a more negative light. This is

³ Millar (1964) 74-75, 118.

⁴ Fromentin (2013) 23-26; Mallan (2013) 737-738; Mallan (forthcoming 2017).

⁵ Cass. Dio 36.1.2.

⁶ See e.g. Sall. *Hist.* 4.69 for Mithridates or Tac. *Ann.* 14.35 for Boudicca.

facilitated by the credibility of the critique since *πλεονεξία* is a central and recurring problem of political competition in this period⁷ and the corrupting influence of success is a mainstay of Dio's narrative, as exemplified by for example Sulla or Caesar.

This priming is further supported as Lucullus is immediately hereafter revealed as a self-serving general who, despite the negative effects on Rome, was averse to relinquish his command: Lucullus refrained from following up his victories and allowed the Armenian king Tigranes "to reach safety quite at his leisure (*συχολήν*)."⁸ Consequently, Lucullus was accused of prolonging the war in order to stay in command, and Acilius, consul in 67, was sent to relieve him when he was judged to have done this again. However, in spite of these accusations and his imminent deposition, Lucullus continued fighting. This is a clear example of the problematic external competition, which is facilitated by the excessively powerful generals in the Late Republic and exacerbated by the prolonged commands, as Lucullus uses his position to gain personal power and keeps hold of a generalship even though the Roman desire for ending the war is hereby undermined.

Through the criticism of Lucullus and Roman imperialism in these first two chapters, Dio has primed his readers to understand the following wars and successes of this Roman general, covering twelve whole chapters, as proof of the uncontrollability of the institutional external competition of powerful generals. This priming allows Dio more fluency without disruptive authorial comments throughout the narrative and he also attains both the communication and support of his interpretation. The chronological manipulation where both accusations against Lucullus are presented at the same time is fundamental in this context.

Dio's emphasis on the problems of external competition is further seen as he now presents the thoroughly negative portrait of Roman foreign policy pervaded and completely undermined by institutional competition, outlined in chapter 2:⁹ The soldiers mutiny because Acilius was sent to relieve Lucullus and Marcius Rex disingenuously pretends to be unable to help. All the generals are criticised as none of them defend the Roman territory which has swift consequences: "Mithridates won back almost all his

⁷ Rees (2011) 18-21.

⁸ Cass. Dio 36.2.1.

⁹ See above: pp. 24-25.

domain and caused great havoc in Cappadocia”.¹⁰ This is a clear example of the thoroughly destructive effects of the political competition that the first half of this thesis has highlighted. The competition is not merely individual as it includes every single general described here and the above situation is therefore instead a consequence both of the process of imperialism and especially of the general process of aristocratic competition where a command was a tool and an opportunity to gain advantages.

After the above successes of Mithridates, Dio critiques Lucullus as a general and the narrative changes focus to Crete. The deeply negative description and interpretation of the selfish competition and its consequences thus become the coda of an otherwise long row of positive military results of Lucullus. Dio hereby succeeds in bookending Lucullus’ successes with clear criticisms of the use of commands for political competition, which causes this at least partly successful generalship to become part of a larger institutional problem rather than just a string of battles. Dio hereby invests this intervening, largely descriptive narrative with far more interpretative meaning than it has on its own, which underscores the importance of a diachronic analysis.

This bookending and narrative construction rest fundamentally on a rejection of the annalistic internal-external-internal model: from chapter one in the year 69 until the year 67 the narrative stays continually in the east, and the internal matters of Rome, so central to the annalistic structure, have been completely eliminated bar the unelaborated notices of displeasure in Rome which are essentially given from an eastern perspective. This structuring avoids the annalistic fragmentation but more importantly it, facilitates the clear communication of Dio’s interpretation of the overall problems of external competition which Lucullus’ command exemplifies eminently.

In conclusion, the narrative surrounding Lucullus’ command is carefully arranged by Dio as he bookends the campaigns with severe criticisms of the process of Rome’s foreign wars; Dio argues that the prolonged commands fostered ambition and reluctance to relinquish power, which is part of the constant institutional competition that undermined Roman imperialism. In order to communicate this, Dio manipulates the chronology slightly when he groups together the two accusations of prolonging the war, hereby seeking to thoroughly prime the reader to understand the following narrative according to Dio’s perspective. Furthermore, the above shows that in order to fully understand the narrative

¹⁰ Cass. Dio 36.17.1.

surrounding the command of Lucullus and Dio's connected interpretation, a close and diachronic reading is fundamental.

4.3: The Cretan War and the pirates

Dio's exploration of the problems of the corrupted Roman imperialism continues as the narrative moves to the war in Crete which started already in 69 but Dio focuses on the rivalry in 67 between Metellus, to whom the war was entrusted, and Pompey who, by virtue of the as yet unexplained *lex Gabinia*, had vast powers in the Mediterranean. The only other sources describing this event, Plutarch and Velleius, both narrate the *lex* before the rivalry between Pompey and Metellus. Through this, they present Metellus in a positive light as the victim of the power-hungry Pompey.¹¹ Dio's narrative is slightly fragmented here but Xiphilinus' epitome does show that Dio briefly described Pompey's command and its powers¹² given by the *lex Gabinia*, in connection with the war in Crete. However, Dio still decisively manipulates the ordering of events as the rivalry between the two men, predicated on the *lex Gabinia*, is narrated before the passing of the actual *lex*, yet this is no blunder. Rather, it facilitates the negative presentation of both men as exceedingly ambitious and locked in destructive competition. In Dio's account there are no heroes and he hereby succeeds in presenting institutional, external competition as a central problem in the Late Republic, which is undermining foreign policy.

This institutional problem of competition is clearly exemplified in Dio's description of the Roman commanders on Crete, starting with the explicit critique of Metellus: "In his eagerness for power (δυναστείας τε ἐρῶν) he attacked even the Cretans who had come to terms with the other [Pompey], and heedless of their claim that there was a truce, hastened to do them injury before Pompey should come up."¹³ Metellus here attacks cities that have made peace with the Romans in a selfish quest for personal *δυναστεία*, a highly negative term in Dio's Late Republic.¹⁴ Furthermore, this sets the scene for Dio's unflattering portrayal of Metellus' following actions as he maltreated many captured towns (ἄλλοις τε οὖν πολλοῖς ἐκεῖνος ἐλυμήνατο)¹⁵ and Octavius is even portrayed as helping

¹¹ Plut. *Pomp.* 29; Vell. Pat. 34.1-2.

¹² Cass. Dio (Xiph.) 36.17a. Xiphilinus is, according to Mallan (2013) 737-738 and Fromentin (2013) 23-26, reasonably faithful.

¹³ Cass. Dio 36.18.1.

¹⁴ Freyburger-Galland (1996); Kemezis (2014) 107-112; Coudry (forthcoming 2016) 8-9.

¹⁵ Cass. Dio 36.18.2.

“those who were being wronged (τοῖς κακουμένοις)”¹⁶ by Metellus. However, Octavius is no saint as he only acts after one of his own towns is attacked: “Octavius, incensed at this, no longer remained quiet, but first used the army of Sisenna (that general had fallen sick and died) to aid here and there those who were being wronged, and then, when these troops had retired, proceeded to Aristion at Hierapydna and aided him in fighting.”¹⁷ Octavius here supports the Cretans against the Roman general Metellus, to whom the war was entrusted, merely out of personal dislike. Another general, Sisenna, who was the governor of Greece, is also portrayed negatively: “Cornelius Sisenna, the governor of Greece, did, to be sure, when he heard the news, come to Crete and advise Metellus to spare the towns, but on failing to persuade him offered no active opposition.”¹⁸ Sisenna is hereby yet another general who chiefly prioritises his own good and Dio here also succeeds in emphasising the lack of options in the face of a determined general with loyal soldiers as the timid efforts at persuasion are futile. Metellus is thus another example of the problem of ambitious generals as his lengthy war, partly because of the competition of Pompey, has turned destructive and tools to oppose him are lacking. Furthermore, Dio succeeds in presenting every single commander as self-interested and they are generally locked in a competition to gain influence on the island, which severely undermines the interests of Rome. This is, then, yet another manifestation of the destructive process of external competition

Upon the defeat of the Cretans, Dio becomes even more damning in his critique: “In this way the Cretans, who had been free (ἐλεύθεροι) through all preceding ages and had never had a foreign master, became enslaved (κατεδουλώθησαν); and from their subjugation Metellus obtained his title.”¹⁹ Dio quite clearly attempts to paint a sympathetic picture of the Cretans by his use of “ἐλεύθεροι” and “κατεδουλώθησαν”, the latter intriguingly bringing Tacitus’ criticism of Roman expansion to mind.²⁰ This casting of Roman imperialism as slavery is a fierce critique and is repeated several times throughout the Late Republic.²¹ However, the depth of this critique is only perceptible against the background of the previous narrative of Book 36.

¹⁶ Cass. Dio 36.19.1. Adapted from Cary (1914-1927).

¹⁷ Cass. Dio 36.19.1.

¹⁸ Cass. Dio 36.18.1.

¹⁹ Cass. Dio 36.19.3.

²⁰ E.g. Tac. *Agr.* 21.

²¹ Cass. Dio 39.54; 40.14.4; 41.13.3.

Moreover, Dio furthers his critique as the negatively portrayed victory over the Cretans, born out of selfish competition, is immediately followed by a resultant honorary *cognomen*, Creticus, for Metellus and a triumph. This triumph, furthermore, is also used to criticise the last remaining actor in the Cretan narrative, Pompey: “He [Metellus] was, however, unable to have Panares and Lasthenes, whom he had also captured, march in his triumph; for Pompey got them away beforehand by persuading (ἀναπείσας) one of the tribunes that it was to him that they had submitted in the settlement and not to Metellus.”²² It should be noted that ἀναπείσας, besides the translation given above, can also mean “seduce”, “mislead” or even “bribe”,²³ which adds another layer of criticism. Dio could appear oddly lenient in his critique of Pompey; however, from Plutarch we learn that Octavius was in fact a general sent by Pompey,²⁴ which would serve to shift the criticism more heavily towards the latter as Dio has a habit of criticising leaders through the act of their underlings.²⁵ We are thus here, as in the case of Lucullus, presented with an incredibly negative picture of Roman imperialism where there are no heroes and all players act self-interestedly, locked in destructive competition. Through this, Dio is singularly negative in his portrayal, which is a clear continuation of his previous narrative of Lucullus. It is striking that the narrative has still not moved back to Rome and Dio hereby succeeds in making an uninterrupted chain of imperialism that is corrupted and undermined by competition.

Dio now turns his attention to the pirates and attributes their rise to the above described wars: “at this time, ever since war had been carried on continuously in many different places at once, and many cities had been overthrown, while sentences hung over the heads of all the fugitives, and there was no freedom from fear for anyone anywhere, large numbers had turned to plundering.”²⁶ Dio here creates a causal link between the pirates and the uncontrollable external competition which is exemplified by the narratives surrounding Metellus and Lucullus: as part of the constant competition, they had continuously provoked war and undermined peace in order to retain commands and gain influence, which had created disorder and ideal conditions for piracy. This is further supported as the connection between excessive imperialism and piracy is given in direct continuation of the narratives of these two generals.

²² Cass. Dio 36.19.3.

²³ LSJ s.v. “ἀναπείθω”.

²⁴ Plut. *Pomp.* 29.2.

²⁵ See e.g. Tiberius: Cass. Dio 57.19-21 or Septimius Severus: 76.14-16.

²⁶ Cass. Dio 36.20.2.

Surprisingly, however, the pirates menacing Italy are described rather positively and thereby furnish a notable contrast to the selfish and competitive Roman imperialism of the previous narrative: “For while the Romans were occupied leading wars (πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιπολέμους ἀσχολίαν ἄγοντων), the pirates had gained great headway, sailing about to many quarters, and adding to their band all of like condition, to such an extent that some of them, after the manner of allies, assisted many others.”²⁷ Rome’s foreign wars are again given as an important cause and the pirates are even portrayed as successful by helping each other as allies, a stark contrast to the Romans whose constant egoistic competition is a central reason for the setbacks against Mithridates and in Crete. However, it should be noted that the contrast is only created through more of the chronological manipulation analysed at the beginning of this subchapter since Dio, uniquely, gives the description of the pirates after the Cretan War in which Pompey used the command given against them. The contrast created by Dio is thus no accident but rather the product of skilful organisation and manipulation of his material in order to highlight the central problem of political competition.

Furthermore, the pirates are described very positively in their dealings with each other: “they nevertheless showed such friendship one for another as to send money and assistance even to those entirely unknown, as if to their nearest of kin. In fact, this was one of the chief sources of their strength that those who paid court to any of them were honoured by all, and those who came into collision with any of them were despoiled by all.”²⁸ The pirates here arguably exemplify the ideal that the Romans are failing to achieve: Rome has been undermined by constant external competition and is therefore unable to defend itself, whereas the pirates achieve great strength from doing the opposite. This is further underlined immediately hereafter as the Romans are passive towards the piratical threat and thereby “caused their allies all the greater distress”.²⁹ Through this emphasis of the distress caused to the allies, the Romans are thus in direct contrast to the solidary pirates.

This is the conclusion of Dio’s narrative of the pirates, and the *lex Gabinia* comes into focus. Dio has thus created a relatively positive picture of the pirates which is unique in the source tradition as for example Plutarch focuses on the typical *topos* of cruelty,³⁰ whereas

²⁷ Cass. Dio 36.20.4. Adapted from Cary (1914-1927).

²⁸ Cass. Dio 36.22.4.

²⁹ Cass. Dio 36.23.2.

³⁰ Plut. *Pomp.* 24-25.

the remaining sources concentrate on the threat they posed.³¹ Yet, it is the preceding narrative that adds the interpretatively significant contrast to the pirates; Dio has spent the first 19 chapters of Book 36 creating a thoroughly damning picture of Roman imperialism where competition rules with destructive consequences for both the Romans and the allies alike, which, as shown in chapter 2,³² is unique in the source tradition. Via this narrative, Dio creates an elaborate and lengthy contrast to the solidary and militarily successful pirates, which can only be perceived through a diachronic approach to the narrative. That even pirates are morally and militarily superior to Rome in the Late Republic functions as a forceful criticism of the destructive effects of institutional competition, which sets the scene for the centre piece of Book 36: the *lex Gabinia*.

4.4: The *lex Gabinia*

Dio now moves back to Rome but the narrative surrounding the *lex Gabinia* is in essence still concerned with competition and imperialism. Dio has in the previous narrative presented a clear problem in the shape of destructive external competition and both Rome and its allies have suffered as a consequence. It is noteworthy that several of the previously narrated events in fact occur after or even as a consequence of the *lex Gabinia* of 67 and Dio has thus purposefully attempted to create an unbroken narrative of corrupted, competitive imperialism as a prelude.

The external competition was, as seen above, key to foster the pirate threat which in turn created the need for extraordinary measures. Dio now turns to the internal competition to show how it played a crucial part in creating a law that Coudry has shown to be a milestone in Dio's Late Republic as it severely distorts the traditional Republican workings of imperialism.³³ This narrative part has also been treated in chapter 2 but it is important here to rehearse the main points; in chapter 2, a comparison with other sources was the focus, whereas the analysis in this chapter is needed to continue the diachronic approach and to demonstrate the cumulative effect of Dio's narrative. The presentation of the *lex Gabinia* by Dio continues the previous focus on competition and problematic commands, clearly seen in Dio's description of Pompey's desire for the command:

³¹ App. *B. Civ.* 2.1; *Per.* 99; Vell. Pat. 2.31.2.

³² See above: pp. 22-25.

³³ Coudry (forthcoming 2016). See also Burden-Strevens (2015) 57-75; (forthcoming 2016) 3-11.

“Pompey, who was very eager to command (ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πάνυ ἄρξαι), and because of his own ambition (ὕπὸ τε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φιλοτιμίας) and the zeal of the populace no longer now so much regarded this commission as an honour as the failure to win it a disgrace, when he saw the opposition of the *optimates* (τῶν δυνατῶν), desired to appear forced to accept. He was always in the habit of pretending as far as possible not to desire (ἐπιθυμεῖν) the things he really wished, and on this occasion did so more than ever, because of the jealousy (ἐπίφθονον) that would follow”.³⁴

The opposition of the *optimates* and the general climate of jealousy connected to competition are important as they force Pompey to be duplicitous and thereby the process of competition degenerates further. However, Pompey also lusts for power and his ambition is key to forcing through the *lex Gabinia*. Furthermore, according to Dio, Gabinius proposed the law either at Pompey’s instigation or out of his own self-interest.³⁵ In either case Gabinius is attempting to gain personal advantages and in the process creates the *lex Gabinia*. The internal process of aristocratic competition and the connected ambition of both major and minor characters thus here play a central role in bringing about the law.

This picture of destructive internal rivalry is completed by Dio’s description of the senate which is not opposed to the law itself but rather to the increase in Pompey’s power: “that body preferred to suffer anything whatever at the hands of the freebooters rather than put so great command into Pompey’s hands; in fact they came near slaying Gabinius in the very senate-house (ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ συνεδρίῳ)”.³⁶ The senate is here clearly involved in the destructive competition as their rivalry with Pompey trumps the good of Rome. Ultimately the people terrify the opposition into passivity as they “rush upon them [the senators] as they sat assembled; and if the senators had not gotten out of the way, they would certainly have killed them.”³⁷ Dio here underlines the futility of the senate’s attempts to oppose Pompey and thereby highlights the problem of successful generals who achieved popularity with the people as these in effect undermined traditional authority. Dio hereby also demonstrates the problematic process of institutional competition in this period as the dynasts have become excessively dominant through their popularity with the people and consequent access to violence.

³⁴ Cass. Dio 36.24.5-6.

³⁵ Cass. Dio 36.23.4.

³⁶ Cass. Dio 36.24.1.

³⁷ Cass. Dio 36.24.2.

Through the above prelude, Dio has primed the reader to understand the following speeches of Gabinius and Pompey as disingenuous and connected to their own ambitious aims.³⁸ This is seen in the first speech, that of Pompey, where the speaker is purposefully mendacious: “Nevertheless, I do not think it fitting either that you should be so insatiable to my services or that I myself should continually be in some position of command. For I have toiled since boyhood”.³⁹ Pompey then proceeds to enumerate the patriotic services he has performed and hereafter disingenuously rejects the command.⁴⁰ Pompey here clearly hides his desire for the command and casts his previous services in an excessively patriotic light.⁴¹ The time of Pompey’s early career is highly fragmentary but we do have one fragment that is the first mention of him: “Pompey was the son of Strabo, [...]. Being angry with those who held the city, he proceeded on his own account to Picenum before he had quite yet come to man’s estate, and thanks to his father’s former rule there he gathered from the inhabitants a small band and set up a sovereignty of his own (δυναστείαν ἰδίαν), thinking to perform some famous exploit by himself; then he joined Sulla.”⁴² Here Pompey’s acts are certainly not patriotic but rather from the outset self-serving and he is even connected to the thoroughly negative term *δυναστεία*. The evidence is of course thin, but Burden-Strevens has rightly suggested that Dio’s Pompey would hereafter have continued his “quest for *δυναστεία*”⁴³ which is also characteristic of him in the extant books. The earlier career of Pompey would have been on the reader’s mind and thus exposed the claims in Pompey’s speech as mendacious.⁴⁴

Another important contrast to Pompey’s claims is the preceding narrative of egoistic competition undermining Roman expansion, as seen elsewhere in the speech: “allow me to remain undisturbed and to attend to my own business, so that now at last I may bestow some care upon my private affairs and may not perish from exhaustion. Against the pirates elect somebody else. [...] Surely I am not the only one who loves you”.⁴⁵ Firstly, Dio’s Pompey is purposefully illogical here as he asks to be allowed to attend to his private business by not being general when the previous narrative has shown how generalships were exactly used for private purposes. This highlights how the distinction between the

³⁸ Burden-Strevens (forthcoming 2016) 3-4.

³⁹ Cass. Dio 36.25.1.

⁴⁰ Cass. Dio 36.25.2-26.4.

⁴¹ Vervaeke (2010) 163-166 and Blom (2011) 561-562 suggest that this behaviour is typical of the historical Pompey as an orator and Dio therefore appears faithful in his description.

⁴² Cass. Dio F 107.

⁴³ Burden-Strevens (2015) 82.

⁴⁴ Burden-Strevens (2015) 210-212.

⁴⁵ Cass. Dio 36.26.3-5.

private (τὰ ἰδία) and the public (τὰ κοινά) has broken down,⁴⁶ which is a consequence of the excessive competition and an important problem in the Late Republic. Furthermore, Pompey is not only disingenuous in claiming to love the senate himself as his argument that others do so as well flies directly in the face of the previous narrative of Book 36 where every single player has acted self-interestedly. This underlines the institutional nature of egoistic competition as it is not confined merely to a few individuals but is a permeating feature of Dio's Late Republic. Dio has thus fashioned a clear contrast to Pompey's words in the preceding narrative which, in connection with the abovementioned description of Pompey, plays a fundamental role in revealing Pompey's speech as an elaborate sham. Yet again, we can only appreciate this sophisticated structuring by analysing Dio's narrative in a diachronic fashion. Furthermore, the revelation of Pompey as disingenuous is significant as it shows another central problem of the institutional competition, namely the corruption of public speech which is absolutely central to Republican government but has become a tool for ambitious dynasts in their constant competition.⁴⁷

Gabinus' subsequent speech also creates clear contrasts between the Republic described and the actual version seen in the previous narrative: "Pompey's behaviour in this very matter, Quirites, is worthy of his character: he does not seek the leadership, nor does he accept it off-hand when offered to him. For a good man has no business, in any case, to desire to hold office and to manage public affairs".⁴⁸ This is of course plainly dissimilar to Pompey himself but also to the generals of the previous narrative and Dio thereby criticises both Pompey and Roman institutional competition in general. This two-layered approach, focusing partly on Pompey and partly on the broader context, is clearly seen throughout the speech: "heed me and your country. For her you [Pompey] were born, for her you were reared. You must serve her interests".⁴⁹ The contrast to the earlier narrative is almost comical as not a single player has so far served the interests of Rome but rather those of themselves. The preceding narrative thus interacts with the speech as it undermines Gabinus' credibility while the speech in turn highlights the previous criticism of excessive institutional competition in relation to commands.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ See also Caesar's Vesontio speech: Cass. Dio 38.36.1; Burden-Strevens (2015) 223.

⁴⁷ See also Burden-Strevens (2015) 68-80, 99-100.

⁴⁸ Cass. Dio 36.27.1-2.

⁴⁹ Cass. Dio 36.28.4.

⁵⁰ Burden-Strevens (2015) 83-84, 212-214.

Gabinus' speech is followed by a short narrative interlude where the opposition of the senate is futile in the face of a violently threatening populace that supported Pompey. Dio hereby underlines the senate's helplessness in the face of the mendacious rhetoric of Gabinus and Pompey, and Catulus' speech thus becomes the last possible opposition to the *lex Gabinia*. Catulus himself is introduced very positively: "all respected and honoured him as one who at all times spoke and acted for their advantage".⁵¹ This clearly heightens Catulus' credibility as everybody else, except Cato, is described as egoistic.⁵² Dio uses Catulus to emphasise the deeply problematic nature of the extraordinary command proposed to Pompey:

"it is not proper to entrust to any one man so many positions of command one after another. This has not only been forbidden by the laws, but has also been found by experience to be most perilous. What made Marius what he became was practically nothing else than being entrusted with so many wars in the shortest space of time and being made consul six times in the briefest period; and similarly Sulla became what he was because he held command of the armies so many years in succession, and later was appointed dictator, then consul. For it does not lie in human nature for a person [...] after holding positions of authority for a long period to be willing to abide by ancestral customs."⁵³

Catulus is here presenting a clear explanation of the problems of prolonged commands, which in this particular case is Dio's own. This is further supported in the fragments describing Sulla: "as he drew nearer to his dream of absolute power, he [...] reposed his trust rather in the basest men".⁵⁴ This is a clear condemnation of prolonged and repeated command, and the previous narrative of Book 36 supports this assertion as all the generals worked for their own benefit.

Catulus underlines the importance of not transgressing the Roman traditions and then proceeds to suggest the office of dictator as a solution. He himself notes the severe opposition to this office after Sulla and also emphasises the importance of upholding the traditional limitations: "However, because this official held such power, our fathers did not appoint one on all occasions nor for a longer period than six months. Accordingly, if you require any such official, you may, without either transgressing the laws or forming plans in disregard of the common welfare, elect Pompey himself or anyone else as dictator – on

⁵¹ Cass. Dio 36.30.5.

⁵² Seen e.g. in Dio's necrology of Catulus: 37.57.3.

⁵³ Cass. Dio 36.31.3-4.

⁵⁴ Cass. Dio F 108.1.

condition that he shall not hold office longer than the appointed time nor outside of Italy.”⁵⁵ Catulus thus insists on respecting the geographical and temporal limits of the dictatorship, which completely undermines the usefulness of the proposal in this context. Dio has previously described how the pirates were highly widespread and Catulus immediately after his suggestion goes on to restate this aspect. Furthermore, just before this point, Catulus noted the hostility towards the dictatorship and his proposal is therefore in total thoroughly unworkable and illogical. Through Catulus, Dio presents a forceful demonstration of the inadequacy of Republican tools available to solve the piratical problem which was itself the product of the Republican process of competition and imperialism. This undermines Saylor Rodgers’ criticisms that Dio’s choice of Catulus as a speaker is mainly due to his “moralising or philosophical agenda”.⁵⁶ Furthermore, Pompey’s proposed command is even cast in a monarchical light according to a fragment that is arguably from the speech of Catulus:⁵⁷ “Nor will his task as monarch over all your possessions be free from envy.”⁵⁸ That Dio viewed the command as partly monarchical is further supported by his comments regarding the grain supply in Book 39: “So now in the case of the grain supply, as previously in the case of the pirates, he was once more to hold sway over the entire world then under Roman power.”⁵⁹ This is intriguing as Pompey achieves great success during his quasi-monarchical command, which, supported by the preceding narrative, suggests that Dio is presenting the Republic as inherently unworkable and monarchy as the only viable cure for the Republican problems.

Catulus’ lack of appreciation of the Republican realities is continued in his suggestion that the senate should choose Pompey’s lieutenants as “there will be keener rivalry among them (φιλοτιμήσονται) because they are independent and will themselves get the glory for whatever they achieve.”⁶⁰ One could argue that Catulus is advising a return to the virtues of an ideal earlier Republic, which could solve the problems without breaching Republican constitutional limitations. However, this is untenable since both Libourel and newer research have shown that the Early and Mid-Republic in Dio’s narrative in fact represent a break with the idealisation of other authors and that competition had been part of the Republic since its very inception.⁶¹ Furthermore, only in speeches given by the defenders

⁵⁵ Cass. Dio 36.34.1-2.

⁵⁶ Rodgers (2008) 297. See also Burden-Strevens (2015) 25.

⁵⁷ So Burden-Strevens (2015) 118.

⁵⁸ *Anecd. Bekk.* 157, 30.

⁵⁹ Cass. Dio 39.9.3.

⁶⁰ Cass. Dio 36.36.2.

⁶¹ Libourel (1968); (1974); Lindholmer (forthcoming 2017); Lange (forthcoming 2017).

of the Republic is φιλοτιμία used in this positive sense during the Late Republic⁶² and the preceding narrative clearly shows that rivalry and competition connected to Roman foreign matters are a thoroughly destructive force. The preceding narrative, both of Book 36 and the work more widely, thus plays a key role in unveiling Catulus' arguments as nonsensical and the diachronic mode of analysis is again fundamental in understanding this interrelation. Moreover, Dio is here drawing on Classical Greek thinking about φιλοτιμία but also rejecting it, both through Catulus' naïve and unrealistic usage and via the Late Republic in general where φιλοτιμία's positive part is excluded and it is instead consistently and entirely negative in practice.

The *lex Gabinia* is of course ultimately enacted with subsequent great military successes and this is an emphasis of the problematic process of Republican competition as mendacious and self-interested politicians prevail over the positively described and unselfish Catulus. An important reason for this is the mendacious use of public speech which here degenerates in pursuit of foreign commands.⁶³ Furthermore, the narrative preceding the *lex Gabinia* gives additional depth to the failure of Catulus since Dio in this narrative had presented Roman imperialism as completely corrupted by competition. The defeat of the Republican proposal of Catulus and the enactment of the quasi-monarchical *lex Gabinia* is hereby not just the start of a narrative centred on extraordinary commands as Coudry has argued.⁶⁴ It is also the culmination of a shorter, more focused narrative in Book 36, where the *lex Gabinia* is the problematic result of the uncontrollable external competition of the Republic. Essentially, Dio presents a problem in the first part of the narrative but then underlines the impossibility of solving it within Republican constitutional limits since only the *lex Gabinia* offers a viable solution. Furthermore, Pompey's successful command is cast in a monarchical light by Dio and monarchy is hence implicitly represented as the solution to the Republican problems, thereby foreshadowing the redeeming regime of Augustus. This elaborate argument, brought out by the structuring and ordering of the narrative, is only perceivable through a diachronic analysis.

⁶² See also Agrippa's speech: Cass. Dio 52.6.2.

⁶³ Burden-Strevens (2015) 209-226; Kemezis (forthcoming 2016).

⁶⁴ Coudry (forthcoming 2016).

4.5: The *lex Manilia* and the end of Book 36

The narrative after the *lex Gabinia* creates an important prelude to the *lex Manilia* of 66 through its negative portrayal of politics and further explores the internal reasons for the creation of the problematic extraordinary commands. Furthermore, the narrative also confirms and illustrates several key points made in relation to the *lex Gabinia*.⁶⁵ This is clearly seen in the chapter immediately after the law where Pompey has great successes against the pirates: “For not alone was the force that he directed vast both in point of fleet and infantry, so that he was irresistible both on sea and on land, but his leniency (φιλανθρωπία) toward those who made terms with him was equally great, so that he won over large numbers by such a course”.⁶⁶ Φιλανθρωπία has been identified as a key component of the successful new regime of Dio’s idealised Augustus which overcame and solved the Republican problems.⁶⁷ Pompey’s accomplishments through exactly this tool thus reemphasise the need for monarchy as the pirates had grown strong during the passivity and excessive competition of the Republic but are then brought under control through Pompey’s quasi-monarchical powers and φιλανθρωπία.

This focus on the untenability of the Republic is continued as Dio for the first time narrates internal matters in Rome with no apparent connections to foreign affairs or potential commands. Dio paints a decidedly negative portrait dominated by bribery and the tribunes are heavily criticised: “For now that the power of the tribunes (τῶν δημάρχων δυναστεία) had been restored to its ancient status, and many of those whose names had been stricken off the list by the censors were aspiring to regain the rank of senator by one means or another, a great many factions (συστάσεις) and cliques were being formed aiming at all the offices.”⁶⁸ In his first mention of the tribunes, Dio had already warned against their destructive power⁶⁹ which is again underlined here as they are connected to δυναστεία, στάσις and increased destructive competition. We are singularly badly informed about Dio’s Book 34 and 35 as only a single diminutive fragment has survived and the sources in general for this period, the 70s, are also sparse. However, we do know that the end of this decade marked the reversal of Sulla’s conservative reforms. This reached a climax when Crassus and Pompey reinstituted the traditional tribuneship and

⁶⁵ *Contra* Rodgers (2008) 297.

⁶⁶ Cass. Dio 36.37.4.

⁶⁷ Burden-Strevens (2015) 230-248.

⁶⁸ Cass. Dio 36.38.2.

⁶⁹ Cass. Dio 4.13.4.

named censors, for the first time since 86, who conducted a strict census and expelled many senators from the order.⁷⁰ It is on this background striking that exactly these two elements are singled out in the quote above as the main causes for competition in the first actual treatment of internal affairs in Book 36. To engage in some healthy speculation, it could be that Dio here seeks to accentuate the inherent institutional untenability of the Republic by emphasising that it is exactly two reinstituted, essentially Republican institutions that create the above problems.

Furthermore, it is also noteworthy that the increase in popular power is so clearly connected to an upsurge in the destructive political competition that was the central problem of the Late Republic. This is only supported in the preceding narrative as Pompey had exactly allied himself with a tribune, Gabinius, and been supported by the people, through which he attained the *lex Gabinia*. The below described *lex Manilia* and the later *lex Trebonia* are likewise products of tribunician legislation and the above notice regarding the tribunes could thus be a way of accentuating the destructive effects of their newly reinstituted powers that are indeed instrumental in the creation of three extraordinary commands and the furthering of the dynasts' ambition. According to Dio, then, the return of popular power is key to the further degeneration of political competition.

Moreover, this focus on institutional competition and its connection to tribunes is continued immediately hereafter as Cornelius, a tribune, and the senate support competing laws to counter rampant bribery: "When a great uproar arose at this, since Piso and a number of the senators opposed him [Cornelius], the crowd broke the consul's fasces to pieces and threatened to tear him limb from limb."⁷¹ Cornelius hereby secures the passage of the law in a manner with clear parallels to the threatening people immediately before the speech of Catulus. The situation thus rehearses the senate's lack of power in the face of the determined use of violence by a politician supported by the people and also reemphasises the problematic nature of the tribunes. The institutional competition has transformed decisively in favour of the senate's enemies who both here and regarding the *lex Gabinia* dominate the law-making through threats of violence.

Another important aspect of the Republican system is also undermined through competition, namely the courts which the praetors exploit for their own benefits: "they [...]"

⁷⁰ Steel (2013) 117-120.

⁷¹ Cass. Dio 36.39.3.

did not observe the rules as written, but often made changes in them, many of which were introduced out of favour or out of hatred of someone.”⁷² Yet again, this problem is not addressed through the formal channels of Republican power but instead forcibly solved by Cornelius and the violent populace. Essentially, Dio here presents an internally deeply dysfunctional Republic right after the long narrative exploration of external competition, which had already shown that the Republic was not functioning, and competition is in both spheres at the heart of the problems. The problem of competition is again highlighted as Dio now includes the narrative aside regarding Lucullus rejecting his province, analysed in chapter 3,⁷³ which emphasises how institutional competition has undermined the governing of provinces. Dio has thus included a range of mainly internal negative effects of the excessive institutional competition in these few chapters.

These internal criticisms could appear out of place as the narrative before the *lex Gabinia* had primarily been concerned with problems of external competition. However, Dio uses this short internal narrative to explore the internal factors of egoistic competition which ultimately spawn the *lex Manilia*, a new extraordinary command: Manilius had proposed a highly unpopular law and he “then, in fear because the plebs were terribly angry, [...] paid court to Pompey even in the latter’s absence, especially because he knew that Gabinius had the greatest influence with him. He went so far as to offer him command of the war against Tigranes and that against Mithridates, and the governorship of Bithynia and Cilicia at the same time.”⁷⁴ Through the preceding chapters, Manilius’ desperate attempt to save himself becomes a continuation of the larger problem of egoistic political competition, here connected to the problematic effects of the newly empowered tribuneship. Political competition is thus again presented as a central cause for another deeply problematic extraordinary command.

The *lex Manilia* is voted upon and accepted by the people but due to the lack of narrative elaboration in the form of for example speeches by Dio, one could argue that the *lex Manilia* was far less important than its predecessor. However, through the mention of Gabinius in the above quote, Dio creates a powerful allusion which brings to mind the previous criticisms from Catulus. This is further supported in Dio’s description of Pompey receiving the news as he “pretended to be annoyed as before, and charged the members of

⁷² Cass. Dio 36.40.2.

⁷³ See pp. 55-56.

⁷⁴ Cass. Dio 36.42.3-4.

the opposite faction (ἀντιστασιώταις) with always loading tasks upon him so that he might meet with some reverse. In reality he received the news with the greatest joy”.⁷⁵ Dio here clearly evokes the previous law by the parallel in Pompey’s mendacious behaviour and his complaints of being overburdened. The *lex Manilia* was certainly significant but another grand exposition was now unnecessary and would disrupt the narrative. Dio solves this problem by the use of allusions which invest the *lex Manilia* with central importance⁷⁶ that is, however, only perceivable through a diachronic approach.

The aftermath of the proposal of the law highlights the connection between internal competition and the problematic transformation of military commands as Caesar supported the measure and hereby “not only courted the good-will of the multitude, observing how much stronger they were than the senate, but also at the same time paved the way for a similar vote to be passed some day in his own interest.”⁷⁷ Dio here explicitly highlights the problematic precedents that the extraordinary commands set and Caesar will indeed exploit these to the ruin of the Republic. Furthermore, Dio also explicitly notes that the senate is powerless in the face of the people, who are allied to the dynasts. This is a clear demonstration of how the internal competition, where the dynasts use the people, has completely undermined the traditional authority of the senate.

A short notice of the so-called first Catilinarian Conspiracy is inserted at this point, which continues several of the previous problematic aspects: bribery is rife and the attempts to stop it by convicting the perpetrators in fact foster the conspiracy which is, however, revealed. Yet, the tribunes again come into focus as they hinder the prosecution and the senate is instead forced to send one of the perpetrators to Spain: “and when Piso even then continued to display his audacity, the senate, fearing he would cause some riot, sent him at once to Spain, ostensibly to hold some command or other”.⁷⁸ Dio thus reemphasises the problematic institutional competition, the consequent weakness of the senate in the face of the tribunes and the dire consequences for foreign policy as Piso is given a command rather than convicted. These themes have been so consistently explored by Dio in the previous narrative that the mentions here become part of a larger institutional problem rather than constituting merely a momentary issue. This cumulative effect is again only perceivable through a diachronic reading of the narrative.

⁷⁵ Cass. Dio 36.45.1.

⁷⁶ For a parallel use by Tacitus, see Ginsburg (1986).

⁷⁷ Cass. Dio 36.43.3-4.

⁷⁸ Cass. Dio 36.44.5.

The narrative now moves away from Rome and focuses on Pompey's campaigns in the east, attained through the *lex Manilia*, for the remainder of the book. However, this new command in fact undermines Pompey's completion of other military tasks: "no longer regarding as of any importance Crete or the other maritime points where things had been left unsettled (ἀδιοίκητον), he [Pompey] made preparations for the war with the barbarians."⁷⁹ This indifference to Rome's military problems due to ambition is a clear parallel to the previously narrated destructive effects of competition on foreign policy and imperialism seen in relation to Lucullus and Metellus. Furthermore, the mention of other "unsettled maritime points" is intriguing. This could be a reference to the pirates as Dio, in contrast to all other sources,⁸⁰ asserts that Pompey did not finish the job: "he subdued **the greater part of it** [the sea] (τὰ πλείω) that very year."⁸¹ Moreover, of the year 57 in Book 39, Dio writes that the pirates "were flourishing **even then** (καὶ τότε ἤκμαζε)."⁸² This is of course several years after the *lex Manilia* but it still indicates that the pirates were not eradicated and Dio indeed never mentions a complete victory for Pompey. Notwithstanding, the narrative plainly shows that Pompey only focused on his own benefits and disregarded the problems of the state.

Furthermore, Pompey's initial egoistic actions and the negative description of the *lex Manilia* put the Roman general's subsequent heroics in the east in a more unflattering light. This is further supported as Lucullus maligns Pompey upon his arrival: "Lucullus turned to abuse, stigmatizing him as officious, greedy for war, greedy for office (πολυπράγμονα καὶ φιλοπόλεμον καὶ φιλαρχοῦντα), and so on."⁸³ These accusations of Pompey certainly ring true based on the previous narrative but they also deliberately reflect back on Lucullus, who is guilty of exactly the same charges, and the general political competition where these features were widespread. Pompey's command is, then, here portrayed as part of the general problem of external competition where generals used commands for their own ambition. However, through the prelude to the *lex Manilia*, Dio has also succeeded in presenting the command as the result of internal destructive political competition, thereby investing Pompey's campaigns in the east with even greater significance. In short, through the previous narrative, both the immediately preceding chapters and the book in general, Pompey's command is intricately connected to the

⁷⁹ Cass. Dio 46.45.2.

⁸⁰ App. *B. Civ.* 2.1; *Per.* 99; Plut. *Pomp.* 28; Vell. Pat. 2.31.2.

⁸¹ Cass. Dio 36.37.3.

⁸² Cass. Dio 39.56.1.

⁸³ Cass. Dio 36.46.1. Cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 31.4.

problem of political competition and thereby becomes more than a mere description of battles and army movements. This last part of Book 36 thus stands in close interrelation with the previous narrative, which shows Dio's sophisticated crafting of a highly cohesive book and underlines the importance of a diachronic reading of Dio.

4.6: Conclusion

In the above, I have shown how Dio structures his narrative to bring out specific interpretative points and demonstrated how central the diachronic approach is to fully understand these. Essentially, Dio constructs a long narrative of external competition that creates a need for the *lex Gabinia* where Catulus instructively fails to offer any viable solutions. The *lex Gabinia* hereby functions as a landmark where only a non-Republican measure can solve the problems of the Republic. Dio's attention then switches more markedly to internal politics and he gives another perspective on how competition decisively undermines Republican institutions as it is now internal competition that fosters an extraordinary command. Book 36 is, then, essentially focused on institutional competition and its consequences for Roman imperialism, and gives mostly external but also internal reasons for the highly destructive extraordinary commands that emerge from this competition and which are ultimately paramount in destroying the Republic.

The constant, institutional competition of the political class, both externally as generals and internally in Rome, thus severely undermines foreign policy and sets Rome on a fatal course. This focus is clearly in line with the conclusions of chapters 2 and 3 which suggested that Dio employed skilful manipulation of his sources and the annalistic conventions respectively in order to emphasise the problem of competition in Roman politics. Corrupt competition is of course canonical in the ancient historiography of the Late Republic but Dio's incorporation of this in an institutional interpretation is, as shown in chapter 2, distinctive. This approach is further seen as Dio via Book 36, argues that institutionally generated political competition had so severely undermined the Republican system that only quasi-monarchical powers, such as those of Pompey, could remedy the problems. Dio's treatment of the *lex Gabinia* is, then, not merely a comment on the specific piratical issue but rather a general assertion that monarchical rule was needed to save Rome from the negative results of destructive competition in a degenerated Republic. Furthermore, these interpretative points are presented clearly and cumulatively

strengthened through Dio's skilful structuring of his narrative, where chronological manipulation plays a significant role.

Earlier studies have suggested that the decad was used as a structuring device by Dio as he attempted to end each one with monumental events,⁸⁴ but no scholarly work has hitherto concentrated on a specific book. However, this study has shown that also individual books, as the next chapter will support, were used as important self-contained narratives of problematic aspects of the Republic, as Book 36 centred on the extraordinary command as an especially problematic consequence of the institutional competition. Yet, we should of course not look at the books in complete isolation. Book 36, through its strong focus on the problematic effects of the newly re-empowered tribunes, appears for example at least in part to be a destructive sequel to the restoration of the power of the tribuneship in 70, almost certainly narrated in Book 35 given that Dio since its inception had exhibited a keen interest in this office.⁸⁵ Book 36 also plays an important part in the grander evolution of the *Historia Romana*: Pompey, upon his return from the extraordinary command against Mithridates, is opposed by the senate in Book 37, driving him into the triumvirate that in turn ensures more extraordinary commands, such as the *lex Trebonia* of Book 39, which play an important part in the eventual downfall of the Republic. This whole development started with the corrupted, competitive imperialism that led to the pirates causing the *lex Gabinia* and with the degraded internal politics that resulted in the *lex Manilia*. We should of course be wary of assigning ulterior motives to all of Dio's choices as his simple duty as a historian of recording facts was no doubt important as can be seen in his lengthy campaign narratives at the beginning and end of Book 36. However, through skilful manipulation of the narrative, Dio primes the reader to understand these campaigns as negative manifestations of the institutional problem of competition and thereby adds additional meaning to seemingly descriptive narrative parts while also presenting and strengthening his own interpretation of the Late Republic.

In conclusion, Dio appears to have an overarching interpretative framework centred on institutional competition, governing both Book 36 and the Late Republic. This undermines both older views and the more cautious criticisms that Dio was essentially writing history from a third century AD perspective and offered little innovation in his narrative of the

⁸⁴ Millar (1964) 38-39; Rees (2011) 41-43; Urso (2013) 9-10; Rich (forthcoming 2016) 7-8.

⁸⁵ Dio (Zon.) 4.15.1.

Late Republic.⁸⁶ Book 36 is wholly focused on the destructiveness of aristocratic competition and consequently ambitious dynasts, as well as the very Republican problems of accommodating these two aspects. Dio's explanation of the problems of the Republic is thoroughly focused on Republican institutions such as the inadequateness of the dictatorship, the problems of the tribunate and the issue of prolonged and especially extraordinary commands. All these aspects are essentially manifestations of Dio's focus on Republican institutional competition, which challenges both the argument that Dio was overly influenced by his own time and that he was an unoriginal historian. Dio thus offers an interpretation of the Republic on its own terms, focused on institutional problems, which clearly stands apart from the source tradition and undermines the dominant critical views of this Greek historian.

⁸⁶ Rees (2011) 4; Kemezis (2014) 90-94, 103.

5: Book 39 and competition in practice

5.1: Introduction

The narrative of the Late Republic in Dio is essentially a narrative of why this governmental form was unworkable and institutional competition is, as I have shown in the preceding chapters, the central problem. I will argue that Book 39 is absolutely fundamental in understanding the failure of Roman δημοκρατία; Dio here presents the three most important tools and manifestations of internal institutional competition, namely violence, bribery and political manipulation. These tools, especially violence and bribery, are a consequence of the transformed institutional competition as ambitious politicians in the Late Republic, due to the influx of resources as a result of empire, had vast resources available for bribery and for buying the allegiance of the people, who could be incited to violence. The tools are liberally used for political competition and politicians who refuse to utilise them are perpetually futile, exemplified most consistently by Cato. It is thus only self-interested politicians who use these thoroughly destructive tools who are successful and the Republic is hereby inevitably at the mercy of its enemies and bound for civil war and its own destruction. Dio purposefully manipulates his narrative to bring the institutional problem of competition to the fore and posit it as key for the breakdown of Republican politics and the ensuing civil war. For this purpose, Dio incorporates an exposition of the three abovementioned tools in the first half of the book whereafter he demonstrates how they were used to devastating effect in the second half. This again demonstrates how Dio, as in Book 36, utilised the structuring of individual books as an important narrative and interpretative tool.

A brief overview of the causes for civil war in Dio and the parallel sources is helpful here in order to more clearly understand the importance of Book 39. The *Periochae* is too brief to offer a cohesive interpretation but Velleius invests the first triumvirate and Julia's death with great significance and the corrupt Curio is central as well.¹ Plutarch asserts that the creation of the triumvirate was the main reason for civil war and Luca is consequently important,² as are the deaths of Julia and especially Crassus.³ Appian, likewise, is focused

¹ Vell. Pat. 2.44-48.

² Plut. *Caes.* 13.5; *Pomp.* 51.4.

³ Plut. *Cato* 41.1; *Pomp.* 53.5-6.

on the triumvirate and the meeting at Luca.⁴ Crassus' death is not given significance but the death of Julia certainly is.⁵ Suetonius, lastly, sees Caesar's ambition, exacerbated by prolonged command, almost exclusively as the main cause.⁶

Dio also invests the triumvirate with some significance but omits the meeting at Luca, which severely undermines the importance of the triumvirs, as I will argue in this chapter.⁷ Moreover, the importance of the death of Julia is significantly downplayed as Dio's brief explanation of the implications is only inserted in 50 when civil war was already on Rome's doorstep. Crassus' death, likewise, is mentioned outside the battle narrative for the first time only in 50 where Dio merely notes that "Crassus was dead".⁸ Even the scene of Caesar's infamous crossing of the Rubicon that would thrust responsibility for the civil wars on him is also omitted by Dio – uniquely in the source tradition.⁹ We are hereby left without important singular events with which to explain the outbreak of the civil war and it is instead the institutional problems of the Late Republic, centred on competition, which are presented as the main cause of its downfall. Pompey's sole consulship of Book 40 is of course important as a last nail in the coffin of peace, but it is in fact the unavoidable product of the internal unrest of the time which has its narrative roots firmly in Book 39. Furthermore, this unrest is created by the internal destructive competition explored in the same book. The fundamental reasons for the civil war and the downfall of the Republic are thus to be found in Dio's exploration of institutional competition in Book 39.

Against this background, it is striking that Book 39 is sparsely treated in some of the newer attempts to explain the fall of Dio's Republic. Rees only touches briefly on the book in connection with the consulship of Crassus and Pompey but besides this, mainly concentrates on the preceding narrative and speeches. One reason for this could be that Rees' numerous aspects of human nature undermining the Republic are sparse in Book 39, which reveals a problematic hole in his arguments.¹⁰ Kemezis, likewise, writes of the 60s but then moves directly to Pharsalus and the subsequent Augustan settlement.¹¹ Burden-Strevens' work from 2015, furthermore, largely ignores Book 39 since it includes no

⁴ App. *B. Civ.* 2.9, 17.

⁵ App. *B. Civ.* 2.19.

⁶ Suet. *Caes.* 30.5.

⁷ See below: pp. 97-98.

⁸ Cass. Dio 40.44.2.

⁹ App. *B. Civ.* 2.35; Plut. *Caes.* 32; Suet. *Caes.* 31-33; Vell. Pat. 2.49.4.

¹⁰ Φιλονεικία is e.g. only mentioned once: Cass. Dio 39.58.2; Rees (2011) 27-29 and φιλοτιμία likewise once: Cass. Dio 39.58.2; Rees (2011) 27-29.

¹¹ Kemezis (2014) 112-120.

speeches and Coudry focuses primarily on the *lex Gabinia*. These works all offer interesting explanations but also demonstrate a gap in the research tradition as Book 39 has been largely ignored. This overview emphasises the need to complement the current research by a focused, in-depth analysis of Book 39 which, I argue, will yield an alternative explanation of the fall of the Republic, centred on institutional competition. Through its focus on internal matters, the chapter will be more thematic than chapter 4 but still keep the overall diachronic structure that has, as shown in the previous chapter, hitherto been disregarded by scholars. I have divided the following into two subchapters: the first deals with Dio's thematic presentation of the three main internal destructive tools and thereby lays the foundation for the second subchapter which explores the use of these tools in relation to the consular elections of 56 and the events surrounding the restoration of Ptolemy.

Caesar's campaigns also feature in Book 39 but these are part of a broad exploration, spanning several books, of how Caesar used commands for competition, largely similar to the utilisation by other commanders seen and analysed in chapter 4. As this issue has already been examined, chapter 5 will omit Caesar's campaigns and instead focus on the rest of Book 39 which constitutes a sustained and concentrated investigation of mainly internal competition and how this was executed in practice.

5.2: Violence, bribery and political manipulation

5.2.1: Violence

The first destructive tool, violence, is initially presented in the first part of the internal narrative, dealing with the return of Cicero and the ensuing conflict with Clodius. The descriptions of the groups of combatants are instructive as we are told that the consul Spinther "aided Cicero's cause in the senate, partly as a favour to Pompey and partly to avenge himself upon Clodius, by reason of a private enmity (ιδίας ἔχθρας) which had led him as a juror to vote to condemn Clodius for adultery."¹² The state is here disregarded and only private benefits prioritised, and the supporters of Clodius are similarly described as he "was supported by various magistrates, including Appius Claudius, his brother, who was praetor, and Nepos, the consul, who had a private grudge (οἰκείας τινὸς ἔχθρας) against

¹² Cass. Dio 39.6.2.

Cicero.”¹³ This line-up of combatants shows again that there are no heroes in Dio’s Late Republic as Dio primes the reader to understand the ensuing events as essentially self-interested.

Significantly, the involvement of both consuls is explicitly linked to an increase in violent competition in Rome: “These men, accordingly, now that they had [ἔχοντες] the consuls as leaders (ἡγεμόνας), made more disturbance than before, and the same was true of the others in the city [...]. Many disorderly proceedings were the result”.¹⁴ The involvement of the consuls in destructive competition is, as Dio notes, a new development and this he connects through the participle (ἔχοντες) to increased competition, which manifests itself in Clodius’ attempt to disrupt the vote on Cicero’s return: “during the very taking of the vote (ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ διαψηφίσει) on the measure Clodius, knowing that the multitude would be on Cicero’s side, took the gladiators that his brother held in readiness for the funeral games in honour of Marcus, his relative, and rushing (ἐσεπήδησεν) into the assemblage, wounded many and killed many others. Consequently (οὖν) the measure was not passed”.¹⁵ The use of gladiators to even kill senators is a completely new development in Late Republican politics and Dio goes to some length to stress the outrage of Clodius’ acts; he emphasises Clodius’ disregard for due political process through the demonstrative pronoun in predicate position (ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ), he notes that Clodius took the gladiators from the funeral games of his own relative and he adds drama by the use of ἐσεπήδησεν. However, Dio also emphasises the effectiveness of this increase in violence as he creates a clear link between the use of this tool in rivalry and political success, here in the form of disrupting the measure to recall Cicero.

Milo then attempts to indict Clodius by lawful means but fails utterly, which demonstrates the powerlessness of constitutional avenues and traditional authority in Late Republican competition. Clodius’ highly successful use of violence is only countered when Milo, after the futility of the lawful attempts, gathers his own gladiators “and kept continually coming to blows with Clodius, so that bloodshed occurred throughout practically the whole city.”¹⁶ This new strategy results in immediate success: “Nepos, accordingly, inspired with fear [...], changed his attitude; and thus (οὕτως) the senate

¹³ Cass. Dio 39.6.3.

¹⁴ Cass. Dio 39.7.1.

¹⁵ Cass. Dio 39.7.2-3.

¹⁶ Cass. Dio 39.8.1.

decreed [...] that Cicero should be restored”.¹⁷ Through οὕτως, Dio creates a direct causal link between the violence and the resultant fear on the one side and the political success of Cicero’s recall on the other. Dio hereby highlights the importance of violence in Late Republican competition but also reveals an important problem: violence creates serious unrest in the city but is unavoidable if one desires political success. The Late Republic is therefore bound for increasingly violent and destructive institutional competition.

This violent victory, however, breeds further problems as Cicero upon his return convinces the senate to give Pompey an extraordinary command as commissioner of the grain supply: “So now in the case of the grain supply, as previously in the case of the pirates, he was once more to hold sway (ἄρξεν) over the entire world then under Roman power.”¹⁸ Through his allusion to the *lex Gabinia*, Dio cleverly conjures up Catulus’ criticisms and marks this extraordinary command too as deeply problematic. Furthermore, the cause of this command is in fact to be found in violence: “A sore famine had arisen in the city and the entire populace rushed into the theatre [...] and afterwards to the Capitol where the senators were in session, threatening at first to slay them with their own hands, and later to burn them alive, temples and all.”¹⁹ The explicit evocation of the *lex Gabinia* invites the reader to compare the two situations: regarding the *lex* in Book 36, the people merely “gave a great threatening shout”²⁰ and although they had exhibited violence earlier it was never on the same level as the threat of burning both temples and senators. It is here clear that the violence of the populace has increased and intensified greatly. This extreme use of violence is thus an important feature of Book 39 and is here the sole reason for the need of another problematic extraordinary command. Furthermore, the violence is again imminently effective as a tool to gain objectives as the traditional authority of the senate is powerless and forced to accept Cicero’s proposal.

Dio has in short here created a highly focused narrative where every chapter is concentrated on the intensified problem of competition manifested in violence and he hereby achieves an effective communication of important interpretative points. Dio presents violence as an absolutely essential tool used both by individual politicians and the people as a group in order to gain political advances. Constitutional attempts and traditional authority, on the other hand, are clearly connected to political impotence and

¹⁷ Cass. Dio 39.8.2.

¹⁸ Cass. Dio 39.9.3.

¹⁹ Cass. Dio 39.9.2.

²⁰ Cass. Dio 36.30.3.

failure. Consequently, only egoistic and destructive politicians can achieve success, whereas the senate or less problematic politicians are consistently defeated, which clearly demonstrates the institutional nature of the problem of competition in Dio's Late Republic.

5.2.2: Bribery

Bribery, the second central competitive tool, is explored in the account of King Ptolemy's request for Roman help that follows the return of Cicero. In a parallel to the case of violence, the problem of bribery receives intense focus in the next handful of chapters and has severely increased compared to earlier books. However, Dio sums up the previous events relating to Ptolemy to show that bribery had permeated Roman relations with him even before his accession: "He had spent large amounts upon some of the Romans, part of it out of his own purse and part borrowed, in order to have his rule confirmed and to receive the name of friend and ally".²¹ Bribery is thus at the very heart of Ptolemy's success and Rome is shown to be highly susceptible to this tool.

Ptolemy proceeds to collect money forcibly from the Egyptians, is forced to flee to Rome and here claims to have been deposed. The Egyptian people send a hundred men to Rome to bring counter-complaints but most are assassinated by Ptolemy "and others he either terrified by what had happened or by administering bribes persuaded them neither to consult the magistrates touching the matters for which they had been sent nor to make any mention at all of those who had been killed."²² Ptolemy uses bribes to great effect and is again successful, which demonstrates the importance of this tool. Dio then proceeds to emphasise that the problem of bribery was not limited to the Ptolemy affair: "The affair, however, became so noised abroad that even the senate was mightily displeased; it was urged to action chiefly by Marcus Favonius, on the double ground that many envoys sent by their allies had perished by violence and that numerous Romans had **again** on this occasion taken bribes."²³ This shows that bribery in political competition was in fact a general problem, as "numerous Romans had again" accepted bribes, and also demonstrates the importance of this tool.

Yet again, the attempts of traditional authority in the shape of the senate to solve the problem are completely futile as "they summoned Dio, the leader of the envoys, who

²¹ Cass. Dio 39.12.1.

²² Cass. Dio 39.13.2.

²³ Cass. Dio 39.14.1 (my emphasis).

survived, in order to learn the truth from him. But this time, too, Ptolemy had such influence with his money that not only did Dio fail to enter the senate-house, but there was not even any mention made of the murder of the dead men, so long at least as Ptolemy was there.”²⁴ Dio, furthermore, emphasises at the conclusion of the account that no one was punished for taking bribes at this time and that Pompey even supported Ptolemy,²⁵ which collectively constitutes an increase and intensification of the problem of bribery compared to earlier books. Thus, the constitutional and legal measures taken, first by the Egyptians in sending envoys and later by the senate in summoning the envoy Dio, are thoroughly ineffectual in the face of the influence of Ptolemy’s money and selfish competition. Dio clearly goes to great lengths here to emphasise this problem as he highlights the affair as outrageous through the assertion that a full hundred men were sent but the dead were not even mentioned and no one punished. Ptolemy’s complete success through bribes against the senate and his opposers here exemplifies the workings of institutional competition in Roman politics, which is further supported as Dio asserted the problem of bribery to be a general one. Thus the narrative shows yet again that egoistic politicians who use destructive tools are consistently successful against traditional authority. Furthermore, it is striking that the *Periochae* asserts that Ptolemy was the wronged part as he “left his kingdom and came to Rome because of the wrongs he had suffered at the hands of his people”,²⁶ while Plutarch states that Pompey’s “ambition was not of such a mean and base order”²⁷ as to manipulate Roman politics to obtain another command. In Dio’s account by contrast, Ptolemy is a ruthless oppressor and Pompey is selfishly colluding with him. Dio hereby appears to have either manipulated his sources or chosen them very carefully in order to degrade Ptolemy and inculcate Pompey, which supports the portrayal of Roman politics as problematic and rife with bribery but also as lacking heroes and permeated by egoistic competition.

That Dio’s purpose is indeed to focus on bribery is clearly seen in the omens that follow the Ptolemy affair: “While mortals were acting thus under the influence of money, Heaven at the very beginning of the next year struck with a thunderbolt the statue of Jupiter erected on the Alban Mount”.²⁸ Dio has here clearly exploited the annalistic tradition of including omens in order to criticise the bribery in his authorial voice and the omens add divine

²⁴ Cass. Dio 39.14.2.

²⁵ Cass. Dio 39.14.3.

²⁶ *Per.* 104.

²⁷ Plut. *Pomp.* 49.7.

²⁸ Cass. Dio 39.15.1.

backing to his criticisms. Even the Sibylline verses were found to warn against aiding Ptolemy “with any great force”.²⁹ However, the Romans are unable to correct their behaviour as Gaius Cato, a tribune, forces the priests to announce the verses even though “it was unlawful to announce to the populace any of the Sibylline Verses, unless the senate voted it”.³⁰ The Romans here respond to divine anger by violating more religious laws and the selfish rivalry also continues unabated when it is suggested that Pompey should escort Ptolemy home: “But the senators, fearing that Pompey would by this means obtain still greater power, opposed it, using his connection with the corn-supply as an excuse (προφάσει).”³¹ Dio here, through προφάσει, portrays the senate as disingenuous and part of the constant selfish competition. Even in the face of divine warnings, the Romans thus fail to correct themselves and in fact become more corrupted in the process, all of which is rooted in the problematic competitive tool of bribery.

In conclusion, Dio uses the account of Ptolemy to deliver a damning exploration of the excessive and increased use of bribes in Roman politics. Dio’s approach is strikingly thematic here as bribes had been almost absent in Book 39 before this point. Furthermore, from the above it appears clear that Dio structured his narrative carefully in order to bring out these points as the *cura annonae*, for example, is invested with importance but treated only briefly, whereas the bribery of King Ptolemy is explored and exploited to full effect in order to highlight the problem of bribery. Thus Dio, as in the case of violence, shows how bribery is used as a central tool of institutional competition, which is intimately connected to political success and decisively thwarts traditional authority.

5.2.3: Political manipulation

Through bribery and violence, the Roman politicians broke the rules of the Late Republic. However, Dio now turns to the manipulation of these rules where they, though kept intact, were exploited to further political aims and Dio again incorporates an intense focus on this subject in the next handful of chapters. In fact, Dio exploits the annalistic conventions to make the transition to this third destructive aspect as he includes the generally ignored priestly elections for this purpose:

²⁹ Cass. Dio 39.15.2.

³⁰ Cass. Dio 39.15.4.

³¹ Cass. Dio 39.16.2.

“The year before there had occurred an incident of a private nature which, however, **has some bearing upon our history**. It was this. Although the law expressly forbade any two persons of the same gens to hold the same priesthood at the same time, Spinther, the consul, was anxious to place his son Cornelius Spinther among the augurs, and since Faustus, the son of Sulla, of the Cornelian gens, had been enrolled before him, he transferred his son to the gens of Manlius Torquatus; **thus, though the letter of the law (νόμος) was observed, its spirit (ἔργον) was broken.**”³²

Dio very rarely marks an episode out for special attention in his authorial voice, which indicates the story’s significance. Spinther here thoroughly manipulates the religious rules as part of the constant competition and this political manipulation is no less problematic than bribery or violence as Dio notes that the “ἔργον” of the laws was still broken. Furthermore, it seems that Dio has purposefully included the above annalistic notice and moved it from “the year before” in order to make an abrupt transition that allows him to highlight the new topic in a clear fashion. Had he merely continued with the narrative of Clodius, which follows the above quote, the new focus on political manipulation might have escaped the reader.

This theme of political manipulation is clearly continued in the following chapter where Clodius attains the aedileship, not to serve Rome but “being anxious to avoid the lawsuit, he had got himself elected by a political combination.”³³ Clodius here exploits the sacrosanctity of magistracies for his own personal benefit and as part of the general competition. Moreover, Clodius then “instituted proceedings against Milo for providing himself with gladiators, hereby charging him with the very thing he was doing himself and for which he was likely to be brought to trial. He did this, not in the expectation of convicting Milo [...] but in order that under this pretext (ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει) he might not only carry on a campaign (προσπολεμοίη) against Milo but also insult his backers.”³⁴ Clodius here purposefully exploits the laws as he manipulates the justice system to attack Pompey rather than Milo and even charged the latter for using gladiators which he himself had been the first to do. Clodius thereby again uses political manipulation as part of the constant competition. Furthermore, Dio’s wording here is illustrative of his view of the Late Republic as Clodius is successful through mendacity, πρόφασις, and politics have turned into an actual war as seen in the word προσπολεμοίη.

³² Cass. Dio 39.17 (my emphasis).

³³ Cass. Dio 39.18.1.

³⁴ Cass. Dio 39.18.

Dio then elaborates on the political manipulation: “Now Pompey could not control himself and keep quiet, **nor would he stoop to a trick like that of Clodius** [...]; thus nominally Milo was the defendant, but in reality Pompey was being convicted without even offering a defence. For Clodius, in order to embarrass him the more, would not allow the *lex curiata* to be introduced; and until that was enacted no other serious business could be transacted in the state or any suit instituted.”³⁵ Strikingly, as in the case of the gladiators, Clodius is highly successful because he is willing to use methods too corrupted for his enemies and Dio emphasises Pompey’s inability to oppose Clodius because of the former’s relative uprightness. This feature of Clodius is also seen as he even paralyses the state through his obstruction of the *lex curiata* in order to embarrass Pompey, and he seemingly disregards completely the adverse effects on the state. Political advances are thus again connected to egoistic political manipulation in a clear parallel to violence and bribery, and Dio hereby creates a consistent picture of a Republic where the politicians who most consistently use these three tools achieve the highest degree of success. Dio has here included an unprecedented concentration of manipulations where the letter of the law is observed but the spirit broken, exactly as in the case of Spinther’s son.

Comparable to the previous omens regarding bribery, Dio now writes that threatening and destructive omens occurred “and the soothsayers, being anxious to find a remedy, said that some divinity was angry with them because some temples or consecrated sites were being used for residence. Then Clodius substituted Cicero for Milo and not only attacked him vigorously in a speech because the site of the house he had built upon was dedicated to Liberty, but even went to it once, with the intention of razing it to the ground”.³⁶ The omens can again be seen as divine anger, here due to the corrupted political manipulation, and the Romans are also now unable to correct themselves as Clodius exploits the soothsayers’ explanation for his own ends in another manipulation. The political rivalry now even deteriorates as “no quarter was shown on either side, but they [Clodius and Cicero] abused and slandered each other as much as they could, without refraining from the basest means. The one declared that the tribuneship of Clodius had been contrary to the laws and that therefore his official acts were invalid, and the other that Cicero’s exile had been justly decreed and his return unlawfully voted.”³⁷ Both parties here attempt to manipulate and undermine the laws in order to weaken each other and political

³⁵ Cass. Dio 39.19.2-3 (my emphasis).

³⁶ Cass. Dio 39.20.2-3.

³⁷ Cass. Dio 39.21.3-4.

manipulation has thereby again been used as a tool in political competition. However, Clodius' transfer to the plebeian order had indeed been contrary to the laws³⁸ and Cicero's return had only been effected through Milo's use of gladiators. The political system is thus now so corrupt that the validity of laws is completely undermined and they hereby become ripe for manipulation.

Dio ends his exploration of political manipulation by positing Cato as a positive contrast: "the consuls proposed in the senate that he [Cato] be given the praetorship, although by law he could not yet hold it. And though he was not appointed, for he spoke against the measure himself, yet he obtained greater renown from this very circumstance."³⁹ Cato here refuses manipulation of the law and through this puts the preceding egoistic manipulations in an even sharper negative light. However, despite winning great renown, Cato gains nothing concrete and instead quickly attracts Clodius' hostility.⁴⁰ The upright but unsuccessful Cato hereby functions to support Dio's portrayal of politics throughout Book 39 where self-serving and destructive acts were depicted as highly effective. This is a central institutional problem in Dio's Late Republic as consequently only egoistic politicians can gain success whereas the upright are *a priori* unsuccessful.

In conclusion, Dio has presented three main tools of the corrupted political competition of the Late Republic, namely bribery, violence and political manipulation. Furthermore, these problems have here been presented in their most extreme forms, achieved through a thematic treatment of each in turn and by largely eschewing the common narrative focus on the dynasts. Moreover, Dio has clearly shown that these tools were absolutely essential for political success and that constitutional opposition and traditional authority were powerless in the face of egoistic politicians who availed themselves of them. Strikingly, Book 39 has so far not been intensely focused on the leading characters even though Pompey was present in Rome. Rather, Dio has concentrated his criticism on the destructive process of political competition and the myriad problematic politicians that were involved in it. Through this narrative prioritisation, Dio relieves the leading dynasts in the triumvirate of part of the responsibility for the downfall of the Republic and shifts it onto the institutional competition in the Late Republic instead.

³⁸ Cass. Dio 37.51.1-2; 38.12.1-2.

³⁹ Cass. Dio 39.23.1.

⁴⁰ Cass. Dio 39.23.2-3.

5.3: The main themes in practice

5.3.1: The consulship of Pompey and Crassus

Dio now turns to the application of the main tools of violence, bribery and political manipulation by the dynasts during central events of Book 39, firstly the consular elections of 56. As mentioned previously, Caesar's success is a prime mover in Pompey's desire for the consulship this year as it elicits φιλοτιμία in the latter.⁴¹ It is noteworthy that this situation is the only place in Book 39 where φιλοτιμία is mentioned,⁴² especially in view of the importance of this book for the outbreak of the civil war. The scarcity of φιλοτιμία in this crucial book is problematic for Rees' psychological or moral perspective and for his assertion that φιλοτιμία is "the dominant and most destructive vice in Dio's history."⁴³ Pompey's φιλοτιμία here is important as it spurs him on to seek the consulship but it clearly grows out of the political competition of the Republic as set out in chapter 1.⁴⁴ This is thus a prime example of the political nature of seemingly moral aspects in Dio's Late Republic which is essentially focused on institutional competition.

This focus is clearly seen, as the tool of political manipulation is immediately in focus as the narrative moves to the consular elections of 56 themselves and the involvement of Crassus and Pompey herein: "When they began to canvass for the office outside of the period specified by law, and, among others the consuls themselves [...] made it plain that they would not allow them to be elected, they tried to bring it about, through the agency of Gaius Cato and others, that the elections should not be held that year, in order that an interrex might be chosen and they might then seek and secure the office in accordance with the laws."⁴⁵ Dio here shows the importance of political manipulation in Late Republican politics as it crucially enables Pompey and Crassus to stand for the consulship.

Furthermore, Gaius Cato continues the manipulation of the laws as he attempts to stop the senators from undertaking measures opposing Pompey and Crassus: "[Cato] rushed out of the gathering [and called in any one he met in the market-place (?)] in order that no decision might be reached; for, if any person not a senator were inside, they might not give

⁴¹ See pp. 13.

⁴² Cass. Dio 39.25.3.

⁴³ Rees (2011) 15.

⁴⁴ See pp. 13.

⁴⁵ Cass. Dio 39.27.3. The above insertion with "?" is Cary's (1914-1927) suggestion.

their vote.”⁴⁶ The senators then attempt to counter this by constitutional means as they changed their dress in order to frighten Cato and addressed the people, hereby bringing them “to a state of extreme sorrow”.⁴⁷ These acts by the senate are of course traditional and constitutional Republican aspects. However, Clodius likewise addressed the people and the senate now resorted to violence to counter this: “the senate confronted him [...], while at that moment he was surrounded by the knights and would have been torn limb from limb, had he not raised an outcry, calling upon the people for aid; whereupon many ran to the scene bringing fire and threatening to burn his oppressors along with the senate-house if they should do him any violence. Thus Clodius was saved after coming so near perishing.”⁴⁸ Essentially, this part of the narrative exemplifies the constantly escalating use of different tools in order to gain political aims in the Late Republic. The senate attempts to act in a constitutional fashion and appeal to the people but the *popularis* politicians, here in the figure of Clodius, have far more influence with them, as was made clear in chapter 4.⁴⁹ This causes the senators to resort to violence but their opponents are, predictably, vastly more powerful in this respect as they are supported by the people, whose threats of burning the senate-house and the senators exemplify the intensification of violence that is occurring in Book 39. Through these consular elections, by far the most detailed described in Dio’s Late Republic, Dio shows the importance and practical use of the political manipulation and violence by major dynasts and their supporters. However, these dynasts are not the main focus; rather it is the problematic process of political competition which they exemplify that is Dio’s central arena of investigation.

Notably, Pompey is “not alarmed at all by this”⁵⁰ and instead he and Crassus terrify the senators into passivity whereafter they spend the rest of the year without further official business “exactly as if they were enslaved (ὥσπερ δεδουλωμένοι)”.⁵¹ Through δεδουλωμένοι and the emphatic suffix on the conjunction, the corruption of the political system through violent competition is clearly emphasised and taken to an extreme as it has completely paralysed the state. However, the use of this strategy by Pompey and Crassus has immediate advantages for themselves: “Crassus and Pompey were appointed consuls after an interregnum as no one else of the earlier candidates opposed them. To be sure, Lucius Domitius [...] set out from his house for the assembly just after dark, but when the

⁴⁶ Cass. Dio 39.28.2-3.

⁴⁷ Cass. Dio 39.28.4.

⁴⁸ Cass. Dio 39.29.2-3.

⁴⁹ See e.g. pp. 69, 76.

⁵⁰ Cass. Dio 39.30.1.

⁵¹ Cass. Dio 39.30.4. Adapted from Cary (1914-1927).

slave who carried the torch in front of him was slain, he became frightened and went no farther. Hence, since no one at all opposed them, and furthermore since Publius Crassus [...] brought soldiers to Rome for this very purpose, they were easily chosen.”⁵² This shows that violence backed up by sufficient force is key to unlocking political success, whereas the seemingly law-abiding Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus or the previous constitutional measures of the senate are completely ineffective; the senators’ change of garments for example seems almost comically futile in the face of determined violence.⁵³

This is restated later as Dio even asserts explicitly that Crassus and Pompey “had secured their office by violence (βίᾱ)”,⁵⁴ which forcefully highlights the importance of violence for political success. Cato illustrates this point by contrast as Pompey and Crassus bar him from becoming a praetor “for Cato did not see fit to offer any violence (βίαιον)”.⁵⁵ Dio here creates a clear contrast between the consuls, who obtained their office through βία and Cato, who is rendered politically impotent and unsuccessful by his refusal to use the selfsame tool. The importance of violence as a political tool again comes into focus when Cato and Favonius oppose the consuls’ measures: “their outspokenness (ἐπαρρησιάζοντο) was of no avail”⁵⁶ and Cato “well understood that even if he employed the whole day, he could not persuade them to vote anything that he wished.”⁵⁷ Their opponents instead resort to forceful measures: “the attendants of the tribunes drove them both out, wounded the rest who were with them, and actually killed a few. After the law [the *lex Trebonia*] had been passed in this way [...]”.⁵⁸ Cato and Favonius here use the time-honoured constitutional tactic of public speaking, despite Dio’s emphasis of the awareness of Cato that this tactic was bound to be ineffectual. Pompey’s use of the decidedly unconstitutional tool of violence is, on the other hand, strikingly successful. This contrast between the *a priori* futility of παρρησία and constitutional measures, and the perpetual success of violence is a shrewd presentation of the institutional problems of the Republic.

Dio’s focus on violence as a political tool is again evident later in the consulship of 55 as the tribunes opposed Crassus’ levies for his campaign in the east but “Crassus, however, [...] looked to the force of arms (τῶν ὀπλῶν ἰσχὺν). The tribunes, then, seeing that their

⁵² Cass. Dio 39.31.

⁵³ This tactic consistently seems ineffective in Dio: e.g. 37.33.3, 43.3; 38.16.3.

⁵⁴ Cass. Dio 39.37.1. Adapted from Cary (1914-1927).

⁵⁵ Cass. Dio 39.32.2.

⁵⁶ Cass. Dio 39.34.1.

⁵⁷ Cass. Dio 39.34.3.

⁵⁸ Cass. Dio 39.35.5-36.1.

outspokenness, unsupported by arms, (παρρησία αὐτῶν ἄοπλος) was too weak to hinder any of his undertakings, held their peace for the most part”.⁵⁹ Dio here explicitly states that the παρρησία of the tribunes, a traditional, constitutional Republican tool, was powerless without access to armed force and the consequent threat of violence. Strikingly, the successful tribunes of the previous narrative, such as Gabinius and Cornelius, did in fact back up their παρρησία with violence, achieved through the people.⁶⁰ Via the feeble opposition of the peaceful tribunes against Crassus and its contrast to earlier, violently successful tribunes, Dio here shows that the achievement of political goals is closely linked to the use of the important tool of violence. This is further supported as Crassus is highly successful exactly through this tool. In this situation, Dio thus again emphasises the weakness of traditional Republican authority in the face of the violent dynasts, which is a manifestation of the problematic process of political competition.

Bribery is only mentioned briefly in relation to the consulship of Crassus and Pompey⁶¹ but political manipulation and especially violence receive intense focus both before and during. Furthermore, the use of these brings great success as Crassus, Pompey and Caesar are all rewarded with new extraordinary commands, despite enmity between especially Pompey and Caesar.⁶² However, Dio in fact omits the meeting in Luca in 56 where the triumvirs formed this plan, whereas Appian and Plutarch, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, invest the event with noteworthy importance.⁶³ Lintott calls it “the most striking error of omission”⁶⁴ but the omission in fact plays a key role in Dio’s narrative as it detracts from the importance of the triumvirate. This is a continuation of Dio’s narrative and interpretative shift away from the leading men and onto the institutional problems of the Republic, seen previously in Book 39. The omission thus diminishes an important factor in the outbreak of the civil wars as the triumvirate in Dio’s account is hereby portrayed as having basically disintegrated at 56, supported by the abovementioned enmity between Caesar and Pompey. Through this, the explicit political influence of the triumvirate is in fact confined merely to the years 60 and 59. The absence of the meeting at Luca is therefore not an error but a conscious omission⁶⁵ that enhances the importance of

⁵⁹ Cass. Dio 39.39.5. Adapted from Cary (1914-1927).

⁶⁰ See e.g. pp. 69, 76.

⁶¹ Cass. Dio 39.37.1.

⁶² Cass. Dio 39.25-27.

⁶³ App. *B. Civ.* 2.17; Plut. *Cato* 41.1.

⁶⁴ Lintott (1997) 2512.

⁶⁵ So Schwartz (1899) 1713-1714. However, Schwartz offers no wider explanation. See also Rees (2011) 206-209.

institutional competition as a cause for the downfall of the Republic. However, Dio needed to explain why Caesar was also given an extraordinary command if the triumvirate had broken down. According to Dio, the consuls feared that Caesar would obstruct their measures and therefore included him in the extraordinary commands given through the *lex Trebonia*. Intriguingly, Dio here adds: “to state the actual fact (ὥς γε τάληθες εὐρίσκεται).”⁶⁶ It seems that Dio was aware of his omission of Luca and wanted to emphasise the accuracy of his own alternative explanation centring on the *lex Trebonia*, further seen by the addition of the emphatic *γε* and the use of *τάληθες*.

Dio thus in the narrative of Crassus’ and Pompey’s consulship explores how especially political manipulation and violence were used to great effect in Late Republican political competition and through this also emphasises the ineffectualness of traditional authority and constitutional methods. Furthermore, through the omission of Luca and the alternative explanation centring on the *lex Trebonia*, Dio puts the institutional competition and its destructiveness at the centre of his explanation of the degenerating Republic. It is also instructive that the *lex Trebonia*, like the *lex Gabinia* and the *lex Manilia*, is another piece of tribunician legislation used by dynasts to achieve their goals, which shows how the restoration of the power of the tribunes furthered the problem of competition. However, this whole part of the narrative is set against the background of Dio’s thematic treatment of the main themes in the first half of the book. Through this interconnection, only perceivable through a diachronic reading, Dio shows that the use of violence and political manipulation by Crassus and Pompey is not a singular moral problem related to these two dynasts. Rather, these tools are part of the grander institutional problem of competition. Dio’s close treatment of Pompey and Crassus here is, then, not due to a preoccupation with these individuals as seen in other sources, further supported by their relative absence in the first half of the book. They are instead used in Dio’s exploration of the destructive process of institutional competition. Book 39 thus shows great narrative sophistication and premeditation on the part of Dio and again suggests the presence of an overarching interpretative framework centred on political competition.

⁶⁶ Cass. Dio 39.33.3.

5.3.2: The restoration of Ptolemy

The last part of the narrative of Book 39 is concerned with the restoration of Ptolemy, and bribery is the main focus point. In fact, Dio starts with a summary of events which explicitly underlines the problem of bribery that will be in focus:

About this time Ptolemy, although the Romans had voted not to assist him and were even now highly indignant at the bribery he had employed, was nevertheless restored and got back his kingdom. Pompey and Gabinius accomplished this. So much power had domination and abundant wealth as against the decrees of both the people and the senate (αἱ τε δυναστεῖαι καὶ αἱ τῶν χρημάτων περιουσίαι καὶ παρὰ τὰ ψηφίσματα τὰ τετοῦ δήμου καὶ τὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἴσχυσαν), that when Pompey sent orders to Gabinius, then governor of Syria, and the latter made a campaign [...] as the result of a bribe, they restored the king contrary to the wish of the state, paying no heed either to it or to the oracles of the Sibyl.⁶⁷

This use of a summary is a highly efficient strategy as it primes the reader to focus on the problem of bribery in the ensuing narrative. Dio alludes to the earlier description of Ptolemy's extreme use of bribery and also assassinations in order to further criticise his restoration and to emphasise the impotence of the opposing senate. This is further supported as Dio in the above quotation, through the structuring of his sentence and the comparative preposition *παρὰ*, has created an explicit contrast between *δυναστεία* and money on the one side and official authority on the other, in which the latter is clearly inferior. This contrast informs the treatment of Ptolemy's restoration and is a continuation of Dio's focus on the weakness of official authority. Dio here also emphasises that not even religious scruples stood in the way of Gabinius and Pompey, which adds a further layer of criticism and continues the assertion seen in chapter 3⁶⁸ that the Romans, due to excessive competition, were unable to correct themselves when confronted with divine warnings.

Dio has thus in the summary highlighted the external problems that competition through bribery will cause but then turns the attention of the summary to internal matters: "Gabinius was later brought to trial for this [the restoration of Ptolemy], but on account of Pompey's influence and the money at his command was not convicted. To such a state of confusion had affairs come with the Romans of that day, that when some of the magistrates and jurymen received from him but a very small part of the large bribes that he had

⁶⁷ Cass. Dio 39.55.1-3. Adapted from Cary (1914-1927).

⁶⁸ See pp. 45-48.

received, they took no thought for their duty, and furthermore taught others to commit crimes for money, showing them that they could easily buy immunity from punishment.”⁶⁹ Dio here again primes the reader to focus on bribes and to understand the following trial of Gabinius according to Dio’s perspective. In this perspective, Gabinius, and others, could act with impunity due to the competitive tool of bribes and Dio also emphasises the destructive precedence created here, which further corrupted society and taught others to follow Gabinius’ problematic example. Bribery is, then, presented as a main tool of destructive competition and as highly effective. Dio does note that Gabinius was eventually convicted. However, “this was a matter of great surprise to him [and] also a surprise to Pompey”.⁷⁰ Here Dio uses even the acquittal to underscore the problematic process of Late Republican competition as the incident is portrayed as an abnormal and surprising incident. Through the condensed and easily communicable form of a summary, Dio thus succeeds in presenting destructive competition as the main problem and bribery as a central tool that forces further degeneration.

Dio now turns to the narrative itself and relates how Ptolemy paid a huge sum to Gabinius who consequently went on campaign against Egypt “notwithstanding the law forbade governors to enter territory outside their own borders or to begin wars on their own responsibility, and although the people and the Sibyl had declared that the man should not be restored. But the only restraint these considerations imposed was to lead him to sell his assistance for a higher price. He left in Syria his son Sisenna”.⁷¹ Dio is here highly consistent as the theme of bribery is kept centre stage but also intensified as the traditions and laws of Rome function not as restraints but rather to increase the amount Gabinius demands. Furthermore, Gabinius seemingly attempts to keep the province of Syria within his own family as he even places his own son at the helm. This extreme disregard for Rome and its laws is yet again part of the destructive competition in which bribes remain a central tool.

Gabinius continues his corrupted search for increased bribes as he in fact purposefully releases Archelaus, a strong enemy leader captured earlier, since “he hoped that he could exact even a larger amount in view of the cleverness and renown of Archelaus; moreover he received much money besides from the prisoner himself, and so voluntarily released

⁶⁹ Cass. Dio 39.55.4.

⁷⁰ Cass. Dio 39.55.5-6.

⁷¹ Cass. Dio 39.56.4-5.

him, pretending that he had escaped.”⁷² Gabinius here acts in direct contravention of military interests by releasing Archelaus solely to obtain further bribes, which is unprecedented in Dio’s earlier narrative. Gabinius succeeds in restoring Ptolemy but has meanwhile inflicted great damage on Roman territories: “the Syrians cried out loudly against Gabinius, especially since in his absence they had been terribly abused by the pirates, and the tax-gatherers, being unable to collect the taxes on account of the marauders, were owing numerous sums.”⁷³ In short, Gabinius has, through his own personal quest for riches and fuelled by the widespread use of bribes, significantly undermined Roman interests. However, yet again this is set against the background of the earlier thematic treatment of the main competitive tools, which places Gabinius’ behaviour within the larger problem of bribery in institutional competition. Furthermore, the above continues the demonstration of the incredible importance of these main tools in competition as bribery is the central narrative driving force and highly effective.

This focus on bribes continues as the narrative moves back to Rome and the impending trial of Gabinius. Crassus is here won over because of a bribe and the following consul, Claudius “expected to get bribes from Gabinius, if he should cause any disturbance.”⁷⁴ Dio is here highly consistent as he posits bribery as a central cause of action for several individuals and as a fundamental and highly effective tool of Roman politics. The Tiber now rose and wreaked havoc in Rome “as was surmised, by the act of some divinity”.⁷⁵ However, the Romans are again unable to correct themselves: “While this was going on, money sent ahead by Gabinius caused him to suffer no serious penalty either while absent or upon his return, at least for this affair.”⁷⁶ This is yet another damning criticism of Republican politics and a forceful reminder of the immense power and importance of bribes in Late Republican competition. This is further supported as Gabinius is acquitted although Cicero “accused him with all the force of his oratory”,⁷⁷ which reemphasises the lack of power of traditional Republican methods in the face of the three destructive competitive tools.

Dio continues this emphasis as Gabinius is only convicted when the people threateningly force the issue after the first acquittal: “The people accordingly were almost

⁷² Cass. Dio 39.57.3.

⁷³ Cass. Dio 39.59.1-2.

⁷⁴ Cass. Dio 39.60.3.

⁷⁵ Cass. Dio 39.61.1.

⁷⁶ Cass. Dio 39.62.1.

⁷⁷ Cass. Dio 39.62.2.

for putting the jurymen to death also, but, when they escaped, turned their attention to the remaining charges against him and caused him to be convicted on those at any rate. For the men who were chosen by lot to pass judgment on the charges both feared the people and likewise obtained but little from Gabinius”.⁷⁸ Violence through the people is here portrayed as the main cause for Gabinius’ conviction but also the latter’s relative lack of bribes is an important reason. Furthermore, the supporters of Gabinius surprisingly attempt to win the case through constitutional means as Pompey “addressed them at length in behalf of Gabinius, and not only read to them a letter sent to him by Caesar in the man’s behalf, but also besought the jurymen, and not only prevented Cicero from accusing him again but actually persuaded him to plead for him”.⁷⁹ These constitutional attempts by Pompey’s camp are, unsurprisingly, completely futile as they lack the necessary bribes or the use of violence to counter the opposition. This situation hereby demonstrates the institutional nature of the problems of the Republic imminently as political success is evidently not tied to individuals but rather to the use of certain destructive methods whose consistent dominance is dictated by the way institutional competition functions. Thus even the conviction of the corrupt Gabinius is used to communicate and support Dio’s presentation of the effectiveness of the three main destructive competitive tools, and the consequent weakness of constitutional methods.

The narrative surrounding the restoration of Ptolemy essentially explores the corrupt state of Roman competition by focusing on the extreme use of bribes which renders constitutional measures consistently futile. It should also be noted that bribery, as violence and political manipulation previously, is exceptionally effective and political success is clearly tied to the use of it. However, the abundant bribery is not part of a classic moralistic narrative of degeneration by Dio. Rather, Ptolemy’s restoration and the subsequent trials are the narrative continuation of the previous exposition of the bribery problem and hereby, like the consulship of Pompey and Crassus, cumulatively become part of this grander institutional problem of competition and connected bribery, which is far more wide reaching than this particular episode. Dio has thus yet again managed to present an institutional explanation centred on political competition of the problems of the deteriorating Republic, which is another testament to the premeditation of his narrative and interpretation.

⁷⁸ Cass. Dio 39.63.1-2.

⁷⁹ Cass. Dio 39.63.4-5.

5.4: Conclusion

In the above, I have shown how Dio presents violence, bribery and political manipulation as three fundamental tools in the institutional competition of the Late Republic. These tools were institutional and political in origin and effect as they emerged directly from the institutional political competition and then proceeded to degenerate it further. There is of course a moral aspect of these three tools, but they are represented by Dio as generated by and part of the political problem of institutional competition which is Dio's main interest. In order to communicate and support these interpretative aims, Dio explores the tools thematically by moving the focus away from the dynasts and thereby emphasises that these elements were not the products of a few individuals' acts but rather part of an institutional problem that permeated the Republic. In the second half of Book 39, Dio then proceeds consistently to portray these tools as the keys to political success, whereas the rejection of them necessarily leads to failure – another demonstration of the institutional nature of Dio's interpretation. This interrelated structuring of Book 39 also shows again how individual books were important interpretative organisers for Dio.

This institutional perspective is again seen as the institutional competition and consequent disorder in fact cause the civil war. In Book 40, Dio spends the first three quarters on external wars, but then continues the narrative from Book 39 of the rivalry between the camps of Clodius and Milo, which quickly ends with the former's death. This, combined with constant destructive competition in relation to the consular elections, creates the need for the sole consulship of Pompey. Dio comments: "Elated by the novelty and unexpectedness of the honour, he [Pompey] no longer formed any plan to gratify the populace, but was careful to do everything that pleased the senate."⁸⁰ In Dio's view, Pompey has now chosen the side of the senate, which causes his estrangement from Caesar and ultimately civil war. Strikingly, however, this estrangement is fundamentally the result of institutional competition that has its narrative and interpretative roots in Book 39 and then merely reaches a conclusion in the last quarter of Book 40. Furthermore, Dio skilfully downplays or removes all the commonly accepted singular causes for civil war, such as the triumvirate and Luca, the deaths of Julia and Crassus or the crossing of the Rubicon. We are hereby left without singular events with which to explain the outbreak of civil war and it is instead Dio's exploration of competition that takes centre stage. It is, then, not in Book

⁸⁰ Cass. Dio 40.50.5.

40 but in Book 39 and its thorough examination of the institutional problems of political competition that the central exploration of the source of the civil wars is to be found. Dio hereby posits an institutional explanation of the outbreak of the civil wars, centred on institutionally generated competition that is only perceivable by a close analysis of the organisation of the highly cohesive Book 39.

This highly consistent and interconnected institutional interpretation thus supports the previous conclusion, namely that Dio's work was premeditated and governed by an original, overarching interpretative framework with competition at its centre. This interpretation is, as shown in chapter 2, unique in the source tradition and undermines both the assertion that Dio was unoriginal and the moralising and psychological tradition that culminated in Rees.⁸¹ Furthermore, Dio's interpretation parallels modern ones to a higher degree than other sources and far more than previously admitted by scholars. The central role of Republican institutions in Dio's interpretation also shows that the portrayal of the Late Republic in his narrative is not overly influenced by or merely a mirroring of the problems of his own time, the Severan age, as has so often been stated.⁸² This does not mean that Dio's Late Republic is wholly divorced from his own time but that the relationship is much more complex than a simple mirroring. The Late Republic plays an important role in the overall narrative, but the portrayal of this period is thus also an exploration on its own terms through an original perspective organised around competition – a sharp contrast to the predominant scholarly view.

⁸¹ Hose (1994) 436; Sion-Jenkis (2000) 184-185; Kuhn-Chen (2002) 243-246; Rees (2011) 6-7.

⁸² This approach is seen from Millar (1964) 103-104 to Rees (2011) 255 and Kemezis (2014) 11-14.

6: Conclusion

In this part, I will reiterate the most important conclusions from the thesis, which are important to situate within the scholarly tradition, and provide concluding thoughts on the nature of Dio's Late Republic. Lastly, I will include a section on potentially fruitful future research. Firstly, the widely shared assertion that Dio had no "specific aim in view save that of composing the work itself"¹ is surely untenable. Dio's account of the Late Republic is highly consistent in its focus on institutional competition as the central problem of the period, which is seen both in the deviations from other sources, the use of the annalistic tradition and the case studies of Book 36 and 39. Secondly, this problem is inherently Republican in nature, growing out of the fundamental institutions of the δημοκρατία, and is largely irrelevant to Dio's own time, when political competition in this form had ceased to exist. Furthermore, Dio's portrayal of the Late Republic cannot be seen as an attempt to legitimise monarchy as a governmental form since this was essentially unnecessary in the third century AD. In other words, Dio's Late Republic is not, as for example Kemezis would have it, primarily an indirect comment on his own time but rather an exploration of this period on its own terms and a genuine attempt at explaining the fall of the Republic. Thirdly, the widely held assertion that Dio was unoriginal,² seen also in the newer works of Rees and Kemezis,³ is on the basis of especially chapter 2, but also supported by the following chapters, demonstrably incorrect, at least when compared to the sources surviving today. Livy could have had a similar focus on competition, but this cannot be ascertained through the *Periochae* which in any case reveals significant discrepancies with Dio. This originality also undermines the *Quellenforschung*, even as recent as Simons in 2009,⁴ which through Nissen's Law, attempted to reconstruct lost parts of sources through Dio; the Greek historian seemingly had a very different interpretative framework from other writers and manipulated his material to support it, which makes his work impractical for reconstructing older sources. The idea that Dio had an interpretative framework with an original perspective thus undermines the *Quellenforschung* that still constitutes a

¹ Millar (1964) 73.

² Millar (1964) 46.

³ Rees (2011) 4; Kemezis (2014) 93.

⁴ Simons (2009) 300; see also Schettino (2006).

significant part of scholarly work. This could be a central factor in the reluctance to ascribe such a framework to the historian.⁵

In short, I have shown the common criticisms of Dio in newer and older scholarship to be problematic. However, some scholarly works have deviated from these standard criticisms and deserve mention here. An important example is the psychological or moral strand of scholarship, seen in Hose, Sion-Jenkis and Kuhn-Chen,⁶ which found its most persuasive expression in the changing human nature of Rees.⁷ Human nature and morality were certainly important to Dio, at least on a philosophical level, but are not given precedence in Dio's overall interpretation of the Late Republic. Rather, they are subordinated to the workings of political institutions and are often presented as part of or as manifestations of institutional competition or used to focalise this problem. This institutional competition and the connected political world are instead Dio's central arena of investigation. This is clearly seen in Book 39 where the myriad aspects of human nature identified by Rees did not take centre stage, as shown in chapter 5 regarding φιλοτιμία.⁸ Another instructive example is φιλονεικία, which Rees invests with great importance,⁹ as it only appears once in the fundamental Book 39 where it is even used to describe the Alexandrians.¹⁰ Thus in Book 39, Dio consistently downplays the importance of human nature as a cause for the downfall of the Republic. Furthermore, even when numerous, these aspects remain political in origin as they grow out of the institutional competition that is at the heart of the Republican constitution and they likewise have political consequences. A final scholarly perspective that deserves mention here is that of Fechner who built on Ferwer's idea that Dio was in fact critical towards the new monarchy and rather a supporter of an ideal Republic.¹¹ However, the above shows that Dio went to great lengths to portray the Late Republic as inherently untenable and Fechner's position therefore appears problematic.

This cohesive presentation of the Late Republic also highlights the need to situate this period, and the Republic in general, within Dio's work as a whole. Dio's institutionally

⁵ See also Lindholmer (forthcoming 2017).

⁶ Hose (1994) 436; Sion-Jenkis (2000) 184-185; Kuhn-Chen (2002) 243-246.

⁷ Rees (2011) 12-14.

⁸ See pp. 94.

⁹ Rees (2011) 27-29.

¹⁰ Cass. Dio 39.58.2.

¹¹ Ferwer (1878) 15; Fechner (1986) 98-107.

doomed Republic is absolutely central to the work¹² since it prepares the foundation for the presentation of Augustus as a model ruler against whom all subsequent emperors could be measured: institutional competition was a central and unavoidable destructive problem in Dio's Late Republic but this problem would naturally disappear under an emperor where real political competition ceased to exist. Dio's institutional approach thus provides far stronger support for his argument that monarchy was inevitable and beneficial than a typical Late Republican narrative focused on Caesar and Pompey. Had the Late Republic merely been a temporary degeneration or brought down by individual people and events, as seen in the parallel sources, Augustus could still be portrayed as the destroyer of freedom, seen in for example Tacitus. The presentation of the Late Republic as the culmination of an institutionally condemned Republic thus becomes fundamental in supporting the subsequent positive portrayal of the first *princeps*, which constitutes the foundation for the following imperial period, as Dio could now present an idealised Augustus who had saved Rome from the innately impracticable Republic.

Through the above, Dio's work emerges as a highly complicated source for the Late Republic, which highlights the problematic use of him by modern historians, outlined in chapter 1.¹³ Historians should be wary of incorporating Dio's prejudices uncritically into their own works through the problematic assumption that Dio is a simple historian who can be easily used. Furthermore, Dio has often been carelessly used as a quarry for individual details but, as shown by his omission of for example the meeting at Luca or the crossing of the Rubicon, historians should be cautious in this regard and use Dio more carefully; it has long been noted that Dio occasionally makes factual mistakes and deviates from strict chronology, so modern scholars should be wary of utilising him on these areas.¹⁴ However, scholars can for example more securely use Dio concerning constitutional and institutional matters¹⁵ since these are significant for his interpretative framework wherefore Dio shows a keen interest in and knowledge of these areas. Through an appreciation of Dio's framework, the modern historian can thus more safely use Dio as a source for the Late Republic. This has been realised by for example Urso who uses Dio exactly to reconstruct constitutional and institutional developments for the Early Republic,¹⁶ but this more differentiated use of Dio has not penetrated general scholarship. I have also demonstrated

¹² *Contra* Wirth (1985) 11.

¹³ See pp. 7.

¹⁴ Lintott (1997).

¹⁵ See e.g. Hinard (2005); Lachenaud (2011) LXVIII.

¹⁶ Urso (2005); (2011).

Dio's cohesive and premeditated institutional interpretation of the fall of the Republic, centred on competition, which out of all the ancient sources, most closely parallels modern works. This suggests that modern scholars would gain from according Dio's interpretation of the Late Republic attention in its own right, a historical explanation that ought not to be rejected out of hand.

I will conclude with a few remarks on potentially fruitful future areas of scholarship against the background of my thesis. A possible area could be Dio's Republic as a whole; I suggested in chapter 1 that Dio's institutional interpretation was an overarching one, spanning the Republic but an in-depth analysis of the fragments of the Early and Mid-Republic would be a significant support for this argument.¹⁷ A connected possibility for future research is Dio's work more broadly as the field is in dire need of a comprehensive monograph to replace Millar's, which attempts to interpret and understand the *Historia Romana* as a whole against the background of newer research on Dio; my thesis and other recent works have demonstrated the premeditation of Dio's presentation of individual parts but the field would gain greatly from a monograph connecting these and creating an overarching interpretation of Dio's work.

Another important area, on which this thesis has highlighted the need for future research, is the annalistic tradition. I have shown that the definition of this tradition is essentially based only on Livy, which is of course untenable. No other extant source exhibits the same characteristics as Livy and it is therefore highly necessary to construct a broader, more inclusive definition of the annalistic method. Furthermore, a sustained and comprehensive analysis of the fragmentary historians preceding Livy could shed important light on the origins of the method seen in the latter. If no historians are found to work in the same fashion as Livy, it could of course be due to the coincidences of survival, but one would also have to acknowledge the possibility that the strict, almost mechanic version seen in Livy is his own creation. Livy would then be accorded far more ability and independent research than previously thought, and the individual ancient historians both before and after would become more autonomous and less bound by tradition, exemplified eminently by the original and premeditated institutional interpretation presented by Dio.

¹⁷ See, however, e.g. Lindholmer (forthcoming 2017) or Lange (forthcoming 2017).

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